Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...resolved under the customary international law of jurisdiction. The Lotus and the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction The starting point when considering whether territorial states may or may not delegate their prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction by treaty to an international court over nationals of non-consenting states is of course The Lotus. With respect to the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, Lotus stands for the principle that ‘what is not prohibited is permitted’ (a prohibitive rule). This rule does not apply to the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction as Lotus holds...

...statements therein made) to opine on whether the practice of extraterritorial self-defense against non-State actors absent consent of the territorial State was permitted or not by article 51 of the UNC. In prospecting for opinio juris a richer vein could not be found: States used legal justificatory discourse, expressed their own legal views, and weren’t coy on articulating what they thought was the definitive meaning, extent, and significance on the customary rules purportedly expanding (or not) self-defense. This seems to be the indicative of certainty about the articulation of legality...

...substantive legal grounds. To this end, the prohibition on the imposition of nationality may mandate non-recognition in particular instances of passportization. A valid grant of nationality requires the consent of the naturalized individual. Coercing someone into naturalizing vitiates their consent, rendering the resulting grant of nationality invalid. Therefore, where Russian forces directly coerced Ukrainians into applying for Russian passports, either by threatening them with violence or prohibitive administrative sanctions, the resulting grant of nationality is invalid. In arguing for blanket non-recognition, as opposed to the unlawfulness of individual instances, states...

...fundamental problems with how lower courts have approached these suits. These problems center on five key issues: First, whether the ATS applies extraterritorially – that is, whether a U.S. court can properly apply U.S. federal common law under the ATS to conduct that occurred entirely in the territory of a foreign State. Second, even if such a cause of action could properly be recognized, whether exhaustion of adequate and available local remedies in that foreign country should be a prerequisite to bringing an ATS suit. Third, whether corporations or other...

...critical when it comes to doctrines like “unwilling or unable,” because its actual adoption by states would open the floodgates to the extraterritorial (ie, sovereignty-infringing) use of force against non-state actors. There may well come a time when the “unwilling or unable” test reflects customary international law, but that time is not now. Two states do not a customary rule make, however powerful those states may be. And we cannot simply ignore the states in the Global South, however inconvenient powerful states in the Global North may find their views....

...Chief Justice Roberts stated that ““[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices [to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application].” The argument here is that although “mere corporate presence” is not enough, corporations with other, deeper connections might displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. (Since the Court in other places explicitly stated it was not reaching the corporate liability question, I am skeptical of this argument). Second, and more persuasively, you might argue that because the Supreme Court dismissed...

...to the exigencies of Latin America’s strong commitment to human rights and democratic values. This is why non-intervention now coexists with the Inter-American Democratic Charter, as seen above. The Lima Group’s statement and Mexico’s opposition to it, take place in the context of one such particularly hot-topic discussion: economic sanctions. Every year, the Human Rights Council approves a Resolution on “unilateral coercive measures and human rights”. This resolution calls upon states to stop adopting unilateral measures “of a coercive nature with extraterritorial effects, which create obstacles to trade relations among...

...offer a broader basis for jurisdiction (i.e. prosecution of extraterritorial acts), curtail the applicability of statutes of limitation or extend the prospects for cooperation and judicial assistance. Moreover, in practice, domestic and international crime labels are de facto often interrelated in a domestic setting. Many jurisdictions rely on a mix of ‘international’ and ‘ordinary crime’ definitions in order to try offences, or adjust modes of liability to capture the conduct in question. These factors are not taken into account in the Heller’s ‘cost-benefit’ analysis. Paradoxically, in existing practice, ‘ordinary crime’...

...as a universal civil jurisdiction decision, although it was grounded in U.S. historical analysis that seemed to coincide with universal civil jurisdiction. Still, as I noted before, Justice Breyer did not build on the Sosa concurrence in today’s Kiobel opinion. Instead, he revived the quite rarely invoked “protective” principle to justify the ATS’ extraterritorial reach. He then added that preventing war criminals from winning a “safe harbor” in the U.S. was within the protective principle (that’s a somewhat dubious interpretation to me). This is a much narrower approach than I...

...are much less well known. Regardless, until now these parts have not been put together and treated as an interconnected, if occasionally wide-ranging, narrative. My third aim is to advance several more specific claims about this legal evolution. First, the central concept of extraterritoriality has shown surprising continuity in its purpose even as its form has changed dramatically. Extraterritoriality meant very different things to nineteenth-century lawyers than it does to contemporary lawyers. But the primary function of extraterritoriality has remained, at a fundamental level, the same. That function, I argue,...

...— it’s unclear from the fact sheet — its new understanding of the use of lethal force applies only to the current conflict. Second, although I don’t imagine that the US much cares, the jus ad bellum-like targeting standards announced in the fact sheet do not necessarily satisfy the limitations on lethal force imposed by international human rights law. As I have pointed out ad nauseum on the blog (see here for an example), whether an extraterritorial use of force is legitimate under the jus ad bellum says nothing about...

...Since the 1980s, the southern neighbor has served as a buffer zone to prevent mass movement up north (FitzGerald, David Scott Refuge Beyond Reach (OUP 2019), pp. 123-159). To halt and decrease the rapidly rising numbers of asylums seekers from Central America in the last months, the US government has pushed for the above-described policies. Both policies, the extraterritorial asylum processing (‘Remain in Mexico-policy’) and the safe-third-country concept, were implemented after a combination of immense pressure from the US government and good coaxing. President Trump had used the threat to...