ASEAN’s Expanding Role in Space Diplomacy: A Humble Call for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space

[Yvette Foo (LLM, LLB) is a Research Associate with the ASEAN Law & Policy team at the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore]

Once dominated by Western powers, outer space and related space industries have benefitted from its democratisation with China’s successful space rise, and emergent economic leaders in related industries like India, Japan, and Australia. Amid this diversification, Southeast Asia (SEA), though not yet a leading region in space activities, shows promising engagement and growing interest. The majority of ASEAN member states (AMS) already use space technologies for telecommunications, satellite navigation, surveillance for weather, fisheries, and even disaster management. Some are building satellites of their own. As equatorial states, there are inherent geographical advantages for ASEAN to consider becoming potential space launch sites: an incredible lucrative market. The anticipated ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Space Cooperation to be issued next month at the 48th ASEAN Summit also signals space’s importance to the region.

Nevertheless, as the region becomes more invested in this new sector, space-related risks and dangers must be considered. ‘Astropolitics’ and resurgence of a space ‘arms race’ threaten ASEAN’s foothold—and any future role it may play—in this unique industry. This post argues that ASEAN must maintain its voice in ongoing debates on the peaceful use of outer space through the United Nations (UN) and other regional groupings. As Southeast Asia formalises its space capabilities, ASEAN can contribute to normative conversations on outer space through existing multilateral frameworks at its disposal and engaging in strategic dialogue with major spacefaring powers.

What Does Outer Space Law Say on Peace and Demilitarisation?

Existing international space treaties provide important foundation on this topic but are not conclusive. The prevailing 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) states that parties must not place any nuclear weapons/weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and ensure that the moon and other celestial bodies are used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Article IV). The 1979 Moon Agreement restates these principles under Articles 2 and 3. Soft law principles also push for states to explore and use space peacefully and in accordance with international law—specifically, the UN Charter (see here, and here).

The problem is not the lack of law per se, but in the interpretation of these treaties in modern times. Questions pertaining to the applicability of the treaties to conventional weapons, cyberwarfare conducted through space, and dual use technologies present sore points as space technologies and markets ‘take off’. Exacerbating this imprecision is the fact that space is treated as a special arena where the application of international humanitarian law principles is, while possible, done with some artificiality and abstraction.

A new Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects was proposed at the UN to recodify the OST’s overarching principles to control the development and deployment of armaments in space. Unfortunately, the treaty’s unclear language, and opposition from many member states, means ratification within the near future remains unlikely.

ASEAN’s Position on Peaceful Use of Outer Space: A United Stance?

The majority of AMS (except Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Timor-Leste) have ratified the OST, and therefore agree to conduct space activities peacefully. Arguably however, a unified ASEAN position manifests through the grouping’s many statements to the UN: reaffirming the importance of peaceful exploration, preventing an arms race, and outer space weaponisation in 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. Despite controversies behind a new space demilitarisation treaty, ASEAN continues to support the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space, indicating that the region remains ambitiously committed to this important goal (see ASEAN’s three statements made to each substantive session of the OEWG: first, second, third).

Six out of eleven AMS are members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the leading UN body discussing ‘international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space’. Thailand is the Chairmanship of COPUOUS’ Scientific and Technical Subcommittee for 2026.

All AMS maintain an interest in space as a global commons, to which equal access is their inalienable right. Preserving a peaceful environment in space must continue to be a paramount concern for ASEAN, regardless of its members’ differing capacity or engagement in space industries. In fact, one of the strategic measures under the ASEAN 2045 Vision calls for ASEAN member states to maintain a coordinated position on:

“emerging issues involving international peace and security, such as outer space and autonomous weapons systems”

(ASEAN Political-Security Community Strategic Plan – Strategic Goal A.5.8)

ASEAN’s Sub-Committee on Space Technology and Applications (SCOSA) could help in this regard. As the coordinating body for regional space activities. SCOSA studies and promote space projects for the region, facilitates space collaboration between AMS, and also leads capacity building and technical expertise sharing (through e.g. the ASEAN Research and Training Centre for Space Technology and Application). In this way, SCOSA acts as a ‘first-gate’ check for regional space research and education, which in turn informs AMS norms on space engagements.

What Role for ASEAN?

Without firm traction through hard law, space law development likely depends on diplomacy and soft law. Other than continuing to speak as a united front at UN bodies or COPUOS on the importance of peace in peace and its demilitarisation, ASEAN could gently assert its views on more powerful spacefaring nations in other multilateral groupings to generate norm diffusion: a key factor underpinning ASEAN centrality. This is where ASEAN’s broader diplomatic identity becomes relevant. The region has long relied on multilateralism, non-alignment, and patient institution-building to manage power asymmetries. Space demilitarisation is just another field to explore.

In terms of convening power, a vital forum is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): ASEAN’s vehicle for deeper cooperative security in political-security relations with 16 countries. The 2020-2025 ARF Ha Noi Plan of Action II includes the “exchange of views on space security, in particular the prevention of an arms race in outer space” as an area of cooperation (Section 1.4.11), which should continue to be a priority in next upcoming Plan of Action. In addition, the ARF has held workshops on space security in the past, welcoming up to 20+ member states including the major space powers, the US and China. As the last workshop was in 2015; it may be high time that the ARF convenes once more to discuss space security matters. A related forum would be the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus which should include space demilitarisation as part of its agenda (for more detailed discussions, see here and here). Through these long-established platforms, ASEAN has ‘normalised’ security-focused dialogue between a diverse set of states, which could facilitate conversations on the peaceful use and exploration of outer space.

In terms of diplomacy, AMS have joined strategic space alliances, chief of them being US-led Artemis programme and PRC-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO). Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines are parties to the Artemis Accords while Thailand and Indonesia (ratification in progress) are parties to APSCO. The point here is that ASEAN has an opportunity to restate its unambiguous position that outer space should remain weapons-free and peaceful through both networks in order to balance major power rivalries, ideally without being swept away by external influence.

ASEAN is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), a Japan-led initiative connecting national space agencies, international organisations, private companies, and universities to promote and expand peaceful space activities, and discuss international cooperation in space. The APRSAF’s work is split into several working groups, one of which concerns space policy and law, seeking to enhance members’ space policy capacities through mutual learning from open call presentations. Within this framework, ASEAN (or more likely, AMS space agencies) could propose discussions for the benefit of the Asia Pacific region.

As ASEAN becomes increasingly involved in the space industry, its incentive to ensure they operate within a safe and stable environment increases. The bloc can no longer remain a passive ‘recipient’ of space law, policy, and geopolitics—it can and should contribute creatively in ongoing dialogues to safeguard regional interests. In doing so, ASEAN would play a formative role in shaping emerging space law and governance to ensure that the peaceful use of space remains entrenched.