Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...armed attacks by non-state actors not amounting to armed conflict -- to be governed by human rights law, particularly extraterritorially. In such cases, states may observe IHL as a matter of policy or by analogy but had no requirement to do so as a matter of law. This, I think, is Jordan Paust's position, and somewhat reflects the U.S. position (depending, perhaps, upon the administration). While I respect Kevin immensely, he frequently argues, without citation, that no European country views the law this way. Absent a thorough study, I can't...

...(generally more restrictive) HR (and other applicable peacetime norms), not ILOAC standards. Whether such actions may be carried out extraterritorialy, i.e. in the territory of another state, is a question of jus ad bellum, not ILOAC, as Marko likewise rightly noted and the two regimes on the use of armed force should not be conflated. The ILOAC may or may not apply regardless of the jus ad bellum questions. I think that in terms of jus ad bellum, the US president would have a harder task than just coming up...

...belligerents, and thus are subject to domestic criminal charges for their mere participation in the conflict (though APII art. 6(5) encourages amnesty). But such participation is not an international crime. For an unprivileged belligerent to kill a U.S. soldier in combat in Afghanistan falls within U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, and presumably constituted a domestic-law crime in 2001-02, so it can be tried in a regular U.S. court. Neither can be said, so far as I can see, for otherwise-lawful acts of war committed by unprivileged belligerents against our "co-belligerents." Howard Gilbert...

...Israel's considers) there is no occupation there is simply no law to apply (reference to general principles of law will not get someone very far, whereas Israel -- along with other States -- does not recognise extraterritorial application of its ICCPR obligations in accordance with that instruments basic text). In any event, the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that Israel does apply are its humanitarian provisions (see Ajuri and Others v. Israel Defence Force Commander, 125 I.L.R. 537, 547, ¶ 13 (Israel H.Ct.J. 2002)). shmuel Ori, "if (as Israel’s...

...obligations under the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture. The article also provides an Appendix that sets forth a Torture Timeline 2001 – 2007 and addresses standards for criminal complicity that would be applicable concerning criminal or civil sanctions against members of the prior Administration who are clearly reasonably accused. [forthcoming, 18 Barry L. Rev. (2013)] The Bush-Cheney Legacy: Serial Torture and Forced Disappearance in Manifest Violation of Global Human Rights Law – Jordan J. Paust Introduction I. Rejection of...

...by non-state actors BEFORE the organization, intensity and duration criteria are met. That, to me, seems to be most dynamic area of IHL going forward (and the largest issue surrounding the Tallinn Manual). U.S. policy statements endorse the view that IHL governs acts of national self-defense against extraterritorial non-state actors who pose an "imminent" and "continuing" threat. Others claim human rights law governs even though the U.S. claims it doesn't apply extraterritorially. How that difference of opinion is ultimately resolved has tremendous practical consequences for states and non-state actors alike....

...So, you rightly ask, what work is the LOAC doing? Why not just apply IHRL directly to the specific factual circumstances surrounding each deprivation of life? Here are a few thoughts: First, the LOAC may apply where IHRL does not. As you know, there is a move to apply IHRL to all extraterritorial killings by state agents, but if that move fails then the LOAC may be the only applicable law in many cases. Second, where both apply, the LOAC provides a floor of protection, a minimal content to “arbitrary”...

...believe international law does not constrain covert operations, at least from the perspective of U.S. domestic law. First, we must remember that Title 50 operations may be authorized as an integral part of an armed conflict or in the absence of one. Thus, IHL may or may not be triggered and apply to a covert operation or program, and IHRL would apply only to the extent one accepts (contrary to long held official U.S. views) that IHRL applies to a nation's extraterritorial actions. Regardless of whether either body of international...

...does not reflect international law despite the assertion that it does], which expressly does not apply to section 404, etc., etc. -- and Moxon and Bolchos had extraterritorial aspects that the majority opinion ignores -- such as the fact that foreign flag vessesls are the equivalent of foreign territory wherever the happen to end up and the fact that a violation of international law can take place elsewhere in some cases but the vessel ends up in a U.S. port). Despite the shocking 9-0 ultimate vote, errors must be addressed...

...to situations affected or potentially affected by the ICJ decision. It is further worth observing that the Constitutional Court while reaching the conclusion that article 2 and 24 of the Constitution prevail over the rule of international law granting sovereign States immunity for acta jure imperii, made it clear that its reasoning was referred to war crimes and crimes committed on Italian soil (Paras 4.1 and 5 of the decision). This said, what relevance can we expect the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court will have for extraterritorial claims? What...

...offences’ are defined as inter alia extraterritorial offences “which [constitute] an offence under the law of another state [presumably the territorial state] and which would have constituted [terrorism] … had that activity taken place in the Republic”. To my mind, at least, that conditions SA’s UJ in Okah to offences that were also offences under the law of Nigeria (loosely ‘double criminality’). There is another contender for UJ however (section 15(2)), which states in relevant part that any act [NOTE: not ‘specified offence’] committed outside the Republic shall, regardless of...

...three part functional test for the extraterritorial availability of the Great Writ: "at least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ." The Court has not emphasized citizenship too heavily in its decisions regading the general availability of...