Search: extraterritorial sanctions

In Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, Policy, Marko Milanovic has written an illuminating and comprehensive analysis of the increasingly contested question of the geographic scope of human rights treaties. Of course, this is a dynamic area of law—as Marko notes, many of the cases he examines are of quite recent vintage—so undoubtedly he will be at work on second addition in a few years. But for now, this book provides a closer reading and a more detailed, one might even say exhaustive, survey of the relevant issues...

...begging. A treaty can govern both territorial and extraterritorial matters. According to SCOTUS, federal statutes generally cannot govern extraterritorial matters because this would violate international law's comity presumption against the extraterritorial effect of national legislation. The only way federal statutes can have extraterritorial effect is if international law (e.g., a treaty) allows it. Therefore, the authority of a federal statute to have extraterritorial effect is based on international law (e.g., a treaty). Treaties, on the other hand, do not rely on the authority of federal statutory law to have territorial...

...would make a difference given these circumstances. Can prosecutors avoid these constitutional protections by trying him in a foreign court? And then on the other side of the coin, why is a court in Montenegro prosecuting someone for a single murder that occurred in New York? I can hardly imagine that it is an international law violation, and if not, then on what grounds does a Montenegran criminal court have jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes of this sort? I’m not a criminal law expert, so perhaps others can help me out....

in Cambodia until after he was arrested and did not participate in Frank’s detention or interrogation. As for the extraterritorial application of the statute, the Court found that because Section 2251A requires that in the course of the prohibited conduct, the defendant or minor “travel[ ] in … interstate or foreign commerce,” Congress plainly intended that the statute sweep broadly and apply extraterritorially. The language of § 2251A requiring travel in foreign commerce, the broad sweep warranted by child pornography offenses, and Congress’s repeated efforts to prevent exploiters of children...

...against foreign companies has been so prominent as to gain the attention of main-stream media such as the New York Times in this story. In short, while the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors (and several other examples could also be cited) did not rely on extraterritorial jurisdiction – because indeed there is none under the FCPA as to foreign actors – they did rely on what I’ve called de facto extraterritorial jurisdiction given the scant connection the bribery schemes had to the U.S. It is here where the...

...States to regulate foreign harms, why should the other exceptions not be interpreted to authorize a Member State to regulate foreign harms? Moreover, VCLT 31(3) requires treaty provisions to be interpreted in light of subsequent agreements between the parties and relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. If treaties or international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction allow Member States to regulate extraterritorial harms, then this too should inform the interpretation of the Article XX exceptions. On this theory, Member States should be able to take measures under Article...

is intended to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. Thus, on its face, the presumption appears to limit the reach of U.S. law abroad by setting a high threshold for applying statutes extraterritorially. Yet, the presumption does not categorically prohibit extraterritorial application. Rather, it acts as a procedural gatekeeping mechanism. Courts first determine whether the statutory text contains a “clear, affirmative indication” of extraterritorial intent. If no such language exists, the inquiry ends with the statute being confined to domestic application. However, if courts find that there is sufficient...

...assumption that “states cannot effectively ensure respect for their human rights obligations abroad unless constitutional rights also extend extraterritorially.” He questions this assumption, and suggests that some extraterritorial regulation of state agent conduct could be done for example by statute, rather than through constitutional means. This raises important and interesting questions of institutional competence and, as Pierre-Hugues indicates, “self-compliance” by states (which I consider briefly, e.g., p. 111). To a large extent, delineating the extraterritorial reach of domestic rights also defines the role of domestic courts in enforcing those rights...

Raustiala’s book is about the scope of constitutional protections applied abroad. I did not find much in the book addressing whether the Constitution imposes limits on the extraterritorial exercise of federal power. Why is that? We have a robust and well-developed Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but we have precious little guidance as to the scope or even theory of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Can we say that there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative authority outside of our borders based on the Foreign Commerce Clause? I would think...

...does not demand anything like the blanket rule in Hape. This is why prescriptive jurisdiction does not play a significant role in the U.S. and U.K. cases. The extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights is primarily an internal question, to be resolved by interpreting the relevant national instruments rather than by reference to international law. Of course, this is where the real problems begin. As Marko points out, there are many reasons why national courts are hesitant to extend rights extraterritorially. These reasons, however, are not external to the constitutional interpretation...

...if it is affirmed in the section on extraterritorial NIACs, the ICRC seems to include all kind of NIACs. It says "both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC". Don't you think that otherwise it would have said "...a legal basis for internment in extraterritorial NIAC"? Kevin Jon Heller No, because that statement comes in the section on extraterritorial NIAC -- and the section on traditional NIAC says nothing remotely similar....

to such a degree that they were a matter of concern to the international community. By December 2016, the situation between Ukraine and Russia was recognized by the UN General Assembly as involving armed conflict. Further evidence of the gravity of the situation is the fact that, since 2014, a number of countries have imposed sanctions against Russia in connection with this situation. The panel drew from UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 and UN General Assembly Resolution 71/205, as well as Russian sanctions imposed on the United States, EU Member...