Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...Breyer argued in his concurrence in Kiobel) that the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute can be limited by other jurisdictional restrictions. I agree. Despite the obvious clash of approaches between the Roberts majority and the Breyer minority in Kiobel, they do have an important common ground – an intention to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction through a stricter application of the traditional bases of jurisdiction. The DaimlerChrysler case gives Justice Breyer an opportunity to put sharper teeth, if that’s his inclination, into the third alternative test for finding jurisdiction that...

Elena Kouvabina Many commenters opined that the Dodd-Frank bill will particially reverse the Supreme Court's Morrison decision with respect to the SEC extraterritorial jurisdiction. The bill's provision in question, however, talks about expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear actions brought by the SEC with extraterritorial elements. In Morrison, Justice Scalia stated that the issue of extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws is not jurisdictional but substantive. Several other scholars noted the same. To give the SEC the power to try actions with extraterritorial elements under Section 10(b), Section...

..."perfect" complementarity in a state's legal obligations anywhere in the world escapes me. The complementarity of IHRL, particularly the ICCPR, in extraterritorial or transnational NIAC is not at all clear, and imperfect at best. By its terms, the ICCPR applies within the territory and jurisdicition of signatory states, not to extraterritorial matters. Even if we impose a functional definition of "jurisdiction" upon and exclude "territory" from the ICCPR, a competely atextual approach, it can't possibly cover all aspects of extraterritorial NIAC. There is an assumption being made (or teleological interpretation)...

...those who are not plausibly part of an ongoing armed conflict - there seems to be no mention of the applicability of human rights law or principles as constraints on the use of force. U.S. views on the extraterritorial application of HR law aside, that's a very serious and profound mistake with regards to what law applies. While the law of war conduct of hostilities rules may apply as baseline constraints to any use of force, it doesn't follow that compliance with these rules is all that's required (beyond meeting...

...to veto by, in this case, Russia. Even if sanctions are imposed, will the UN be able to keep them in place? As the oil-for-food scandal makes clear, sanctions create a powerful moral hazard by raising the price of goods and creating the opportunity for huge profits, encouraging defection and cheating. Regardless of whether you agree with the logic of the invasion of Iraq, there is an important lesson there that is relevant to the problem of Iran. If the UN is unwilling or incapable of enforcing its own rules...

Marko Milanovic Roger, I also it might be useful to compare the extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution with jurisprudence on the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties, which poses very similar questions. Generally speaking, human rights treaties apply to territories under a contracting state's 'jurisdiction', defined in a leading European Court of Human Rights case, Loizidou, as any area under the state's effective overall control. You will certainly have noted that Justice Kennedy uses the word 'jurisdiction' in this functional sense as an exercise of power throughout his opinion. (see...

Alexander Panayotov The discussion is illuminating. I can hardly imagine a better panel to discuss Prof. Besson’s article given panelists’ recent contributions on different aspects of extraterritoriality. It’s hard to establish a consensus on extraterritoriality. I don’t think that such a consensus is even possible. Still, the introduction of normative theorizing raises a couple of open-ended questions. I will pose them because I think that normative theorizing about extraterritoriality is exceedingly difficult; thus, it entails a great deal of groundwork. I imagine that the article did not engage in this...

...domestic one with a weirdly constructed trigger, invoking a “law of nations” that we don’t mean the way other people mean it, argues strongly for a traditional approach to jurisdiction – it’s not universal jurisdiction anymore, because we’re not pretending that our reference point is actually universal, but instead merely a claim of extraterritoriality. So it doesn’t seem quite so strange that the Chief Justice would invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality, because the thing, the statute, that plaintiffs propose to apply extraterritorially isn’t truly a claim of universality, either. Nor...

...of Cuba’s argument that the U.S. embargo violates international law. I still think Cuba’s description of the U.S. embargo as a “blockade” is ludicrous. But I am more sympathetic to legal criticisms of the extraterritorial effects of the U.S. embargo. First, as the photo suggests, Cuba calls the U.S. embargo a “blockade”. Indeed, the billboard (which faces visitors as soon as they drive in from the airport), refers to the “bloqueo” as the “longest genocide in history.” This might be put down simply to rhetorical excess, but the Cuban government...

...1795 Opinion of the AG obviously affirmed expectations that the ATS is extraterritorial, applying to conduct of U.S. citizens on the coast of Africa. Moxon and Bolchos also affirm extraterritoriality when one recognizes the fact that foreign flag vessels are the equivalent of foreign territory under international law and tha conduct on such vessels is conduct in the territory of the flag, among other early cases. Adra was extraterritorial and the landmark Filartiga case was extraterritorial as have been so many cases post-Filartiga (especially Kadic, Presbyterian Church of the Sudan,...

...the UN Security Council resolution, but the legal and diplomatic costs would be much higher than withdrawing from a mere political commitment. Congress could also, unquestionably, override any domestic legal effects of a UN Security Council Resolution by passing a statute refusing to lift sanctions on Iran, or stopping the President from doing so. Diggs v. Shultz makes clear that a statute passed by Congress later in time than a Security Council resolution will have the force of law by operation of the last in time rule. But the legal...

...sovereignty as much as a necessary feature of sovereignty—something inherent in the Westphalian system. Bill’s second point builds on his own expertise on statutory extraterritoriality, and I certainly defer to him on the particulars here. He thinks I overstate the motivating role of leveling the playing field for American firms, and slight both the role of consumers and the ways that extraterritorial application sometimes harmed American firms, as in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I agree that leveling was not the only factor. I also agree that the FCPA is...