Search: self-defense

new president. As Cuddy explains, the Nixon administration quickly abandoned the Johnson administration’s quite traditional view of self-defense. In 1970, John Stevenson, the State Department’s new Legal Advisor, issued a memo rejecting the idea that self-defense on neutral territory was limited to situations in which the neutral state was complicit in the armed attacks. In his view — adopted by the Nixon administration — self-defense was permissible whenever the neutral state “cannot or will not” prevent the unneutral use of its territory (pp. 83-84): Stevenson noted that “it was impossible...

the Security Council, gives defendants the right to self-represent. That is, of course, an obvious point. But it seems all too forgotten in these discussions. Article 21(4)(d) may be an egregious mistake. But that is the Security Council’s fault, not Dr. Karadzic’s. It is not his job to save the Security Council from itself. The existence of the right, in my view, means that our baseline assumption has to be that it is legally and morally unjustifiable to penalize Dr. Karadzic in any way for his decision to represent himself....

...an "imminent threat" because an "imminent" threat is not even a threat and self-defense against a mere threat, once it actually exists, is "preemptive" self-dfense (al la the old discreditd Bush doctrine) and unlawful, it is not even anticipatory self-defense against an "imminent attack" (note the difference!), which itself is onconsistnet with the language in UN art. 51. 5) when a person is DPH in Pakistan (directly participating in the international armed conflct occuring in Afghanistan against U.S. soldiers), the theatre of war migrated de facto to where such person...

...be lawful: (1) when the United States is acting in self-defense (pursuant to the President’s power under Article II of the Constitution) in response to an “imminent” threat; or (2) when the United States is using force as part of an ongoing armed conflict (authorized by Congress and consistent with the international law of armed conflict). Self-defense first. Under the most common conception of the word “imminent” – and under the interpretation of that standard most plainly accepted under international law – the use of force in self-defense would only...

it offers blunt advice to the Obama administration and the US Congress with a particular normative goal in mind – to preserve the legal rationales for the use of self-defense in targeted killing, whether or not an IHL armed conflict is underway, consistent with the positions taken by the United States in the 1980s, and culminating with a statement of the US position on self-defense against terrorism and targeting terrorists in third-state safe havens by then-State Department legal advisor Abraham Sofaer in 1989. The point of the paper is to...

...attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend against further attacks. This is an aspect of the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations Charter....” The U.S. has consistently recognized the propriety of self-defense against NSA armed attacks since 1814, 1816, 1817, 1818 and the Caroline incident in 1837. See, e.g., Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors..., 19 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 237, 241-49 (2010) (available at SSRN). The 1986 ICJ opinion did not rule on self-defense against a NSA as such. Greece addressed an “attack...

etc.). This type of self-determination has been described as “internal,” and many in the international community argue that outside of the decolonization paradigm, peoples only have internal self-determination rights. Unlike the exercise of external self-determination, the implementation of meaningful internal self-determination rights does not entail disrupting the territorial integrity of the larger mother state. This is why most scholars argue that peoples outside of the decolonization paradigm can only exercise self-determination rights within the territory of their mother state, in an internal manner. Nonetheless, external self-determination has occurred outside of...

...In other words, this falls under the inherent right of self-defense that is carved out by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as an exception to the general prohibition on the use of force contained in article 2 of the U.N. Charter. The U.S. is intervening militarily to vindicate Iraq’s self-defense interest as a case of individual or collective self-defense. A few observations here: First, this was a predictable development. I don’t see another avenue for the U.S. to legally defend the intervention, unless it wanted to rely on the...

...in the form of anything remotely like a use of force, far less an armed attack—and it will be recalled that self-defense is only permitted in response to an armed attack. But it will also be recalled that there have been several strong claims made in the last couple of decades for similar expansions of the doctrine of self-defense. These recent claims have included efforts to relax and weaken the doctrine in a number of ways: in the form of preventative self-defense to deal with the threat of weapons of...

an important distinction, as you recognize but don't fully analyze. To successfully support such attacks as an independent act of self-defense, the USG must necessarily believe that IHL applies (perhaps only by analogy) to acts of self-defense against non-state actors even if hostilities with them do not meet the oft-asserted customary international law (CIL) duration, intensity and organization thresholds to establish a NIAC. I think this is what Marty earlier stated as his understanding of the USG view, and Michael Lewis argues to be state practice as well. Kevin's (and...

not as correct application of the uti possidetis and self-determination principles in post-Cold War settings. He is also right, as he argues in his recent book, that cases such as Kosovo “bespeak[] the ad hoc nature of the international order’s solutions” to self-determination conflicts around the world. But, in the structure of his overarching argument, the doctrinal interpretation of self-determination is only one argument against a more normatively generous understanding of self-determination in the post-colonial context. Roth’s insistence on the combination of the principle of effectivity and non-intervention, as the...

...law and legal consequences but is not a legal term in and of itself. Considered that way, unit self-defence can be thought of as: a) a form of delegated authority from the national command chain of a State to exercise a State’s right of national self-defence in limited circumstances and in a constrained fashion; b) a reminder of the criminal law authority to act in self-defence to protect oneself and protect others, (recalling that the criminal law concept of self-defence allows a person to not only defend his or herself,...