The Roger Lumbala Trial – Analysis of a Landmark Universal Jurisdiction Case

[Daniele Perissi is Head of the Democratic Republic of Congo Program at TRIAL International, and holds an LLM in international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Morgane Greco is a Legal Advisor for the Democratic Republic of the Congo Program at the TRIAL International, and holds an LLM in international human rights law and international criminal justice.

Julie Baleynaud is a Legal Advisor for the Democratic Republic of the Congo Program at the TRIAL International, and holds an LLM in public international and human rights law.]

On 15 December 2025, the Paris Cour d’assises convicted Roger Lumbala Tshitenga – former Congolese minister and armed group leader – to 30 years’ imprisonment for complicity in crimes against humanity committed during the Second Congo War (1998–2003). This historic decision constitutes the first conviction for atrocities committed during this conflict by a national court, whether in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or abroad. 

More than two decades after the crimes, the trial represents a rare instance of accountability for mass atrocities and a landmark application of universal jurisdiction by French courts. In this case, universal jurisdiction provided the only viable avenue for justice for crimes committed during this conflict, filling a critical accountability gap and enabling victims to be heard, as atrocities from earlier conflicts have remained beyond the reach of domestic courts despite progress in prosecuting more recent crimes. 

After briefly reviewing the background and significance of the trial, this article examines the decision from three perspectives: how the Court navigated procedural complexity in a universal jurisdiction trial, how it interpreted crimes against humanity under the applicable legal framework, and how it established individual criminal responsibility at the highest levels of authority.

Background and Significance of the Trial 

Roger Lumbala was the leader of the Congolese Rally for National Democracy (RCD-N), an armed group active in eastern DRC between 2000 and 2003. He later served as Minister of Foreign Trade and as a Member of Parliament. 

The charges against him concerned a 2002 military campaign known as “Erasing the Board,” aimed at seizing territory from a rival armed group. The campaign was marked by systematic attacks on civilians, widespread destruction of villages, pillage of property, forced labour, and sexual violence, particularly targeting Nande and Bambuti communities. Thousands suffered grave abuses, though the exact death toll remains unknown.

Prosecuting crimes committed two decades earlier, thousands of kilometres from the court, posed a formidable challenge. Investigators were unable to conduct field investigations in the DRC because of security constraints and the absence of judicial cooperation. Against this backdrop, the prosecution relied on an exceptionally diverse evidentiary record to establish both the factual basis of the crimes and Lumbala’s individual responsibility. A substantial body of contemporaneous documentation and open-source evidence including reports from NGOs, United Nations missions, and the ICC was collected, along with press coverage and official RCD-N records; documentation that corroborated first-hand accounts of survivors and insider witnesses. This multi-source approach allowed the Court to reconstruct events with precision and to establish patterns of organised violence.

The trial particularly highlighted the pivotal role of survivors in such proceedings. Over 23 hearing days, 26 survivors of the RCD-N’s atrocities testified as civil parties. Overcoming the enduring effects of decades of impunity, insecurity in their communities, and the burden of week-long travel from remote and conflict-affected areas of the DRC, they delivered detailed and consistent testimony, providing the Court with essential evidence to establish individual criminal responsibility. 

The trial was closely followed in the DRC not only because of its historic significance, but also due to its political sensitivity. During the proceedings, Lumbala called upon high-profile figures, including current Vice Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Bemba, to testify in his defence. Multiple witnesses referred to Bemba as a key ally of Lumbala’s group during the period of the crimes, highlighting the deep entanglement between armed actors and state authority. 

Overcoming Obstruction by the Defendant 

From the very first day of the hearings, Roger Lumbala openly challenged the proceedings, objecting to the Court’s jurisdiction. By the end of the opening day, he made the deliberate decision to cease appearing and expressly instructed his lawyers to withdraw. In response, the Court appointed counsel to safeguard the right to a defence; however, the lawyer ultimately did not intervene, following Lumbala’s explicit refusal to be represented. 

The non-appearance of both the accused and defence counsel placed the Court at the outer limits of fair trial guarantees enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and required heightened judicial vigilance.

According to the European Court on Human Rights’ case law, where an accused, duly informed of the proceedings and their consequences, clearly, unequivocally, and repeatedly waives the right to be present and to be represented, the Convention does not preclude the continuation of the trial. The Court has developed the standard of the “knowing and intelligent waiver” which requires any waiver to be voluntary, clear, based on an informed choice, established in an unequivocal manner, attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with the importance of the waived right and not counter to any important public interest. 

