Search: extraterritorial sanctions

Raustiala’s book is about the scope of constitutional protections applied abroad. I did not find much in the book addressing whether the Constitution imposes limits on the extraterritorial exercise of federal power. Why is that? We have a robust and well-developed Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but we have precious little guidance as to the scope or even theory of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Can we say that there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative authority outside of our borders based on the Foreign Commerce Clause? I would think...

...assumption that “states cannot effectively ensure respect for their human rights obligations abroad unless constitutional rights also extend extraterritorially.” He questions this assumption, and suggests that some extraterritorial regulation of state agent conduct could be done for example by statute, rather than through constitutional means. This raises important and interesting questions of institutional competence and, as Pierre-Hugues indicates, “self-compliance” by states (which I consider briefly, e.g., p. 111). To a large extent, delineating the extraterritorial reach of domestic rights also defines the role of domestic courts in enforcing those rights...

is intended to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. Thus, on its face, the presumption appears to limit the reach of U.S. law abroad by setting a high threshold for applying statutes extraterritorially. Yet, the presumption does not categorically prohibit extraterritorial application. Rather, it acts as a procedural gatekeeping mechanism. Courts first determine whether the statutory text contains a “clear, affirmative indication” of extraterritorial intent. If no such language exists, the inquiry ends with the statute being confined to domestic application. However, if courts find that there is sufficient...

...if it is affirmed in the section on extraterritorial NIACs, the ICRC seems to include all kind of NIACs. It says "both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC". Don't you think that otherwise it would have said "...a legal basis for internment in extraterritorial NIAC"? Kevin Jon Heller No, because that statement comes in the section on extraterritorial NIAC -- and the section on traditional NIAC says nothing remotely similar....

...against foreign companies has been so prominent as to gain the attention of main-stream media such as the New York Times in this story. In short, while the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors (and several other examples could also be cited) did not rely on extraterritorial jurisdiction – because indeed there is none under the FCPA as to foreign actors – they did rely on what I’ve called de facto extraterritorial jurisdiction given the scant connection the bribery schemes had to the U.S. It is here where the...

...States to regulate foreign harms, why should the other exceptions not be interpreted to authorize a Member State to regulate foreign harms? Moreover, VCLT 31(3) requires treaty provisions to be interpreted in light of subsequent agreements between the parties and relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. If treaties or international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction allow Member States to regulate extraterritorial harms, then this too should inform the interpretation of the Article XX exceptions. On this theory, Member States should be able to take measures under Article...

...court judge and law professor Winfried Hassemer: our response to deviation in society must be a humane one, so that the state’s manner of interacting with its citizens will stand as a beacon for citizens’ interactions among themselves and encourage humane public discourse. At any rate, demanding tougher sanctions does not answer the question of enforcement of those sanctions. The threat of a sanction alone is not enough; what is needed are officials who register infringements and pass them on to the competent authorities, who then punish them. It is...

to such a degree that they were a matter of concern to the international community. By December 2016, the situation between Ukraine and Russia was recognized by the UN General Assembly as involving armed conflict. Further evidence of the gravity of the situation is the fact that, since 2014, a number of countries have imposed sanctions against Russia in connection with this situation. The panel drew from UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 and UN General Assembly Resolution 71/205, as well as Russian sanctions imposed on the United States, EU Member...

...would undertake the following voluntary measures: Pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services. Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on: Iran’s petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services.5 Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services. · Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry,...

in agreement that it’s “too early to impose sanctions on Iran.” AFP reports that Kofi Annan, meanwhile, has arrived in Iran to let the Iranians know that notwithstanding the clear language of resolution 1696, the UN Secretary General opposes sanctions and believes “patience is more effective.” Sadly, the Security Council’s inaction was rather predictable. Some days ago, the United States already began maneuvering to create an ad hoc coalition of countries that will impose economic sanctions on Iran. However, it’s difficult to believe these efforts will meet substantial success. Iran...

...as “why widespread protest against forged elections in Venezuela, Syria and many other countries around the world have not succeeded”? They implicitly suggest that some nations are not brave enough to pay the price for freedom. Some policy-makers also address the issue by referring to inadequacy of internal or international pressures on a nation. In this regard, the tough economic sanctions imposed on states like Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela is essentially based on an optimistic premise that sanctions would make life harder for the people and eventually lead them...

...should be no US interest in furthering impunity. Problem 3:  The claim that it is in US interests to implement sanctions against Court staff The Order imposes potential sanctions freezing “all property and interests in property that are in the US” of “foreign persons” who “directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any US personnel” or nationals of “an ally of the United States” without the consent of that country.  (Section 1, (a)(i)(A)-(B).)  (Given past US Government statements and recent reporting, the “ally”...