Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...should be no US interest in furthering impunity. Problem 3:  The claim that it is in US interests to implement sanctions against Court staff The Order imposes potential sanctions freezing “all property and interests in property that are in the US” of “foreign persons” who “directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any US personnel” or nationals of “an ally of the United States” without the consent of that country.  (Section 1, (a)(i)(A)-(B).)  (Given past US Government statements and recent reporting, the “ally”...

...the violence, the medium-term Western response may be sanctions against Ukraine, particularly targeting the assets of President Yanukovich and his allies. But, hanging over all of this like the sword of Damocles is the concern over the stability of the Ukrainian state. The previous Opinio Juris posts, the BBC report linked-to above, and others have noted the sharp electoral and linguistic (Ukraine-speaking/ Russian speaking) divide between western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine. Some have voiced concern that Ukraine faces a possible civil war or a break-up of the country. Edward Lucas...

Call for Papers Two-day international conference on secondary sanctions: On Thursday 2 and Friday 3 December 2021, the Ghent Rolin-Jaequemyns International Law Institute (GRILI) and the Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe (RENFORCE) will host a two-day international conference on secondary sanctions. The conference seeks to explore both the international legal framework governing such sanctions and the potential remedies to challenge them, as well as how these measures may shape the international legal order. The conference will feature separate panels devoted to discuss the impact of secondary sanctions;...

...hold for the institution now that she is departing, which is significant rule of law problem. The issue was extensively discussed at a recent conference on UN Sanctions at Leiden University in the Netherlands. The program is available under the committee documents tab here. In addition to the fragility of this institution, its exclusivity was discussed in detail. The Ombudsperson’s Office has jurisdiction to review and delist individuals on the Al Qaida sanctions lists, but individuals and entities on the 15 other sanctions lists do not have access to this...

...final, full lifting of all multilateral and unilateral sanctions is set to occur on “Transition Day,” which is defined as 8 years from “Adoption Day,” or when the IAEA reports that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use, whichever is earlier. So the JCPOA envisions a full lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran within the next eight years at a maximum, with significant sanctions lifting to occur hopefully within the coming year. There are a number of important legal observations to make about the JCPOA text. I’ll...

...those risks—like the risks entailed in the very similar terrorism-related sanctions regime—are minimal. Professor Guymon argues that rather than dismissing nonproliferation sanctions based on their perceived lack of effect in achieving the desired change in behavior by proliferators, the United States and the international community must maintain nonproliferation sanctions because these sanctions protect the integrity of the national and global systems and actors within the jurisdictions imposing them. By distancing themselves from proliferators and their supporters, the United States, other countries, as well as voluntary private actors, seek to avoid...

of the challenges to UN lawmaking that became very apparent to me during my recent sabbatical study of UN sanctions is that the UN system doesn’t offer many ways to resolve ambiguities in interpretation and implementation. UN sanctions on North Korea, for example, ban luxury goods, but the resolution did not contain a definition of what a luxury good is. Some clarification was provided in a later Security Council resolution issues in March of 2013, some six years later, see this resolution, but this followed a long period of debate...

...of Armenia, so Russia would likely veto any sanctions. Moreover, when a general assembly resolution passed in 2008 condemning Armenia’s actions in Azerbaijan, over half the UN’s member states abstained, further suggesting that there is not a political appetite for sanctions. Another option is unilateral sanctions. Azerbaijan and Turkey have already done this by closing off their borders with Armenia. Since Armenia is landlocked, the only ways to get out of Armenia are through Iran and Georgia. Armenia has dug its heels in, so it seems the best way to...

to such a degree that they were a matter of concern to the international community. By December 2016, the situation between Ukraine and Russia was recognized by the UN General Assembly as involving armed conflict. Further evidence of the gravity of the situation is the fact that, since 2014, a number of countries have imposed sanctions against Russia in connection with this situation. The panel drew from UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 and UN General Assembly Resolution 71/205, as well as Russian sanctions imposed on the United States, EU Member...

...against US companies. Even in purely universal jurisdiction cases, the Court should respect exceptions to exhaustion recognized by international law. An exhaustion requirement seems likely. In the Kiobel oral argument on the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, three Justices likely to support extraterritorial reach — Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor — asked questions sympathetic to an exhaustion requirement (Tss. at 8, 13-15). In response, Paul Hoffman, plaintiffs’ counsel, appeared open to an exhaustion requirement (Tss. at 13-14). No Justice or counsel spoke against an exhaustion requirement; even two Justices generally hostile...

stark contrast to a flexible cadre of state choice-of-law methodologies that liberally apply state law whenever the forum has any interest in the dispute. The result is a counterintuitive disparity: state law enjoys potentially greater extraterritorial reach than federal law. The disparity is counterintuitive because the federal government, not the states, is generally considered the primary actor in foreign affairs. Indeed, the presumption against extraterritoriality springs directly from foreign affairs concerns: its main purpose is to avoid unintended discord with other nations that might result from extraterritorial applications of U.S....

...analysis. 1) It is legal and consistent with U.S. domestic law for a U.S. court to issue contempt sanctions against a foreign sovereign. The most recent authority for this proposition is the quite recent 2011 opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, F.G. Hemisphere Associates v. Congo. In that case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument by Congo (and the U.S. Government) that contempt sanctions due to Congo’s refusal to comply with discovery orders would violate the FSIA. Following the U.S. Court of Appeals for the...