Author: Samantha Besson

[Samantha Besson is a Professor of Public International Law and European Law, University of Fribourg and Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin] I would like to start by thanking Dov Jacobs and the Leiden Journal of International Law for organizing this on-line symposium on my extraterritoriality piece, and, of course, for agreeing to publish the article in the first place. Many thanks also to Professor Marko Milanovic and Professor Cedric Ryngaert for their generous comments and not least for taking the time to deliver them at this busy time of the year. In this brief reply note, I will start with Professor Ryngaert’s comments and then turn to Professor Milanovic’s. Professor Ryngaert’s main critique is that the normative dimension of jurisdiction as I understand it is difficult to pin down (see also Professor Milanovic on its “vagueness”) and in particular to distinguish from mere coercion. I agree that it is a difficult element to grasp, but not less difficult than the concept of jurisdiction itself. Reducing jurisdiction to coercion by virtue of the sheer complexity of its normative dimension amounts not only to choosing the easy route but, as I have argued, a misguided approach to authority and hence to the normative relationship that underlies any human right. In fact, Ryngaert’s own work on the issue makes me believe he agrees with this normative understanding of jurisdiction. Further, the examples given by Ryngaert in order to show how difficult the distinction between coercion and authority is actually dilute the normative test by not focusing on the normative subjects of the laws enforced (and on human rights-holders as a result) and hence by avoiding the reasons that apply to them and not to others. Of course, Ryngaert is right: there will inevitably be a human rights protection gap and it is frustrating, but we know that gap in the context of democratic accountability for international action as well. As a matter of fact, I argue in the article that the tension this gap creates between international or European and domestic human rights law has proven beneficial –slowly certainly, but surely. 

In their article Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro make a seminal contribution to the study of the legality of international law. Their piece is not only a direct contribution to the burgeoning field of philosophy of international law, but it also participates in and deepens an important conversation within the field of general jurisprudence...