Symposium on Prosecuting Asia-Pacific Crimes: Introduction – Asia-Pacific International Crimes in Domestic Court

[Emma Palmer is an Associate Professor at Griffith Law School researching the use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes in the Asia-Pacific.

Prasadi Wijesinghe is a PhD Candidate at Griffith Business School researching intellectual property law and artificial intelligence.]

This research was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Award (project number DE250100597). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Government or Australian Research Council.

“Please let the world know that they need to arrest those people”; “All I want is justice for the killings of my mother, my sister, my brothers; I want justice for that”; “My grandfather and grandmother were shot and killed, and I miss them a lot … We want justice”

In a 2019 submission to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a Rohingya victim-survivor made the above request. This plea reflects the aspirations of countless victims of atrocity crimes who, among many priorities, seek recognition, accountability and an end to impunity. Over time, the international community has developed a range of accountability mechanisms, including the ICC, state responsibility proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and ad hoc and hybrid criminal tribunals, potentially supported by UN-led investigative mechanisms such as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). However, these mechanisms often face significant limitations, including jurisdictional constraints, political obstacles, resource challenges, and difficulties in securing cooperation from states.

In response to the limitations of international criminal law mechanisms, some actors seeking accountability for atrocity crimes have turned to domestic courts. This includes initiating proceedings in domestic jurisdictions, even far from the sites of the alleged crimes,  where neither the perpetrators nor victims were nationals of the prosecuting state at the time of the alleged crimes.  There has been, in Langer and Eason’s words, a “quiet expansion” of such universal jurisdiction practice, predominantly in Europe but also with cases in Africa and Latin America – most notably Argentina, where arrest warrants have even been issued for Myanmar leaders.

This “turn towards domestic prosecutions” is not without challenges. Regardless of the potential to address impunity (and even with the support of mechanisms like the IIMM), prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction face significant legal, practical and political barriers. These include difficulties in obtaining evidence and secure witness testimony from conflict-affected regions, questions of immunity, limited state cooperation in enforcing arrest warrants, resource constraints, and the influence of diplomatic and political considerations on prosecutorial decisions.

To date, universal jurisdiction has been applied unevenly from a geographical perspective, with most prosecuting courts based in Europe (according to the TRIAL 2025 annual review, 13 of 16 prosecuting countries were in Europe) for crimes committed outside Europe. Moreover, they have also been characterised by geographical selectivity, with universal jurisdiction prosecutions directed predominantly towards crimes committed in certain regions. For example, despite the scale and intensity of armed conflicts with associated international crimes across the Asia-Pacific region, crimes committed there have not been a major focus of universal jurisdiction, whether in European courts or within the region itself.

In some ways, the lack of domestic universal jurisdiction prosecutions within the region is unsurprising, given the lack of prioritisation of justice for atrocity crimes, limited political will to address them, and the strength of sovereignty and non-interference norms across the region.  Historically, these norms have encouraged states to avoid condemning the actions of neighbouring states, arguably especially among ASEAN states. Nevertheless, adherence to norms of non-interference should not be understood as reflecting a broader absence of engagement with accountability processes. There has been significant engagement with transitional justice and international criminal law across the Asia-Pacific, even if convictions have been rare.

There have also been recent examples of growing universal jurisdiction practice within the region, mostly concerning the alleged international crimes committed in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. These include filings with authorities in the Philippines, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and Australia – just in the past several years. However, these efforts raise important questions about whether these initiatives reflect the beginnings of a shift in universal jurisdiction practice regionally, or simply reflect barriers towards securing justice through other avenues? Are there particular challenges and opportunities involved in developing universal jurisdiction experiences within and across the Asia-Pacific region? How might collaboration and cooperation among diverse stakeholders, such as civil society organisations, victims’ groups, legal practitioners, and state authorities involved, be encouraged and supported?

To examine these questions and more, Griffith Law School and Griffith Asia Institute, in partnership with the Asia Justice Coalition and The Baltasar Garzón International Foundation (FIBGAR), convened a workshop in May 2026 to explore emerging practices in the domestic prosecutions of international crimes in the Asia-Pacific. The workshop included more than 40 civil society actors, practitioners, and scholars discussing investigations or cases involving universal or extra-territorial jurisdiction in—or concerning alleged crimes within—Eastern, South, or Southeast Asia and Oceania. The workshop took an inclusive approach, incorporating contributions addressing legal strategy, prosecutions using non-core offences, regional cases involving territorial jurisdiction, and alternative transitional justice or non-legal approaches.

The posts in this symposium from some of the attendees canvass the larger issues addressed by workshop participants: when does pursuing domestic prosecution ‘make sense?’ How can or should a forum be chosen for such prosecution? Can ‘success’ only be measured by criminal conviction, and how do universal jurisdiction filings “fit” among broader accountability or “justice” strategies? And, if the ‘future of international criminal law is domestic’, do inherent issues in both the international and domestic systems risk selective accountability?

We open with contributions that engage with the promise and possible pitfalls of any domestic turn. Antonia Mulvey highlights the significance for some victim survivors of engaging with accountability mechanisms. Still, she notes that although Argentina became the first country to issue arrest warrants against Myanmar officials for alleged international crimes against the Rohingya, the practical impact of these warrants remains limited, as their enforcement cannot be compelled. The case also illustrates challenges posed by immunity, particularly where alleged perpetrators include serving state officials or political leaders who may be protected from apprehension by domestic courts. While victim survivors have diverse priorities, she concludes that ‘the demand for legal status, repair, safety and a future is not separate from justice. It is central to it.’ Olivera Simic reflects on her understanding of the challenges of domestic national criminal practice in Europe, musing that these do not bode well for efforts in the Asia-Pacific, particularly given the regional political and legal context, and historic challenges in securing accountability for atrocities.

