Violence Against Palestinian Children in the Gaza Strip as Indirect Evidence of Israel’s Genocidal Intent

[Emanuele Cimiotta is a Full Professor of International Law at the University of Perugia]

Establishing a state’s genocidal intent is a hard task. Yet intent constitutes one of the building blocks of genocide: the so-called dolus specialis, whose presence is essential for a state to be held responsible. To this end, the violence that Israel has been perpetrating against Palestinian children in the Gaza Strip since October 8, 2023, is of particular significance, given its precision, selectivity, and extent. Since the beginning of the Israeli offensive, over 20,000 children have lost their lives in the bombings, while tens of thousands have been seriously injured, displaced, maimed, or malnourished as a direct result of the siege imposed on Gaza.

Given the non-involvement of Palestinian kids in Hamas’s military cause, whose neutralization is the Israeli declared goal, the violence against them might contribute to demonstrating Israel’s genocidal intent, even in the South Africa v. Israel case pending before the ICJ.

Special Intent as Distinctive Element of Genocide: A Complex and Infrequent Finding

As widely known, pursuant to Article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention and the corresponding customary rule, the key element of genocide is the intent of the wrongdoer, in undertaking one of the five prohibited conducts, to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such. It is the special intent, which subordinates the commission of the wrongdoing to the pursuit of a specific goal (the elimination of a human group), whose attainment, however, is not necessary for the wrongful act to be consummated.

This is what distinguishes genocide from other international crimes, also likely committed in the Gaza Strip—particularly war crimes (murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, starvation) and crimes against humanity (extermination, persecution, torture, deportation)—making it the most heinous international crime, as it threatens the survival of entire human groups.

As international tribunals noted, the special intent prerequisite makes ascertaining the commission of genocide extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is evidently more so where the genocidal intent of a collective entity, like a state, is at hand. Such an assessment requires determining a particular mental state, which normally implies an official or explicit statement (direct evidence). Understandably, this is a very unlikely scenario. Not uncoincidentally, in the two proceedings decided so far on the merits under the Convention—Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia v. Serbia—the ICJ could establish the special intent only in a single circumstance: a specific event (the massacre of Srebrenica), starting from a specific day (July 13, 1995). It was unable to do so with respect to conducts perpetrated in other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, although they objectively amounted to the actus reus of genocide.

Indirect Evidence of Special Intent and Distinction between Military Objective and Genocidal Intent

The difficulties in proving the genocidal intent through direct evidence prompted international tribunals to develop certain presumptions of fact: circumstantial evidence arising from the general context in which the unlawful conduct takes place (indirect evidence). Particularly, for the purposes of establishing state responsibility, the genocidal context consists of an:

“overall plan to commit genocide, indicated by the pattern of genocidal or potentially genocidal acts committed throughout the territory, against persons identified everywhere and in each case on the basis of their membership in a specified group.”.

ICJ, 2007

It is precisely as indirect evidence of the Israeli overall plan to destroy the Palestinians that the violence against minors in Gaza appears to be relevant. This is what the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territories spelled out in its latest reports, published in September 2025 and June 2026.

Nonetheless, the standard of proof for determining the genocidal intent based on an “overall plan” is extremely high. Intent must be the “only” conclusion that can reasonably be drawn from the acts in question.

In wartime, a major obstacle stands in the way of such an appraisal. As the ultimate goal of each belligerent is to defeat the enemy, it is quite complex to determine whether civilian casualties are the result of an unlawful genocidal intent or of the legitimate aspiration to win the war. While it is certainly true that genocide can occur during a conflict (Article 1 of the Convention and international case-law), it is also true that the belligerent purpose should not be confused with the aim to destroy a group as such. These two circumstances must be demonstrated separately. Consequently, genocide cannot be conceived as a tool to achieve a broader military objective (the destruction of Palestinians as a means of annihilating Hamas), accepting the risk that, to neutralize the enemy (Hamas), a national group (the Palestinian population) might be destroyed in whole or in part.

In the only event that the ICJ has qualified as genocide to date —the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995—the Court felt it necessary to assess the military goal pursued by the Bosnian Serb forces. Accordingly, it excluded the genocidal intent until a certain day—July 13, 1995—when the Bosnian Serbs, in approaching the Bosnian enclave, changed their plan. While their initial objective was to turn it into an urban area—which, in the ICJ’s view, showed no genocidal intent—the lack of resistance from the UN peacekeepers prompted them to reconsider their strategy and seek seizure of the area. The ensuing operation led to the extermination of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and the deportation of 25,000 elderly people, women, and children. The only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the combination of these actions was the intention of the Bosnian Serbs to eliminate the Bosniak community of Srebrenica as a substantial part of the larger group of Bosnian Muslims living in Bosnia.

Conversely, the military objective of the Serbian leadership and the Bosnian Serbs in other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the creation of a greater Serbian state: this would not necessarily have resulted in the elimination of the Bosnian Muslims residing there, but their expulsion. Likewise, during the parallel conflict in Croatia the military purpose of the Serbian leadership and the Serbo-Croatian forces was ethnic cleansing, with the ultimate aim of creating an ethnically homogeneous Serbian state, which reflected no genocidal intent.

