Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...Conclusion President Trump represents an existential threat to the international legal order. In facing such challenges, small States–who lack the economic weight to exert countermeasures and reprisals against potential sanctions, as is the case of Panama– must resort to international law and multilateral diplomacy, particularly when dealing with threats against their own territorial integrity and political independence. In situations such as this, time is of the essence. Photo attribution: “ In the Panama Canal, 1994 ” from Family collection of Infrogmation of New Orleans is licenced under CC BY-SA 4.0...

...as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s efforts to obtain full membership at the UN) is “pure diplomatic terrorism” peaceful Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) efforts are economic terrorism; legal work and engagement with international mechanisms is legal terrorism; and those who do such work are “Terrorists in Suits.” Perhaps, for Israel, even writing this article or any similar intellectual exercise is intellectual terrorism. Moreover, for Israel, any criticism of its human rights violations is antisemitism. Even calling Israel’s regime by its name and the accurate legal characterization, i.e., “apartheid,” is antisemitic. Likewise,...

...document the suffering of Palestinians as well as Israel’s breaches of international law. They do so at great personal risk, with special note to Albanese who is routinely threatened in the most vile ways by allies of Israel (including the US State Department which either recklessly or deliberately smeared her this past week). Their recommendations bear repeating here: An arms embargo and economic sanctions levelled against Israel; Support for South Africa’s resort to the UNSC under art 94(2) of the UN Charter; Lobbying Karim Khan to pursue arrest warrants for...

...obligations have direct relevance (see discussion Chapter 4.3.6.1) especially in light of the double veto by China and Russia of a resolution that would have condemned the crimes being committed in Myanmar (draft resolution S/2007/14).  Chapter 5.2 additionally discusses how veto threats in the face of alleged genocide, as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes, in Darfur weakened the sanctions regime and weakened and delayed peacekeeping.  The vetoes and veto threats in both these situations appear the exact opposite of adhering to the due diligence obligation to “prevent”...

...respect to the subject matter thereof,… as if the subject matter of the arbitration were pending before a superior court of this state in a civil action…. (b) The arbitrator or arbitrators themselves shall have power, in addition to the power of determining the merits of the arbitration, to enforce the rights, remedies, procedures, duties, liabilities, and obligations of discovery by the imposition of the same terms, conditions, consequences, liabilities, sanctions, and penalties as can be or may be imposed in like circumstances in a civil action by a superior...

...however, these doctrines were expressions or applications of the broader concept of self-preservation, which Verdebout admits, was recognized as a fundamental right of states. To Verdebout, this confirms the core claim of the book, which is that pre-1914 international law was not indifferent towards the question of the use of force. For instance, on pages 204-205, Verdebout notes that in all the cases of intervention surveyed in her book, the use of force was “presented as sanctions of law – i.e., as the exercise of the right of self-preservation.” This,...

...the panels left the interpretation of the term “essential security interests” open so as to accommodate various interests of the Members. However, the reliance on Article XXI(b)(iii) GATT would require an occurrence of an extreme form of deterioration of international relations. Certainly, this degree of gravity in international relations will be rarely met. Hence, this interpretation of the security exceptions significantly curtails the policy space for the WTO Members to impose trade-restrictive measures in the form of targeted unilateral sanctions or tit-for-tat measures under the aegis of Article XXI(b)(iii) GATT....

...the request of President Assad. Although several states criticized this decision, none deemed it unlawful (160). Libya offers a similar example, where the Gaddafi government’s repressive and violent response to Arab Spring protests led the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions and refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Like with Syria, numerous states concluded that the Gaddafi government was no longer legitimate and had lost the consent of the Libyan people. And like the SOC in Syria, several governments recognized the National Transitional Council as the true representative...

...convinced. According to Professor Ku, nothing in the “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act explicitly (or implicitly) authorize[s] the President to make an agreement with Iran that would go beyond the President’s existing constitutional powers to make sole-executive agreements or nonbinding political commitments.” This claim boldly ignores the Iran Act’s key operative provisions. The Act specifically defines “agreement” to include any accord with Iran “regardless of whether it is legally binding or not.” § 2610e(h)(1). It then authorizes the President to implement sanctions relief unless Congress enacts “a joint resolution stating...

...to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and (2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— (A) the intentional infliction or threatened...

...two economies, and accurately responds to customary principles of third-state responsibility. It shifts the focus to the purpose of these efforts –rendering occupation and genocide unprofitable. At the same time, the Bogotá Declaration is far from comprehensive. More measures should be considered in future texts, such as imposing financial sanctions that prohibit economic relations with individuals and entities complicit in Israel’s illegal occupation (as some countries have done to some extent), and the purchase of Israeli weapons. Further, the Bogotá Declaration makes no explicit mention of measures to prevent military...

...nukes unless they submit to international treaty regimes. The new U.S. strategy: friends like India get help in peacefully controlling their nukes, enemies like Iran and North Korea get ugly threats of sanctions even if neither India, Iran, nor North Korea are currently part of the international non-proliferation treaty regime. Second, being more of a foreign relations than international relations guy, I’m interested in the fact that the nuclear cooperation deal is being approved in the form of a congressional-executive agreement rather than as a treaty or even as a...