Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...as originally understood, article 51 did not permit extraterritorial force against non-state actors without the consent of the territorial State. The real question, therefore, is whether state practice, whether as a constituent element of customary international law, or as subsequent practice for the purposes of interpreting the UN Charter, could have modified this original state-centric reading of the Charter. This question is at the heart of a forthcoming book, The Trialogue on the Use of Force against Non-State Actors (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Christian Tams, Dire Tladi). In my view, an...

...of State is taking place this Thursday, February 12th, 2015 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM US Eastern Standard Time. This year’s theme is: “The Role of the Law in the Fight Against ISIL: Use of Force, Sanctions, and Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” The Section of International Law is pleased to announce the fifth annual non-CLE webcast with the Office of the Legal Adviser from the Jacob Burns Moot Courtroom of the George Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C. Cosponsored by the American Society of International Law, the George Washington University...

...which the court reserved on ways in which it might be curtailed still further – in passing, the court noted but declined to take a view on whether the ATS might have no extraterritorial application, limiting it to conduct within the United States. Once corporations were understood as targets, once everyone understood that neither plaintiff nor defendant required any traditional connection to the United States, as parties, in conduct, nothing, and once the plaintiffs bar saw opportunities to join forces with the NGOs and activists, the trend of the ATS...

...The question thus is whether the Supreme Court’s affirmance constituted a dismissal for lack of SMJ, or instead was a dismissal on the merits. Contextual clues in the Chief Justice’s opinion—in particular, the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality (PAE)—indicate that the Court went beyond the issue of SMJ and reached aspects of the merits. The Court concluded that “[o]n these facts,” the PAE barred relief in this case. There are certain limited circumstances in which a federal court may dismiss on the basis of threshold issues before ascertaining its...

...actors (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/16, paras. 50–51). At any rate, such extraterritorial operations may constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the State of sojourn. If this State – for example, Afghanistan (now represented by the Taliban) – did not consent to such an attack, the strike would constitute a violation of the principle of non-intervention derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States (Article 2(1) UN Charter) (cf. ICJ, Nicaragua Judg. 1986, para. 202); it could also amount to a violation of the prohibition of the use...

...the context of NIAC, Article 42 detention authority even in the more constrained context of IAC is dramatically limited, permitting only that detention as is “absolutely necessary” for the security of the detaining power. Is it “absolutely necessary” for the security of the United States that it be able to detain terrorist suspects picked up anywhere in the world under a legal authority that goes beyond its own sweepingly extraterritorial and often preventively focused criminal law? Guess we’ll find out if the administration advances the Art. 42 theory in court....

...long held (if, in my view, unfortunate) position that ICCPR doesn’t apply extraterritorially (which the report acknowledges), this seems a bit of a tough legal case to make. Beyond the trial situation (to which it seems CA3 would surely apply), as long as we’re choosing between legal regimes the United States officially rejects, why not pick APII, or API by analogy, as the more useful standard? Truly asking here. Responses to that question produced an interesting exchange on and off-line between Gabor Rona and Marty Lederman. With the relevant permission...

...aggression by Germany and Japan. Israel’s obligations in the law of occupation and international human rights law (applicable extraterritorially), which govern how it exercises its military authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, oblige it to secure public order and protect human rights. However, even if these obligations, especially those in occupation law (specifically, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, part of occupation law) can be understood as a general matter to encompass an obligation to use force in occupied territory to neutralize threats emanating from there to...

...international efforts focus primarily on preventing the effects of such threats, rather than on addressing the threats themselves or sanctioning them. There may be an implicit understanding that deviates from the stricter conclusions of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Specifically, the threat of force in response to the extrajudicial and extraterritorial killing of a high-ranking individual within domestic settings (even if they are considered leaders of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the US and the EU) might be viewed as a proportionate...

...world states violate human rights, rule-of-law-abiding weapons manufacturers in the first world respond to the conscience of humanity by adhering to their extraterritorial human rights obligations (see, EU Criterion Two). However, when benevolent and civilised states commit atrocities, these actions are often dismissed as the unfortunate consequences of war. The suspension of arms trade is not even considered until the scale of the atrocities becomes too significant to ignore. When it’s raining bombs, trade becomes a passive factor against carnages and barbarisms of weapon-yielding entities, states or non-state entities or...

...the plaintiffs. But the court isn’t buying it. It finds that the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) doesn’t protect foreign harms, including Mexican seepage wetlands just south of the border. Statutes don’t normally have extraterritorial application and there’s nothing in NEPA to suggest Congress wanted to protect these foreign environmental harms. Okay, that argument didn’t hold water, so the plaintiffs try for trans-boundary harm. Harms in Mexico will have trans-boundary harms in the United States. Like what? Well, the loss of seepage in Mexico will reduce crop importation to the...

...for going after terrorists themselves. But even as the administration wants to expand the reach of the strategy, the legal space for it threatens to shrink. And it is not especially clear that the administration understands that acceptance of certain things that parts of its foreign policy advisors would like to do – accept extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, for example – would have potentially grave effects on the legal rationales it offers for its targeted killing strategies. I see it as a potential clash within the Obama administration’s foreign...