Search: self-defense

...could only target military objects or soldiers already threatening the lives of others but not those about to be deployed to the battlefield at a later stage. Excluding the very first shot from the application of international humanitarian law becomes even more problematic in situations of pre-emptive self-defense. After all, one would have to extend the restrictive imminence-standard under human rights law to the right to self-defense. Only then it would be ensured that action taken in self-defense also conforms to human rights law et vice versa. Otherwise, the defending...

one hand, the SFRC seems to accept the Supreme Court’s preference for clear statements of the treaty-makers’ intent as to the treaty’s self- or non-self-executing status (whereas previously, I believe the SFRC and the Executive often assumed a treaty was self-executing unless they as the treaty-makers expressed a contrary intent). Thus, the inclusion of declarations of self-execution and non-self-execution mark a new Senate practice. And it may actually prove helpful going forward if it means that the Senate (and by extension the Executive) think through and express views on the...

...the right of national self defense exercised here with an individual's right of self defense. Only the former can produce a state of armed conflict; and once it has, then individual right's of self defense become largely subsumed by the scope of the combatant's privilege: which is to kill and be killed in turn. So Koh, it seems to me, has this right, and the ROE and actions taken under the ROE to kill bin Laden on sight legal in that view. I wish our national security team had taken...

use force for 'peace making'. Lacking a SC authorisation, the question is whether Russia's use of force can be justified by Article 51 or some ingenious customary law right. First of all, is this collective self-defence? Georgian attack on S-Ossetia per se is not an armed attack that Russia could respond to with collective self-defence, since S-Ossetia is not a State for the purpose of UN Charter and thus does not enjoy the right to be protected from military force by itself or by States that are willing to help...

military would exercise its obligation of self-defense. Operationally, it is difficult to develop an effective response when we do not know who is responsible for an “attack”; however, the circumstances may be such that at least some level of mitigating action can be taken even when we are not certain who is responsible. Regardless whether we know who is responsible, international law requires that our use of force in self-defense be proportional and discriminate. Neither proportionality nor discrimination requires that we know who is responsible before we take defensive action....

justifications for drone strikes from Afghanistan to Somalia. Within armed conflict, parties to the conflict have the right to use lethal force in the first resort against enemy forces, which includes, as detailed below, members of the regular armed forces, members of organized armed groups or civilians directly participating in hostilities. International law also recognizes the right of states to use force in self-defense in certain circumscribed circumstances. For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict and self-defense as legal justifications for targeted strikes...

legal justification you need to respond in self-defense. An incident was used as sufficient provocation in the recent Israeli-Lebanese war, and it could have been used in Kosovo because of cross-border skirmishes. An interception presupposes that the other side has launched something first, which then justifies military action. Dinstein said the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could have been met with an American interception long before they ever reached Hawaii. Self-defense does not require the consummation of the first strike. It’s not clear when a first strike begins, but it...

[Brad R. Roth is a Professor of Law at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan, where he teaches international law, comparative public law, and political and legal theory] In “Beyond Empty, Conservative, and Ethereal: Pluralist Self-Determination and a Peripheral Political Imaginary,” Zoran Oklopcic gives an enlightening account of a set of related approaches to the international norm of self-determination of peoples. In this rendering, I have the honor of being cast as the representative of “Empty”: that is to say, my approach to international legal pluralism “empties” the self-determination norm...

doesn’t indicate is behind attacks on U.S. forces. That may just be oversight, or lack of information on McClatchy’s part. Maybe the same self-defense rationale exists there, too. But the Pakistani Taliban wasn’t a publicly designated (at least) terrorist group until 2010, and as I understand it is mostly focused on overthrowing the Pakistani government itself. So if it’s not self-defense, what is the international law justification for targeting them? The unattractive (and speculative) explanation is this. The President issued a broad finding authorizing the CIA to use lethal force...

...Charter. As the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission found, “the practice of States and the writings of eminent publicists show that self-defense cannot be invoked to settle territorial disputes.” See Partial Award – Jus Ad Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8, para. 10. This precedent is directly applicable to the Nagorno-Karabakh situation given that Azerbaijan invoked the right of self-defense to restore its territorial integrity in launching the 2020 war. The Commission also noted that “border disputes between States are so frequent that any exception to the prohibition of the threat or use...

...in arguing that it is the need of self-defense against these non-state actors that justifies their killing. In the words of Harold Koh’s well-known 2010 ASIL Speech: “a state that is engaged in armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force”. This position has been overwhelmingly criticized in legal academia, principally because it conflates the jus ad bellum question of self-defense, with the human rights question of arbitrary deprivation of life. Marko Milanovic expressed it best...

...Rumsfeld, the AUMF contains the implied authority to detain war prisoners under its auspices because such detention was a recognized incident of the use of force under international law, then surely self-defense of one’s own forces (at least to the extent permitted by international law) should also be within the realm of implied statutory authority. The problem is, U.S. self-defense is not what most (or maybe all) of these recent incidents have involved. (For a nice list of recent actions in Syria, see here.) By the United States’ own account,...