Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon: A Tripartite Conflict?

[Hussein Badreddine is a Ph.D. Candidate in Public International Law at the University of New South Wales, Canberra]

Since October 8, 2023, Hezbollah and Israel have been engaging in a low-level armed conflict. This conflict has however been intensifying, and further talks about an imminent ground invasion of Lebanon by Israel are on the rise. A previous conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 had been identified as an International Armed Conflict (IAC) by the UN Commission of enquiry on Lebanon (para. 12). The purpose of this article is to identify whether the current armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is an IAC or a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). To reach a conclusion, this article will first explore the 2006 UN Commission’s view which considered that the armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel at that time amounted to an International Armed Conflict (IAC); and second, this article will examine whether the conditions laid down by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic case regarding the classification of an IAC are met.

The 2006 UN Commission’s report considered that the war between Israel and Hezbollah, which occurred from July 12 to August 14, 2006, qualifies as an IAC (para. 12). The UN Commission’s argument was threefold: first, Hezbollah is a legally recognised political party, with duly elected representatives in the parliament, and is part of the government (para. 56); second, Hezbollah’s behaviour in south Lebanon suggests an inferred link between the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah over the years as a resistance movement against Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory. The government policy statement at the time regarded the ‘Lebanese resistance’ as a true and natural expression of the right of the Lebanese people in defending its territory and dignity by confronting the Israeli threat and aggression (para. 57); and third, the State of Lebanon was subject to direct hostilities including a maritime blockade, attacking civilian population and civilian objects, as well as public infrastructure, utilities, and other economic assets (para. 58). This argument, although rightly described the situation, fails to pass the legal test for the characterization of the conflict. The commission’s argument focused on the links between Hezbollah and the Lebanese State on one hand, implying an element of ‘belonging’; and on the other hand, highlighted hostilities against Lebanese civilians and public infrastructure. As discussed below, similar events should simultaneously trigger both, a NIAC, and an IAC. 

The ICTY in the Tadic case established the legal test for classifying whether a conflict is international or not. In this case, the ICTY had to determine whether an armed group ‘belonged’ to a party to the conflict (para. 92). That is, whether the Bosnian-Serb armed group – which Tadic was a member of – belonged to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. If the answer is yes, the conflict would be international. To meet the ‘belonging’ requirement, the ICTY provided the ‘overall control’ test (para. 120). In its judgement, the ICTY considered there should be on one hand, a relationship of dependence and allegiance between the armed group and the State; and on the other, an overall control exercised by that State (para. 94). To exercise an overall control, the ICTY ruled that a State must go beyond equipping and financing the group, to coordinating and helping in the general planning of its military activity (para. 131). An overall control however does not go as far as issuing specific orders by the State or directing operations (para. 137). 

Indeed, as outlined in the UN commission’s report, Hezbollah forms an essential part of Lebanese society, and acts as a political party, represented in both parliament and the cabinet. Being an integral part of the Lebanese political establishment, a link between Hezbollah and the State is, at best, typical. Suggesting links between Hezbollah and the State of Lebanon does not infer ‘belonging’, that is, a relationship of dependence and overall control. Hezbollah is an armed group whose funding, training, and military activities are completely independent of the Lebanese State. In fact, during the 2006 war, in a letter addressed to the UN, the Lebanese government stated that it was not aware of the events on the border (see UN Doc A/60/938–S/2006/518 at 142). During the current conflict (2023 – 2024), Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati, in an interview with Al Jadeed TV, explicitly asserted the State’s inability rather than its unwillingness to stop the conflict (minute 2.48), and that the decision to go to war with Israel on 8 October 2023 was not the State’s decision (minute 0.50). Furthermore, as a matter of comparison, one would refer to the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq (PMF) and the National Defence Forces (NDF) in Syria. The PMF were integrated into the Iraqi State as an auxiliary to the armed forces, and their members secured salaries and benefits from the State. In addition to that, the Iraqi State provided them with weapons, ammunitions, logistical support, and even salaries to martyrs’ families. Similarly, the NDF were recruited and utilised as an auxiliary security force by the Syrian government. While applying the above-mentioned facts to the Tadic test, one can clearly conclude that Hezbollah, as an armed group, does not belong to the Lebanese State. Hezbollah is not an auxiliary to the Lebanese army, and the State does not provide Hezbollah with weapons, ammunitions, salaries, and logistical support. Furthermore, the Lebanese State does not supervise nor help in planning Hezbollah’s military activities. As a result, the current conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, for International Humanitarian Law purposes, is a NIAC. 

