Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...obligations have direct relevance (see discussion Chapter 4.3.6.1) especially in light of the double veto by China and Russia of a resolution that would have condemned the crimes being committed in Myanmar (draft resolution S/2007/14).  Chapter 5.2 additionally discusses how veto threats in the face of alleged genocide, as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes, in Darfur weakened the sanctions regime and weakened and delayed peacekeeping.  The vetoes and veto threats in both these situations appear the exact opposite of adhering to the due diligence obligation to “prevent”...

...however, these doctrines were expressions or applications of the broader concept of self-preservation, which Verdebout admits, was recognized as a fundamental right of states. To Verdebout, this confirms the core claim of the book, which is that pre-1914 international law was not indifferent towards the question of the use of force. For instance, on pages 204-205, Verdebout notes that in all the cases of intervention surveyed in her book, the use of force was “presented as sanctions of law – i.e., as the exercise of the right of self-preservation.” This,...

...the panels left the interpretation of the term “essential security interests” open so as to accommodate various interests of the Members. However, the reliance on Article XXI(b)(iii) GATT would require an occurrence of an extreme form of deterioration of international relations. Certainly, this degree of gravity in international relations will be rarely met. Hence, this interpretation of the security exceptions significantly curtails the policy space for the WTO Members to impose trade-restrictive measures in the form of targeted unilateral sanctions or tit-for-tat measures under the aegis of Article XXI(b)(iii) GATT....

...the request of President Assad. Although several states criticized this decision, none deemed it unlawful (160). Libya offers a similar example, where the Gaddafi government’s repressive and violent response to Arab Spring protests led the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions and refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Like with Syria, numerous states concluded that the Gaddafi government was no longer legitimate and had lost the consent of the Libyan people. And like the SOC in Syria, several governments recognized the National Transitional Council as the true representative...

...convinced. According to Professor Ku, nothing in the “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act explicitly (or implicitly) authorize[s] the President to make an agreement with Iran that would go beyond the President’s existing constitutional powers to make sole-executive agreements or nonbinding political commitments.” This claim boldly ignores the Iran Act’s key operative provisions. The Act specifically defines “agreement” to include any accord with Iran “regardless of whether it is legally binding or not.” § 2610e(h)(1). It then authorizes the President to implement sanctions relief unless Congress enacts “a joint resolution stating...

...international organizations, participation in 200 cases at the ICJ and PCIJ, in thousands of cases in human rights courts, in mediation, negotiation, and arbitration over ever possible right or claim relevant to states—and all in terms of international law. And these officials know there are sanctions for violating international law. If you were to ask the proverbial man on the street whether he has human rights or his country has inviolable national borders—most would say yes and know these are legal rights from beyond the state itself. One of the...

...it has built. A senior U.S. defense official said on Thursday that additional sanctions were a possible response to any North Korea missile launch and the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific said he favored deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system in South Korea. Europe With a troubled peace plan for the Ukrainian conflict nearing its deadline, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg will attempt a balancing act to reassure Kiev of the West’s support without antagonizing Moscow when he visits Ukraine on Monday. Bitterly-divided European leaders will seek to find...

...the Senate as a treaty. Much depends on exactly what the agreement purports to do. If the agreement actually contains a commitment by the U.S. to “not be the first to use cyberweapons to cripple the other’s critical infrastructure”, than it is much closer to the traditional kinds of arms control agreements that have usually been approved under the U.S. system as treaties. Unlike the Iran Nuclear Deal (which is mostly about lifting economic sanctions), the U.S. would be committing to refraining from using certain weapons or from exercising its...

...and scope of obligations for particular non-state actors, such as businesses or corporations (e.g. sanctions, human rights, modern slavery), sporting bodies and organised armed groups; (4) the potential responsibility of these actors and its relationship to state responsibility; (5) the position of these actors in dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms, whether judicial institutions, organs of international organisations or treaty regimes; (6) the special roles of non-state actors in particular areas of international law, such as international environmental law, international economic law (including investment law), the international law of armed conflict,...

...different administrations.  The Nuclear Deal marked an important milestone: it brought together various state parties (despite varying degrees of diplomatic discord and antagonistic relations) who were able to reach a multilateral accord on highly sensitive issues. From its very inception, the deal was heralded by the UN as a positive step towards advancing international peace and security through detailed and comprehensive commitments. Its main purpose was to impose restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program in exchange for substantial economic relief in the form of the lifting of sanctions.  However, it...

...law, nor its employment of “lawfare” to highlight international law, will be very successful against Russia. Lawfare’s main impact against the U.S. was to tie up many of its policies in domestic U.S. litigation. I don’t see that as an avenue against Russia. Moreover, the employment of lawfareish pressure tactics could easily be used as an excuse to avoid taking more strenuous or effective actions (e.g. tougher sanctions, increased military aid, etc.). I am not sure US conservatives should be eager to jump on this lawfare bandwagon, no matter how...

...he would be making an enormous mistake, and I don’t think he will want to go the extra mile.” “I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people. But I agree that such a capability, in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular moments could make different calculations, is dangerous.” According to Gantz, western pressure on Iran by means of diplomacy and economic sanctions has had an effect on Tehran’s rulers but a military response is still an option, albeit the last. Next up, Yuval Diskin, the...