Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...assumption that “states cannot effectively ensure respect for their human rights obligations abroad unless constitutional rights also extend extraterritorially.” He questions this assumption, and suggests that some extraterritorial regulation of state agent conduct could be done for example by statute, rather than through constitutional means. This raises important and interesting questions of institutional competence and, as Pierre-Hugues indicates, “self-compliance” by states (which I consider briefly, e.g., p. 111). To a large extent, delineating the extraterritorial reach of domestic rights also defines the role of domestic courts in enforcing those rights...

is intended to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. Thus, on its face, the presumption appears to limit the reach of U.S. law abroad by setting a high threshold for applying statutes extraterritorially. Yet, the presumption does not categorically prohibit extraterritorial application. Rather, it acts as a procedural gatekeeping mechanism. Courts first determine whether the statutory text contains a “clear, affirmative indication” of extraterritorial intent. If no such language exists, the inquiry ends with the statute being confined to domestic application. However, if courts find that there is sufficient...

...if it is affirmed in the section on extraterritorial NIACs, the ICRC seems to include all kind of NIACs. It says "both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC". Don't you think that otherwise it would have said "...a legal basis for internment in extraterritorial NIAC"? Kevin Jon Heller No, because that statement comes in the section on extraterritorial NIAC -- and the section on traditional NIAC says nothing remotely similar....

...States to regulate foreign harms, why should the other exceptions not be interpreted to authorize a Member State to regulate foreign harms? Moreover, VCLT 31(3) requires treaty provisions to be interpreted in light of subsequent agreements between the parties and relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. If treaties or international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction allow Member States to regulate extraterritorial harms, then this too should inform the interpretation of the Article XX exceptions. On this theory, Member States should be able to take measures under Article...

...against foreign companies has been so prominent as to gain the attention of main-stream media such as the New York Times in this story. In short, while the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors (and several other examples could also be cited) did not rely on extraterritorial jurisdiction – because indeed there is none under the FCPA as to foreign actors – they did rely on what I’ve called de facto extraterritorial jurisdiction given the scant connection the bribery schemes had to the U.S. It is here where the...

I may be on the fringes when we see extraterritorial lawsuits as a method for bringing uncooperative partners back to the bargaining table. (If you’re interested, I’ve explored this last issue, international legal theory, the global growth of extraterritoriality, and the decline of multilateral lawmaking, in a new paper.) Given all this – and the changes in law and science that make such suits more plausible than before – Canadians might well be wise to seriously consider extraterritorial transnational litigation as a pragmatic necessity. One last point, before our guest...

...final, full lifting of all multilateral and unilateral sanctions is set to occur on “Transition Day,” which is defined as 8 years from “Adoption Day,” or when the IAEA reports that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use, whichever is earlier. So the JCPOA envisions a full lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran within the next eight years at a maximum, with significant sanctions lifting to occur hopefully within the coming year. There are a number of important legal observations to make about the JCPOA text. I’ll...

...would undertake the following voluntary measures: Pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services. Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on: Iran’s petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services.5 Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services. · Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry,...

...of Armenia, so Russia would likely veto any sanctions. Moreover, when a general assembly resolution passed in 2008 condemning Armenia’s actions in Azerbaijan, over half the UN’s member states abstained, further suggesting that there is not a political appetite for sanctions. Another option is unilateral sanctions. Azerbaijan and Turkey have already done this by closing off their borders with Armenia. Since Armenia is landlocked, the only ways to get out of Armenia are through Iran and Georgia. Armenia has dug its heels in, so it seems the best way to...

of the challenges to UN lawmaking that became very apparent to me during my recent sabbatical study of UN sanctions is that the UN system doesn’t offer many ways to resolve ambiguities in interpretation and implementation. UN sanctions on North Korea, for example, ban luxury goods, but the resolution did not contain a definition of what a luxury good is. Some clarification was provided in a later Security Council resolution issues in March of 2013, some six years later, see this resolution, but this followed a long period of debate...

...those risks—like the risks entailed in the very similar terrorism-related sanctions regime—are minimal. Professor Guymon argues that rather than dismissing nonproliferation sanctions based on their perceived lack of effect in achieving the desired change in behavior by proliferators, the United States and the international community must maintain nonproliferation sanctions because these sanctions protect the integrity of the national and global systems and actors within the jurisdictions imposing them. By distancing themselves from proliferators and their supporters, the United States, other countries, as well as voluntary private actors, seek to avoid...

...court judge and law professor Winfried Hassemer: our response to deviation in society must be a humane one, so that the state’s manner of interacting with its citizens will stand as a beacon for citizens’ interactions among themselves and encourage humane public discourse. At any rate, demanding tougher sanctions does not answer the question of enforcement of those sanctions. The threat of a sanction alone is not enough; what is needed are officials who register infringements and pass them on to the competent authorities, who then punish them. It is...