A Shared Interest, Divergent Agendas: What Lies Ahead for the GGE on LAWS?

[Mei Ching Liu is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme (MTP) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.]

All views expressed in this post are the author’s own and do not reflect the official position of RSIS.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) will meet later this month for its final session under the current mandate to consider and formulate a set of elements of an instrument to address issues raised by LAWS. Although observers are sceptical of the GGE reaching a consensus on the set of elements, member states of the GGE may share a common interest in preventing negotiations of the set of elements from collapsing.

The GGE has been working on the set of elements since 2024. After a decade of discussion and multiple mandate renewals, the GGE still has not been able to agree on several fundamental issues. These include whether a legally binding instrument is necessary, the standard for human judgment and control over these weapons, and their definition and characterisation. The divides within the GGE mostly run between those states supporting a legally binding instrument and those opposing it.

There are now over 70 states calling for the negotiations of a legally binding instrument based on the elements currently being discussed by the GGE. While these states constitute a critical mass within the GGE, negotiations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—under whose auspices the GGE operates—are only possible if the GGE reaches consensus on the set of elements and, more importantly, if the High Contracting Parties (HCPs) to the CCW agree to start negotiations during the upcoming CCW Review Conference, scheduled from 16 to 20 November. 

While there are states opposed to a legally binding instrument, this does not mean that they will be obstructive and unyielding in the upcoming session. They may share an overlapping interest with those supporting a legally binding instrument in reaching a consensus on the set of elements, despite having different agendas.

Possible Avenues for the Regulation of LAWS

The regulation of LAWS does not necessarily need to be tied to the CCW framework. While LAWS are currently being discussed within the GGE, in the early days of the LAWS discussions, the issue was addressed under the UN Human Rights Council before being transferred to an informal meeting of experts within the CCW framework in 2014.

The regulation of LAWS could be achieved in various ways, including through the CCW framework, the UN General Assembly (UNGA), or state-led processes, mirroring past arms control and disarmament treaties. For example, the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and adopted through a state-led process known as the “Ottawa Process”—a fast-track, 14-month negotiation. Negotiations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) were held following the adoption of UNGA Resolution 71/258. Unlike the CCW which requires consensus, the Ottawa Process and the negotiations for the TPNW operated on a two-thirds majority voting rule for substantive decisions.

Initiatives to discuss the regulation of LAWS outside the CCW framework, specifically within the UNGA and through independent state-led conferences, have gained momentum since 2023. 

For example, Austria convened an international conference on autonomous weapon systems in April 2024. The UNGA has adopted three consecutive resolutions on LAWS: Resolution 78/241 in 2023, Resolution 79/62 in 2024, and Resolution 80/57 in 2025. Austria and a group of states co-sponsored these resolutions.

Most significantly regarding Resolution 78/241 in 2023, the UNGA First Committee adopted the draft resolution on LAWS (A/C.1/78/L.56) on 11 October, before the GGE’s mandate was renewed by the HCPs to the CCW in November of that year. This meant that had the HCPs to the CCW failed to reach a consensus on renewing the GGE, states would still have been able to discuss issues related to LAWS in the UNGA First Committee the following year, as the LAWS agenda was already listed in the resolution (see Resolution 78/241, operational para. 4). Resolution 79/62, adopted in 2024, subsequently mandated informal consultations on LAWS in 2025. 

All of these efforts signal that a group of states is ready to take the multilateral dialogue on the regulation of LAWS outside the CCW framework. 

However, as seen in Resolution 80/57, adopted in 2025, this group of states remains keen for the GGE to agree on the set of elements and complete its mandate (see Resolution 80/57, operational para. 3). While some observers expressed disappointment that the resolution was less ambitious, it nevertheless signals a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term regulation of LAWS. It does so by maintaining pressure on the GGE, while simultaneously signalling that alternative avenues are being pursued to advance the regulatory agenda of LAWS.

A Shared Interest but with Distinct Agendas

Within the GGE, a number of states, including Israel, Russia and the United States, remain opposed to a legally binding instrument on LAWS. While these states oppose such an instrument, they may share an interest with those supporting it in seeing the GGE reaches a consensus on the set of elements during the upcoming session. Indeed, during the GGE’s March 2026 session, Russia stated that it was prepared to show “restraint” in order for the GGE to reach consensus. 

However, the motivation behind this shared interest with pro-legally-binding-instrument states is not to facilitate negotiations for a legally binding instrument on LAWS, but rather to keep multilateral discussions on LAWS perpetually within the CCW framework, without any meaningful way forward regarding the regulation of these weapon systems. Such motivation can be explained by the potential outcomes of the GGE. 

For instance, should the GGE fail to agree on the set of elements—meaning it fails to deliver its current mandate—states supporting a legally binding instrument could view the dialogue within the GGE as deadlocked and seek alternative avenues, such as the UNGA or state-led processes, to advance the regulatory agenda. Conversely, if the GGE agrees on the set of elements, states supporting a legally binding instrument and wishing to pursue alternative avenues outside the CCW framework will have little bargaining power to persuade other states to launch discussions outside the CCW. This is because convening a multilateral dialogue outside the CCW could represent a waste of a decade of diplomatic resources within the GGE and a loss of expertise—a concern highlighted by Australia (on behalf of 21 states, including Australia itself) during the 2025 LAWS informal consultations.

Therefore, to prevent states from seeking alternative avenues to pursue a regulatory agenda for LAWS, states opposing a legally binding instrument have a shared interest in helping the GGE to reach a consensus on the set of elements. This, in turn, means that these states could agree to renew the mandate of the GGE during the upcoming CCW Review Conference, provided that such a mandate falls short of negotiating a legally binding instrument.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that a legally binding instrument is completely off the table under the CCW framework. These states could also agree to a mandate for negotiations and still block the adoption of a new protocol on LAWS under the CCW, as the CCW operates on a consensus basis. These potential trajectories mean that keeping the multilateral dialogue on LAWS within the CCW could help these states advance their own interests; for instance, to enable them to continue using autonomous weapons that might otherwise fall within a restrictive regulatory framework.

Indeed, regardless of whether the GGE reaches consensus on the set of elements, states opposing a legally binding instrument would be keen to renew the GGE’s mandate anyway. Conversely, it is those states supporting a legally binding instrument that would be reluctant to renew the mandate should the GGE fail to deliver its current mandate. In such a scenario, they would most likely seek other platforms to advance LAWS regulatory agenda. In short, both pro- and anti-legally-binding-instrument states have an overlapping interest in seeing the GGE delivers its current mandate, despite their divergent agendas.

High Stakes in the Upcoming GGE on LAWS Session

The stakes are high for both groups of states. 

Should states opposed to a legally binding instrument insist on further watering down the language of the set of elements (a point raised by the opposing camp), there is a risk that states supporting a legally binding instrument could pursue alternative avenues to launch negotiations—where the former group would be unable to veto the adoption of such an instrument. Conversely, should pro-legally-binding states be unwilling to compromise on the set of elements and seek to launch negotiations through the UNGA or state-led processes, they risk losing support from two key groups: those that support an instrument strictly under the CCW framework, and those that have not yet declared a position on the necessity of a legally binding instrument, such as middle powers active in military AI governance like France and Singapore.

All eyes will be on the upcoming GGE on LAWS session to observe whether the group is able to discern enough overlap among the various interests of its member states to agree on a set of elements at this stage of heightened geopolitical tension.