However, in determining whether there was a parallel IAC with the Lebanese State, one would have to look at whether there was recourse to armed forces by one State against another, regardless of the reasons or intensity of confrontations (para. 218). Reports on the 2006 conflict suggested that Israeli actions in Lebanon demonstrated a policy of collective punishment against the Lebanese government and the civilian population (see Amnesty International [p. 4], UN Commission’s report [para. 25], and Human Rights Watch report). It is hence beyond doubt that Israeli operations in 2006 went beyond targeting Hezbollah fighters and military bases. Lebanese officials at the time rightly considered that Lebanon was a victim which suffered devastating effects; and, in the words of the Lebanese minister of justice, ‘un agressé peut être une partie d’un conflit’ (para. 59). Indeed, the inability of one of the parties to engage in military operations should not negate the existence of an armed conflict. In 2006, Israel targeted State and civil infrastructure, the civilian population, and implemented a maritime blockade. All of these would point to the existence of an IAC between Israel and Lebanon. In conclusion, the 2006 war exhibited two parallel armed conflicts, an IAC between Israel and Lebanon, and a NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah. 

Similarly, one can make an argument for the existence of an IAC and a NIAC in the current conflict. Indeed, a NIAC exists between Israel and Hezbollah. The protracted armed violence threshold as set by the ICTY is absolutely met, that is, the intensity of violence, and the level of organisation of the parties.. Since 8 October 2023, there have been more than 8,500 cross-border attacks between Israel and Hezbollah. These attacks damaged thousands of buildings and resulted in huge wildfires on both sides (see here and here). It is also reported that these attacks resulted in 601 deaths in Lebanon, the majority of whom are Hezbollah fighters, and 23 deaths in Israel. Furthermore, Hezbollah has around 100,000 fighters, dozens of thousands of missiles, including precision-guided missiles, the ability to recruit, train, and launch coordinated attacks. Hezbollah hence fulfills the organisation requirement. As for Israel, it is always presumed that a State’s armed forces meet the ‘organisation of the parties’ requirement. 

Regarding the existence of an IAC between Israel and Lebanon, an indicator would be the targeting of the Lebanese State’s infrastructure, Lebanese civilians, and civilian objects. These acts would show that beyond targeting Hezbollah, Israel had recourse to armed forces against the State of Lebanon. In terms of Lebanese infrastructure, electrical grids and water supply systems serving around 100,000 inhabitants had been targeted. Marjayoun power plant for example was targeted and thus rendered out of service (see here and here), and 4,000 hectares of land were set on fire. In terms of civilian casualties, reports from the Lebanese ministry of health indicate that, up until 15 July 2024, around 1,900 civilians had been wounded, and 129 had been killed. Among civilians were journalists, medics, and technicians. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the targeting of Issam Abdallah – a journalist working for Reuters – was deliberate (see here and here). Two further journalists were killed while covering updates in the South of Lebanon (see here and here). A technician contracted by the Lebanese telecommunication company ‘Touch’ was killed while trying to repair a power generator at a telecom tower. In a statement, ‘Touch’ said that it had sought approval from the UNIFEL before heading to the tower. The targeting has prevented other teams from heading to border areas for maintenance and repair tasks. 21 medics have been killed so far, including 7 who lost their lives in a strike while at the medical centre (see here, here and here). Three children and their grandmother were killed in an airstrike on their car . Furthermore, HRW considered that Israel’s widespread use of white phosphorus in south Lebanon, and in southern residential areas, is putting civilians at great risk and contributing to their displacement . As for civilian objects, approximately 35,000 homes were damaged in south Lebanon, 5,000 of them were completely destroyed. Supermarkets and service shops were also damaged. Solar farms, agricultural areas, livestock and poultry farms were targeted. A lot of these incidents show that Israel had derailed from only targeting Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure to targeting Lebanese State infrastructure, civilians, and civilian objects. 

If using the ICRC’s view on the existence of an IAC, that is, whenever there is recourse to armed forces by one State against another, irrespective of intensity and duration, one would conclude that an IAC exists between Israel and Lebanon. Even if one is to take a more restrictive view, that is, the conflict must reach a certain level of intensity to qualify as an armed conflict, one would also reach the conclusion that this level of intensity has been met, and that subsequently an IAC exists between Israel and Lebanon. 

To conclude, this article first addressed the UN commission’s report which considered the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel as an IAC. The reasons the commission adopted to justify such characterization, although correct, do not pass the overall control test set by the ICTY in the Tadic case. The conflict at the time, was initially a NIAC between Hezbollah and Israel. However, the targeting of Lebanese infrastructure and civilians, in addition to the maritime blockade, regardless of the reasons behind them, resulted in an IAC between Israel and the State of Lebanon. A very similar analogy is to be applied to the current conflict. The relationship between Hezbollah and the State of Lebanon does not reach the threshold required for the overall control test, and the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has passed the protracted armed violence threshold. The result is the existence of a NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah. Furthermore, by targeting Lebanese State infrastructure, civilians, and civilian objects, one can easily make the argument that Israel has resorted to armed forces against the State of Lebanon. Hence, the existence of an IAC between Israel and Lebanon. In conclusion, there are currently two parallel armed conflicts in Lebanon, a NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah, and an IAC between Israel and Lebanon.