Yet universal jurisdiction cases do have a role to play, particularly when other avenues are restricted. Bhavani Fonseka explains in her symposium contribution on Sri Lanka that, prior to assuming office, the National People’s Power government pledged to establish an independent public prosecutor to expedite emblematic human rights cases. The establishment of such an authority has been delayed, raising concerns about whether victims will be able to obtain justice within their lifetimes, despite persistent advocacy. This situation reminds us of ‘the importance of victim centrality in the pursuit of accountability and that the long arc of justice cannot be ignored’. Azadah Raz Mohammad and Karin M Frodé observe that, in Afghanistan, following the Taliban takeover in 2021, the constitutional and judicial framework has been significantly dismantled and replaced by decrees and edicts of the Supreme Leader of the Taliban and other so-called ‘de facto authorities’. Accordingly, where domestic accountability mechanisms are unavailable, delayed or hindered by political and institutional constraints, universal jurisdiction offers a complementary pathway for accountability seekers, though it must be survivor-led.

As Phil Orchard and Mareen Brosinsky examine, one practical challenge in applying universal jurisdiction is determining how it can effectively address specific forms of criminal conduct, such as enforced disappearance and forced displacement. While attempts have been made to invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes such as deportation and forcible transfer, many such complaints remain at the preliminary stage and await formal responses from prosecutorial authorities. Nevertheless, these initiatives signal a growing effort by civil society actors in the region to mobilise domestic jurisdictions as alternative avenues for addressing deliberate displacement where traditional accountability mechanisms remain limited.  

In reality, those seeking accountability assess a range of considerations in determining which mechanisms to engage with. Chuka Arinze-Onyia and Emma Palmer note some of these factors and observe that publicity surrounding universal jurisdiction filings is often carefully adapted to the targeted domestic context, for instance by focusing on narrow legal and pragmatic arguments and emphasising religious or moral solidarity. The availability of such legal frameworks might be shaped by any future Crimes against Humanity treaty and its incorporation into domestic laws. Meanwhile, the treaty negotiations are already revealing changing regional perspectives on international criminal law. Aakash Chandran details how the years of analysis and discussions leading up to the negotiations have elucidated distinct prevention and prosecution aspects to the treaty, which Asia-Pacific states have largely supported. Kate Schuetze and Jan Wetzel demonstrate that regional perspectives on the jurisdiction provisions of the treaty have been more mixed. They argue that regional states should support preserving the present ILC proposal, requiring that states ‘shall’ establish jurisdiction where an alleged offender is present on their territory. The treaty should not offer primacy to any particular form of jurisdiction.

Ultimately, justice does matter for victim survivors, although understandings of justice vary and shift. As Chuka Arinze-Onyia notes, accounts from civil society actors demonstrate that for some, justice may involve a personal act of recognition and recovery, even retrieving a deceased family member’s belongings from the perpetrator; for others, it may mean raising public awareness and ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable, or at least ‘made uncomfortable’. Closing out the symposium in a transcribed video, Salai Za Uk Ling reminds us that ‘without local documentation networks, many atrocity crimes in Myanmar would remain legally invisible’. This work is both crucial and dangerous – requiring balancing between humanitarian and accountability needs. He describes universal jurisdiction as ‘a pathway for regional bottom-up accountability’, emphasising that justice pursued within the region shows that ‘accountability is not owned … by international institutions’. When domestic remedies and international action are lacking, accountability efforts can offer some kind of recognition of victims’ experiences, showing that these have not been forgotten. ‘Universal jurisdiction reminds us that accountability does not always have to wait for perfect political conditions.’ But it does rely on grassroots legal documentation. ‘Because every journey toward justice begins with someone deciding that the truth must survive.’

The contributions to this symposium reveal some of the complex considerations surrounding the practice of universal jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific. Ironically, it may be that the same considerations that have rendered this practice relatively rare compared to some other regions, are the same factors driving the growing number of regional filings. That is, regional accountability has been challenged by social, political, and legal factors, including intractable conflicts, strong norms of non-interference, and a lack of accountability in territorial forums – all alongside the limited opportunities for justice outside the region. In that context, Asia-Pacific civil society and legal actors are collaborating with transnational actors and finding that universal jurisdiction filings can open up debates, secure meetings, and gain media attention, despite the challenges. In the words of one participant:

“the point is to ensure that the public becomes aware of what has happened – and to make the powers uncomfortable.”

In these ways, universal jurisdiction efforts contest any status quo of impunity. They bring together diverse actors and reopen the possibility of other futures where accountability and closer regional action are possible. This may be less about a turn toward the “domestic”, and more about using every tool to ensure perpetrators of mass violence are never comfortable, and that victim survivors’ truths survive and are heard.

Accordingly, exploring universal jurisdiction practice involves not just assessing its potential as an accountability mechanism, but also identifying the practical, legal and political dynamics that shape its effectiveness for diverse, survivor-led purposes. Understanding the opportunities and challenges could help accountability actors to strengthen cooperation among states, legal actors, and civil society organisations (eg via PacificJust), and design approaches that maximise the prospects of successful prosecutions while remaining attentive to the limitations of domestic justice systems – and the aims underlying these cases. Such approaches will be directed by victim survivors and organisations, documenting crimes and promoting their own understandings of justice.