Search: extraterritorial sanctions
15 Dec Ashley Deeks’ Problematic Defense of the “Unwilling or Unable” Test
extraterritorial attacks against non-state actors is one of the most difficult and controversial areas of international law, requiring a careful analysis of state practice and opinio juris. Unfortunately, such an analysis is absent from Deeks’ essay. Instead, Deeks relies on a mistaken understanding of neutrality law, provides little more than a few isolated examples of extraterritorial attacks that have ostensibly been justified under the “unwilling or unable” rubric, and ignores all of the contrary examples. That is a methodologically unsound approach, and it significantly weakens what is otherwise a very...06 Mar The ATS, Incentives, and Tradeoffs
...to reverse the arguments against extraterritorial application of the ATS made by the Bush Administration in its brief to the Supreme Court in 2008 in the Apartheid case (which the Solicitor General may be reluctant to do). This may be one reason why the Administration asked the Supreme Court not to address the issue of extraterritoriality in its original amicus brief. One might also add that the amicus brief drafted by Jack Goldsmith in support of defendant corporation Shell seems to have had an effect; Goldsmith and his amicus...13 Aug Emerging Voices: Protecting the World’s Children: R2P and Measures Less-Than-Force
...Union (‘EU’) sanctions (.pdf) in force against Sudan includes travel bans on individuals who ‘commit violations of international humanitarian law or human rights law or other atrocities.’ Among the EU sanctions (.pdf) in force against the Democratic Republic of Congo (‘DRC’) are travel bans and freezing of funds and economic resources of ‘individuals and entities recruiting or using children in armed conflict’ or who are ‘involved in the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict.’ Further, in relation to Syria, the EU has adopted an array of...16 Oct A Response: Reciprocal Unilateralism
I may be on the fringes when we see extraterritorial lawsuits as a method for bringing uncooperative partners back to the bargaining table. (If you’re interested, I’ve explored this last issue, international legal theory, the global growth of extraterritoriality, and the decline of multilateral lawmaking, in a new paper.) Given all this – and the changes in law and science that make such suits more plausible than before – Canadians might well be wise to seriously consider extraterritorial transnational litigation as a pragmatic necessity. One last point, before our guest...02 Nov Extraterritorial Regulation of Human Rights and the Environment Under the WTO General Exceptions
...States to regulate foreign harms, why should the other exceptions not be interpreted to authorize a Member State to regulate foreign harms? Moreover, VCLT 31(3) requires treaty provisions to be interpreted in light of subsequent agreements between the parties and relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. If treaties or international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction allow Member States to regulate extraterritorial harms, then this too should inform the interpretation of the Article XX exceptions. On this theory, Member States should be able to take measures under Article...02 Dec A Response to Milanovic
In Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, Policy, Marko Milanovic has written an illuminating and comprehensive analysis of the increasingly contested question of the geographic scope of human rights treaties. Of course, this is a dynamic area of law—as Marko notes, many of the cases he examines are of quite recent vintage—so undoubtedly he will be at work on second addition in a few years. But for now, this book provides a closer reading and a more detailed, one might even say exhaustive, survey of the relevant issues...08 Mar A Comment on Chimène Keitner’s “Right Beyond Borders”
...does not demand anything like the blanket rule in Hape. This is why prescriptive jurisdiction does not play a significant role in the U.S. and U.K. cases. The extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights is primarily an internal question, to be resolved by interpreting the relevant national instruments rather than by reference to international law. Of course, this is where the real problems begin. As Marko points out, there are many reasons why national courts are hesitant to extend rights extraterritorially. These reasons, however, are not external to the constitutional interpretation...05 Feb Responding to Ryan Goodman About Serdar Mohammed — Part I
...if it is affirmed in the section on extraterritorial NIACs, the ICRC seems to include all kind of NIACs. It says "both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC". Don't you think that otherwise it would have said "...a legal basis for internment in extraterritorial NIAC"? Kevin Jon Heller No, because that statement comes in the section on extraterritorial NIAC -- and the section on traditional NIAC says nothing remotely similar....08 Mar A Response to Milanovic and Verdier on Rights Beyond Borders
...assumption that “states cannot effectively ensure respect for their human rights obligations abroad unless constitutional rights also extend extraterritorially.” He questions this assumption, and suggests that some extraterritorial regulation of state agent conduct could be done for example by statute, rather than through constitutional means. This raises important and interesting questions of institutional competence and, as Pierre-Hugues indicates, “self-compliance” by states (which I consider briefly, e.g., p. 111). To a large extent, delineating the extraterritorial reach of domestic rights also defines the role of domestic courts in enforcing those rights...29 Jul Structuralism and Constitutional Limits on the Extraterritorial Exercise of Power
Raustiala’s book is about the scope of constitutional protections applied abroad. I did not find much in the book addressing whether the Constitution imposes limits on the extraterritorial exercise of federal power. Why is that? We have a robust and well-developed Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but we have precious little guidance as to the scope or even theory of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Can we say that there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative authority outside of our borders based on the Foreign Commerce Clause? I would think...