Search: self-defense

Related to Ken’s earlier post, Amos Guiora has a piece up at Foreign Policy describing the legal analysis he applied when advising the Israeli Defense Forces on targeted killings of terrorists. He argues that international law permits targeted killing when certain conditions are met: The decision to use targeted killing of terrorists is based on an expansive articulation of the concept of pre-emptive self defense, intelligence information, and an analysis regarding policy effectiveness. According to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a nation state can respond to an armed attack....

...case was an invaluable part of ensuring Milosevic had a fair trial. In interviews with the amici, they noted that they preferred the role of amicus to being assigned as defense counsel. They pointed out that had they been assigned to represent Milosevic from the start, they would have an ethical obligation not to act without instructions. Given that Milosevic would have refused to instruct assigned counsel, they would not have had the opportunity they had as amici to file motions helpful to the defense without conflicting with their obligations...

...independence under the “sacred trust of civilisation” and its right to self-determination under the UN Charter”. However, Palestinian self-determination cannot negate Israel’s territorial claims or the principle of territorial integrity; at most they imply the existence of competing claims which must be addressed in a final resolution. Of course, the existence of self-determination rights does not dictate the precise territorial scope in which they can be exercised [nor does it mandate a separate state; see Reference re Secession of Quebec]. A conflicting Palestinian right would not necessarily detract from Israeli...

...armed conflict where and when it engages in sustained or intensive armed hostilities, whether acting in self-defense or in furtherance of the POC mandate. In reality, when peacekeepers are deployed to neutralize threats in operating environments were there is no peace to keep, the likelihood of that eventuality is exponentially increased. The eventuality becomes an inevitability where the mandate itself places the UN forces in direct opposition with named actors, as was the case with MONUSCO in the DRC. F. Constraints arising from traditional principles of UN peacekeeping Many TCCs...

...avoid the questions of territorial sovereignty. Self-determination does not answer the question of the geographical unit in which it is exercised. Armenians, for example, do not principally have a preexisting sovereignty claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. Rather, they see Armenian control as an exercise of the self-determination of the Karabakh population. Similarly, Russia justifies its occupation not on prior title but on the self-determination of the Crimean population. International law rejects this argument, and regards Armenian control as an occupation, because the standard lines in which self-determination is exercised is the preexisting...

...in international affairs might prefer such a constitutional design. However, Professor Stewart is certainly not in that camp, nor were the Founders. Third, one modern permutation of self-execution doctrine—the “no judicial enforcement” doctrine—allows state governments to impose sanctions on a criminal defendant in violation of supreme federal (treaty) law, without addressing the merits of defendant’s treaty-based defense. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees every state criminal defendant an opportunity to be heard on the merits of a federal defense to state criminal charges. Therefore, as I contend in Chapter...

[K.K. Sithebe is a PhD Candidate at the University of Pretoria and a Research Advisor, South African Human Rights Commission.] Professor Oumar Ba’s States of Justice provides much needed scholarship on the subject of international criminal justice and self-referrals. Prof. Ba provides a meticulous account of how individual African states, particularly Uganda, have since exploited the self-referral mechanism as envisaged in the Rome Statute. Further, this fine scholar provides a detailed account of events, detailing the attitude of individual states and other parties, including the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, prior...

...sovereign immunity. The symposium contributors have addressed a number of specific propositions in the book. Here are some brief comments on each of their posts: 1. David Moore contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas need not be read as rejecting all multi-factored approaches to self-execution. I agree and did not mean to suggest otherwise in the book. I read Medellin as rejecting only the approach of the dissent, whereby the same treaty provision might be self-executing in some cases but not in others depending on how...

...Finally, I suggest one recent law review article that considers one of the most important areas of technological innovation: self-replicating technology. But my St. John’s colleague Jeremy Sheff looks at a self-replicating technology that is already here and ubiquitous: the seed. Here’s the abstract: Self-replicating technologies pose a challenge to the legal regimes we ordinarily rely on to promote a balance between innovation and competition. This article examines recent efforts by the federal courts to deal with the leading edge of this policy challenge in cases involving the quintessential self-replicating...

...them unless and until Congress adopts implementing legislation. This is desirable, he writes, because it ensures that international decisions and orders are subject to “the filter of the U.S. democratic process.” (p. 134) Professor Bradley reports that some commentators—himself included—have therefore endorsed a presumption that the orders and decisions of international institutions are not self-executing. When the decisions and orders of international institutions are not self-executing, Congress’s participation becomes essential if the United States is to comply with its international obligations. But can we count on Congress to fulfill this...

...Self-Determination: The occupation must deny or obstruct the right to self-determination of the people under occupation. Hostile and Unprovoked Nature: The scale and severity of the ongoing presence in the occupied territory are both hostile and unprovoked, marked by, for instance, claims of a permanent foreign occupation, widespread loss of life, extensive destruction of property, or the displacement of vast numbers of refugees.  These conditions are clearly fulfilled in the case of Israel’s occupation of Palestine, since its inception and perhaps now more than ever. The ICJ’s advisory opinion recognised...

is not to disregard the obvious differences between LGBT asylum claims and self-repression. Asylum rights are enabling. Self-repression is disabling. Asylum rights are public matters. Self-repression is a private matter. And so on. All of this is important to spell out because it describes the world as we know it and the world as we believe it should be. In articulating the assumptions that allow us to justify LGBT asylum claims in terms of the traumatic consequences of self-repression, we specify the conditions under which such a justification makes sense...