In the Lumbala proceedings, the conditions identified above were cumulatively met. The accused was fully informed of the charges, the hearing schedule and the consequences of his absence; he had the opportunity to discuss these matters with his lawyers and he was notified daily through summaries of the court hearings. His refusal to appear and to be represented was explicit, unequivocal, repeatedly confirmed, and formally recorded in written minutes each day. He retained the option of returning to the courtroom at any time. 

In addition, the President of the Court systematically read out Lumbala’s statements made during the judicial investigation and invited witnesses and civil parties to respond to them. This approach enriched the debate by ensuring that the substance of the defence arguments remained part of the proceedings, thereby maintaining a degree of dialectical balance notwithstanding the accused’s absence.

Legal Innovation: Pillage as a Crime Against Humanity

Under international criminal law, pillage is traditionally only recognised as a war crime, not as a crime against humanity. However, in the Lumbala case, no war crimes charges were legally available, as the facts occurred in 2002–2003 and the French legislation allowing for the prosecution of war crimes could not be applied retroactively. 

Yet, massive theft and pillage lay at the heart of the violence suffered by civilians during the operation “Erasing the Board.” Survivors consistently described systematic, organised, and devastating spoliation. These acts were planned, authorised, and methodical, forming the backbone of a true war economy.

For the victims, this was not a secondary harm. The pillage annihilated livelihoods, plunged entire families into extreme poverty, and created lasting insecurity in an already violent context. The legal challenge was therefore whether such acts, despite targeting property, could rise to the level of crimes against humanity.

Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute – reflected in the version of Article 212-1 of the French Criminal Code applicable at the time – defines “other inhumane acts” as acts intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health. 

Although crimes against humanity have traditionally been understood as crimes committed against persons rather than property, the civil parties, supported by the prosecution, argued that international jurisprudence does not exclude serious attacks on property from this category, provided that the suffering inflicted reaches a sufficient level of gravity.

The ICC has acknowledged that the destruction or loss of property may amount to an inhumane act if it causes “serious injury to mental health.” The ICTY similarly emphasised that gravity must be assessed in light of all the factual circumstances, including the victim’s vulnerability and the cumulative effects of the conduct.

In addition, recent Congolese jurisprudence had already paved the way: in cases such as Mirenzo and Kokodikoko, military courts in South Kivu qualified systematic pillage and destruction of property as “other inhumane acts,” emphasising their devastating psychological, social, and economic consequences. 

In the Lumbala case, the Court explicitly held that the scale, organisation, and cumulative effects of the pillage met the threshold of gravity required for “other inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity. It emphasised that victims were stripped not only of valuables but also of goods essential to survival, leaving already vulnerable civilians in a state of near-total destitution in a conflict zone.

The judgment underlined the acute moral suffering caused by losing the fruit of a lifetime’s labour, the destruction of future prospects, and the cascading effects on education, health, and family life. 

The judgment thus reframed pillage not merely as an economic offence but as a mechanism of social destruction. In contexts of mass violence, economic devastation can serve as a weapon aimed at dismantling a community’s capacity to survive and rebuild. By centring the human impact of systematic spoliation, the Court adopted a more faithful reading of both the law and the lived experience of victims, setting a precedent that will significantly strengthen the legal toolbox available for future prosecutions. 

Sexual Violence as Torture and Enslavement

Sexual violence in conflict contexts is often hidden and under-reported. Survivors face stigma, marginalisation, and a profound lack of trust in institutions that have historically failed to protect them. These barriers are particularly acute in the DRC, where conflict-related sexual violence has been systematically used as a weapon of war.

At the time of the facts, French law did not expressly enumerate rape or sexual violence as distinct crimes against humanity. Such acts could be prosecuted only if they fell within existing categories, notably torture, enslavement, or other inhumane acts. As a result, sexual violence was not initially reflected in the charges.

It was only through the sustained engagement of civil party NGOs maintaining close ties with affected communities, and through the determination of the victims and survivors themselves, that sexual violence was brought to the forefront of the proceedings. 

Despite the passage of twenty years and entrenched impunity in the DRC, more than 10 women came forward to testify regarding rapes and other sexual abuse before the Court. Their testimonies compelled the judicial authorities to confront crimes that had remained silenced for years. 

The evidentiary strength of their accounts was decisive. Their testimony, corroborated by expert reports, medical and psychological assessments, contemporaneous documentation, and cross-confirmation by other victims and witnesses, enabled the Court to characterise rape as a form of torture against 15 victims, and sexual slavery as a form of enslavement against 2 victims.

