Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...extraterritorial jurisdiction over many of these individuals or many of their activities." If these individuals did in fact violate the law of war, which is the predicate for a legitimate exercise of jurisdiction by a military commission of the type established by the President, then doesn't the War Crimes Act establish the requisite "extraterritorial" jurisdiction for trial in Federal Court? I recognize that there may be other pragmatic arguments in favor of trial by military commission, but the jurisdictional predicate for use of the War Crimes Act or trial by...

[William S. Dodge is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. One of his articles on extraterritoriality was cited in Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion.] There is no doubt that Morrison v. National Australia Bank is a landmark opinion, not just because the Supreme Court addresses here, for the first time, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities law, but also for what the opinion tells us more generally about the presumption against extraterritoriality. As Margaret Sachs has already recounted, the Courts of Appeals, under...

...vague), then I’m not sure I have any categorical objections (though the devil will be in the details). In all events, the CCR view that somehow this kind of detention is not already authorized by law, and is in some way historically novel – that view is, I believe, wrong. And if litigated, I believe it will lose. The other examples are more complicated. What about the guy who “received extensive explosives training at al Qaeda training camps”? Receiving training at a terrorist camp is now a crime (with extraterritorial...

...in his seminal War, Aggression and Self-Defence, at least in the context of international armed conflict. So here are my questions: [1] Does anyone know where the US might have defended/explained its position at more length, whether in a legal brief or elsewhere? [2] Does anyone know of scholars other than Dinstein who take the position that once a state acts in self-defence, none of its (extraterritorial) acts in the resulting armed conflict are subject to the jus ad bellum? Any suggestions or citations from readers would be most appreciated....

...action under humanitarian law would remain unrestricted. It is likely that cases in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law might prove to be important will more and more frequent. For example, the Al-Skeini case, which deals with the extraterritorial application of the ECHR in Iraq, is currently pending before the UK House of Lords. The most enduring quality of the Targeted Killings judgment might actually be that it shows how the relationship between these two branches of international law can be a two-way street, and how...

...Security Council resolution. However, following the failure of the 2011 draft resolution on Syria, no country has unilaterally applied R2P’s Third Pillar. Countries have taken independent action such as sanctions but explicitly avoided the use of military force. As the Alex Bellamy article recounts, both the United States and the United Kingdom have been cautious in proceeding outside the Security Council in the post-Iraq environment. The post-Iraq environment dissuades unilateral and “unauthorized” military action with preference for the Security Council’s authority to use of force. This appears to be a...

...members be prosecuted for intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population because “intentionally” includes lower mental states such as dolus eventualis or recklessness? I worry about this argument. And here’s why. If intent = recklessness, then all cases of legitimate collateral damage would count as violations of the principle of distinction, because in collateral damage cases the attacker kills the civilians with knowledge that the civilians will die. And the rule against disproportionate attacks sanctions this behavior as long as the collateral damage is not disproportionate and the attack...

...the ATS applies to piracy, which occurs (typically) on the high seas. This framing of the issue will raise the question whether the presumption against extraterritoriality distinguishes between extraterritorial applications of US law depending on whether the situation in question is within another state's jurisdiction. The Court in recent years hasn't seemed to apply such a distinction. I've argued, however, that it should. Specifically, a presumption against extrajurisdictionality that applies more strictly to situations outside U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction under international law than to situations (such as piracy on the high...

...authority. But there is absolutely nothing of which I am aware that limits Congress's constitutional authority to sanction extraterritorial acts that violate international law. Territorial acts more clearly depend upon the relationship and congruity of any applicable international and constitutional limitations on Congress's powers. Furthermore, it is debatable whether fundamental law of war principles require an attacker to meet formal IHL requirements for prisoner of war status and the combatant's privilege. On that point, I note that the perfidy prohibition is stated by some---incuding European experts and scholars that I...

Chris Jenks Kevin I think this link may work better to get to John's article http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/mqp015v1 John C. Dehn Thanks Kevin and Chris for the article plug. In essence, my article argues that "murder in violation of the law of war" is a domestic, "common law of war" offense applied extraterritorially. For those suspicious of that argument, the existence of this undoubtedly federal common law was recognized post-Erie in Ex parte Quirin. The article did not reach the question of whether applying this municipal law extraterritorially is consistent with international...

...the decision its treatment of the "Multinational Force-Iraq" as, effectively, a U.S. government entity? Roger Alford Steve, No that is not my principal concern. At bottom this is about the extraterritorial application of U.S. habeas corpus law in the face of the territorial sovereignty and authority of Iraq and Iraqi courts to detain and try those persons alleged to have committed crimes on Iraqi soil. It is an affront to the Iraqi court's primary authority over crimes committed in its own territory for a U.S. court to issue an order...

...I am uncertain whether that is true. Certainly in internal armed conflict, domestic law can be the only source of immunity for violence (along the lines of public authority). In extraterritorial NIAC, there is no reason why territorial states in which armed attacks occur could not provide or recognize the equivalent of combatant immunity for a foreign state's armed forces, and state practice might actually support this as being the case. At bottom, it is not necessary to classify a conflict as IAC to immunize a state's armed forces. Going...