Search: self-defense

...create space for anticipatory self-defense even though its plain language—which permits the use of defensive force only “if” an armed attack occurs—clearly states otherwise) this argument is by itself not likely to be a sufficiently sturdy foundation. As such, the best odds for the development of a legal theory to support the sort of test that Koh proposes may lie in a multi-step process, which begins with revisiting the history and text of the UN Charter itself, developing a credible interpretation based on the text and history of Article 2(4)...

...conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. But the analysis is detailed enough in this iteration to accomplish something the White Paper, etc. in important ways did not: identifying key legal limits on the scope of U.S. targeting authority. Take the source-of-authority example. The earlier White Paper was remarkably successful in fudging whether the Administration was invoking the President’s Article II self-defense power under the Constitution, or the statutory AUMF, to support targeting operations. The White Paper likewise (notoriously) fudged whether it was invoking a UN Charter-based self-defense justification...

...other international legal doctrines: state self-defense and prohibition of terrorism. Neocolonial states consistently allege to be acting in self-defense or in the interest of global security when they massacre civilians in the global South. (The U.S. “war on terror” exemplifies this tactic.) These neocolonial states also allege that mass civilian deaths are “mistakes” or “collateral damage.” The state’s claim of self-defense is so sacred in the contemporary international legal system that the burden of proof falls on victims of massacres to prove civilian targeting. Neocolonial states consistently murder disproportionately more...

“areas of active hostilities”) with the legal definition of non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Gabor conceded that “areas of active hostilities” and NIAC are not synonymous, but pointed out that it nonetheless remained unclear where the US government considered itself at war. Ryan, together with Stephen Pomper, replied that such lack of clarity shouldn’t be a reason to distrust the DNI report since, in any event, national self-defense targeting in response to imminent armed attacks is more restrictive than IHL targeting. Simply put, I think that Gabor is more likely to...

...sufficiently intense protracted armed violence and organized armed groups, however, the applicable rules for the Rio operation is international human rights law. These standards, reflected in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, require lethal force to be a measure of last resort, only to be used in cases involving self-defense or the defense of others against a threat of death or serious injury – a standard known as “absolute necessity”....

...in the view of the judge, the case does not pertain to the question of whether the State’s current policy violates its international legal obligations but instead whether, and if so to what extent, the preliminary relief judge is allowed to assess the State’s foreign and defense policies (para. 4.9). In general, the government is presumed to enjoy wide discretion to shape its policy (beleidsvrijheid) in the areas of foreign policy and defense ‘where strongly political choices have to be made’. This explains why the ruling is largely void of...

“an instrument of national policy.” As the International Military Tribunal for Germany (IMT) explained in its Nuremberg Judgment, the Pact made it illegal for any state to engage in armed conflict with another state except for purposes of self-defense. Under the U.N. Charter, that customary prohibition is codified in Article 2(4), which is subject to two treaty-based exceptions. Article 51 reiterates the core customary exception of self-defense. Article 42, however, further provides that states may lawfully utilize force against another state pursuant to UNSC authorization. This did not codify any...

...trade and non-proliferation as well. Finally, I found Obama’s response particularly interesting with respect to the use of force, where he lays out a traditional articulation of the U.S. right to self-defense plus a preference for multilateral action in other circumstances: I will not hesitate to use force, unilaterally if necessary, to protect the American people or our vital interests whenever we are attacked or imminently threatened. . . . There are some circumstances beyond self-defense in which I would be prepared to consider using force, for example to participate...

...my view, the proper legal frame is international law of self-defense – and it is what the US has traditionally viewed the exercise of these discrete uses of force by the CIA, covert or clandestine, as being anyway. These two legal rationales eventually lead to different legal conclusions, constraints and authority for the use of force. My view is that forcing CIA targeted killing in places that might range widely in the world into armed conflict rationales is bad for the CIA’s legal reasoning, and requires ever greater legal contortions...

...control” is absent. Security Considerations and Right to Re-enter Gaza The United Nations Charter (Art. 51) guarantees states the right to self-defense against armed attacks by state and non-state actors, and the Security Council affirmed that right after the attacks of September 11, 2001, encouraging states to combat terrorist acts which threaten international peace and security. Israel’s actions in self-defense reflect U.N. standards, and are reflected in the Agreements which grant Israel authority over its external security. The right to re-enter for security reasons is a common reservation made by...

expressed and expanded upon this view in several key strategic documents such as the 2013 “White Book on Defense and National Security” (Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale), the 2017 “International Cyber Strategy” (Stratégie internationale de la France pour le numérique) and the 2018 “Strategic Review of Cyberdefense” (Revue stratégique de cyberdéfense) as well as two major speeches by Jean-Yves Le Drian, the then minister of defense (and later of foreign affairs), of 12 December 2016 in Bruz and 15 December 2017 in Aix-en-Provence. The new document...

Related to Ken’s earlier post, Amos Guiora has a piece up at Foreign Policy describing the legal analysis he applied when advising the Israeli Defense Forces on targeted killings of terrorists. He argues that international law permits targeted killing when certain conditions are met: The decision to use targeted killing of terrorists is based on an expansive articulation of the concept of pre-emptive self defense, intelligence information, and an analysis regarding policy effectiveness. According to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a nation state can respond to an armed attack....