Lastly, Israel’s stated military goal of its intervention in Gaza has always been defending the state and its citizens, neutralizing Hamas, and securing the release of the hostages. According to the Israeli highest authorities, this did not mean eliminating the Palestinian people in the Strip, as they were asked to abandon the areas of active combat and all necessary measures to minimize civilian casualties were duly taken.

Yet, the brutality to which Palestinian children were subjected contribute to demonstrating that, parallel to the conflict, Israel has perpetrated acts of genocide.

Violence Against Palestinian Children as Indirect Evidence of Israel’s Genocidal Intent

Indeed, it cannot reasonably be excluded that—along with the displacement of almost all the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, the military siege, the blockade of basic services, the indiscriminate bombardments, the entrapment of Palestinians in the area, the destruction of most public and private buildings, the abnormal number of victims and wounded: all of these acts consisting in killings, serious bodily or mental harm, and subjecting the population to conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction—the very grave violence against children reflected Israel’s intention to destroy the Gazawi as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, due to its modalities, duration, scale, and nature.

This is what the International Commission of Inquiry held in its two latest reports.

First of all, according to the Commission, from October 2023 to October 2025 the Israeli forces and authorities have killed 20,179 and injured 44,143 children, representing 30% and 26% of the total deaths and wounded. Many of them were shot while being within safe areas or following evacuation routes from active combat zones. Some kids suffered gunshot wounds to the head or abdomen and were hit by snipers or drones. Others were shot while waving white flags. Many were hit while being alone or accompanied by unarmed adults. In these circumstances, they could not have posed any threat to the Israeli security forces, nor could their elimination have had any impact on the defense of Israel, the neutralization of Hamas, or the release of the hostages. The modalities of the attacks show that the Israeli military deliberately targeted Palestinian children with the intention of killing them as members of the Palestinian group in Gaza.

Furthermore, the Commission found that the Israeli forces have inflicted severe, irreversible bodily harm on Palestinian children, creating a generation of orphaned, unaccompanied, and permanently disabled minors. Tens of thousands have sustained injuries from bombings, collapsing buildings, lack of medical care, and denial of access to adequate food and water, causing polytrauma, amputations, and long-lasting disabilities requiring multiple surgeries. Malnutrition and diseases have further weakened their bodies and immune systems.

Additionally, in December 2023, the Israeli forces dropped a large-caliber bomb on the Al-Basma clinic, the main in vitro fertilization facility in the Strip, causing the explosion of five liquid nitrogen tanks and the destruction of the reproductive material contained therein. This was an act intended to prevent births within the group and reflects the Israel’s intent to preclude the survival of the Palestinians. The targeted facility was separated from the surrounding buildings (which were spared), was visible at distance as a healthcare facility, and there was no evidence that Hamas was using it. Consequently, it could not have constituted a legitimate military objective. The fact that Al-Basma was a fertility clinic could not have been unknown to Israel.

Moreover, Israel’s blockade of humanitarian assistance, in violation of the interim measures that the ICJ has ordered over time, has severely affected the younger kids, who have been deprived of essentials for life, like milk, food, drinking water, clothing, medicines, and safe shelter. This has led to malnutrition, hunger, and severe physical and mental illness, with long-term effects, especially on their cognitive abilities and life prospects.

Finally, the collapse of two-thirds of the medical infrastructures, including those providing basic reproductive and sexual health services to women—such as gynecological and pediatric services—has caused the deliberate subjection of Palestinians to living conditions calculated to bring about their destruction and the prevention of births within the group, drastically dropping their reproductive potential, reducing the birth rate, and increasing the level of infant mortality and congenital disability.

Altogether, what precedes cannot but reflect an “overall plan” aimed at undermining the biological continuity and future existence of the Palestinian populace, not only by eliminating today’s children but also by compromising their ability to procreate. Targeting children means targeting next generations as well as the group’s ability to proliferate, with long-lasting and severe consequences for its very survival.

Ultimately, “the only reasonable inference” that can be drawn is that the Israeli authorities¾in conducting their offensive in the Gaza Strip, destroying the healthcare and reproductive system, attacking so many children so precisely, extensively, and selectively¾were not motivated by the need to protect Israel’s security, defeat Hamas, or free the Israeli hostages, but by the desire to bring about the disappearance of the Palestinian group as such.

By Way of Conclusion

Certainly it is still unknown what the ICJ will decide in the South Africa v. Israel case, which is far from being settled on the merits. Nonetheless one thing is clear. In keeping with its case-law on the evidentiary standards for establishing genocidal intent¾from which it has no reason to depart¾the Court will be inevitably led to consider the brutality inflicted on Palestinian children.

This is not only because of the decisions taken in that regard by other UN bodies, including the International Commission of Inquiry, that the Court has proved willing to utilize in determining the grounds for indicating provisional measures. It also because, in assessing the plausibility of the Palestinians right not to be subjected to acts of genocide, the Court itself has already pointed to the horrors suffered by children in Gaza.

Consequently, it cannot be ruled out that all the above could prompt the ICJ to hold Israel responsible for acts of genocide, at least within a limited timeframe: during the total siege imposed from March 2 to May 18, 2025, despite warnings, including the flagrant disregard of the ICJ’s binding orders. As the Court already noted in its advisory opinion of October 22, 2025, in that period the ongoing humanitarian disaster resulted in widespread famine, epidemics, and unprecedented suffering for most of the Palestinian population, including children unfortunately.