The Court’s legal reasoning is particularly compelling. It emphasised the extreme physical and psychological suffering inflicted through gang rapes committed in conditions of humiliation, terror, and domination, often in public and in the presence of family members. It explicitly recognised rape as a weapon of war, deliberately deployed to subjugate civilians, destroy social bonds, and terrorise communities. Sexual slavery was established through evidence of capture, prolonged detention, repeated sexual abuse, deprivation of autonomy, and the constant threat of violence, satisfying the constitutive elements of enslavement under international criminal law.

Crucially, the Court underscored that these crimes could only be judicially established because victims chose to speak. Their testimony was treated as a central evidentiary pillar, assessed within a rigorous framework of corroboration and contextual analysis.

The judgment demonstrates that even in the absence of explicit statutory provisions, courts can effectively prosecute conflict-related sexual violence by adopting survivor-centred approaches and interpreting international criminal law in line with the realities of armed conflict. 

Leadership Responsibility Through Complicity

Establishing Lumbala’s criminal responsibility posed a further challenge for the Court, as he was not a direct perpetrator but a senior political and military leader. At the time of the crimes, French law did not criminalise the doctrine of command responsibility. This legal gap posed a major obstacle to holding leaders such as Lumbala accountable, requiring the Court to construct a robust case of complicity based on authority, knowledge, and facilitation, rather than on formal command responsibility.

Roger Lumbala claimed to be a mere political administrator without authority over the armed forces. The Court rejected this narrative. Based on extensive testimonial, documentary, and contextual evidence, it found that he was the founder, leader, and de facto chief of the RCD-N, exercising direct and effective authority over territory, taxation, governance, and military operations. Lumbala was central to the planning, organisation, and perpetuation of the criminal system that enabled mass atrocities to occur.

The court established three key elements to assess complicity:

Authority – Lumbala exercised effective authority over troops operating in territories under his control, including those formally belonging to allied forces. He was publicly presented as president and commander, appeared in military uniform accompanied by armed men, and was recognised by combatants, civilians, the United Nations, and international observers as a warlord. The Court further emphasised that political authority constitutes the highest level of command. Decisions to deploy troops, define strategic objectives, and tolerate certain methods of warfare emanate from political leadership, even when operational execution is delegated. 

Knowledge – Given the scale, repetition, and publicity of the crimes, the Court found it implausible that Lumbala was unaware of the atrocities. His centralised governance system, intelligence network, public apologies and repeated field reports to various media outlets evidenced actual knowledge. 

Contribution and Modes of Complicity – Applying Article 121-7 of the French Criminal Code, the Court found Lumbala guilty of complicity by aiding and abetting the commission of the crimes in three different ways. First, the Court held that Lumbala designed the RCD-N’s military offensive in a way that structurally authorised or encouraged the commission of crimes, notably through the absence of wages and logistical support to his troops which led to systematic pillage and forced labour. Second, the Court found that Lumbala provided material assistance: he financed the military campaign by creating and enforcing a system of heavy taxation on economic activities – particularly on natural resources – and sometimes provided direct material support through the supply and delivery of ammunition. Finally, through public statements, administrative decrees, and political legitimisation, he endorsed the use of violence against civilians, normalised terror, and protected perpetrators from accountability. 

The Court stressed that each of these acts – though indirect – played an instrumental role in enabling subordinates to commit atrocities. It considered that structuring and maintaining a system in which crimes were foreseeable and instrumental to political or military objectives was sufficient to establish criminal complicity. 

This reasoning aligns with international jurisprudence on indirect responsibility. Adopting a functional approach to complicity, the Court focused on authority, knowledge, and concrete facilitation. The judgment therefore provides a compelling model for prosecuting senior leaders who hide behind administrative roles or fragmented command structures. It demonstrates that accountability can be established through evidence of structural involvement and the orchestration of criminal systems, even when command responsibility is unavailable under applicable law.

Conclusion

The Lumbala judgment constitutes a significant development in universal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Applying domestic law as it stood at the time of the facts, the Paris court navigated strict legality constraints to address mass atrocities long beyond the reach of domestic justice in the DRC. Through careful management of procedural safeguards, a contextual interpretation of crimes against humanity grounded in the realities of mass violence and a functional theory of leadership complicity, the Court demonstrated that accountability for historic crimes remains legally attainable. Anchored in victims’ lived realities, the decision demonstrates how domestic courts can strengthen the progressive development of international criminal law while making clear that senior political and military leaders cannot evade responsibility by remaining removed from the physical commission of crimes.