Search: crossing lines

...to attack non-state actors in cases of unwillingness or inability of the host State, but rather requested each State to deal with the threats they encountered inside their own borders. In fact, this understanding of a limited set of options available to deal with rebel forces acting across national lines is precisely the legal discussion at the heart of the Mexican and American positions during the 1916 Punitive Expedition, and exactly the reason why I find its inclusion on Deeks’ chart so surprising. But more on this in Part II....

...organize the world along lines of social or racial inclusion and exclusion and to legitimize and domination and suppression” and (2) that they were “more pluralist at the time than admitted”, thus challenging the argument that “takings occurred in a legal vacuum”. There is a solid methodological reason for this dual role understanding, as it allows Stahn to avoid the inter-temporal problem: the idea that legal phenomena should be studied under the law as it existed at the time of their occurrence, not the time of their evaluation. This means...

...“use of force” under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the need to interpret it in tandem with recent ecological violations. Although, there is a dearth of scholarship arguing on similar lines, the imminency of the issue cannot be over-emphasised. The need for a robust framework including state liability in cases of ecocide is imperative, otherwise the biggest perpetrators of ecological destruction i.e. nation states will go unpunished. As the climate crisis deepens and states continue to deploy environmental destruction as a weapon of war, the existing legal architecture,...

...to compromise has opened, moreover, there is no obvious stopping point. There may be situations where the best case scenario falls short of even Mark’s relatively deferential standards. For example, deference to a dictator’s imposition of blanket amnesty paired with some minimal truth-telling process might be necessary to prevent imminent atrocities, even though the arrangement might fail some of Mark’s preferred criteria, such as those pertaining to good faith and democratic legitimacy. Should the specific guidelines still constrain in that circumstance, or should the Court revert to a general choice-of-evils...

...the “discursive turn” in the Court’s judicial style, which I describe and defend in my paper, could reopen debates about supremacy or direct effect, or even fracture the Court along the lines of the Berlin Wall. But there is more to Oliver’s argument. He suggests an alternative future of a Court engaged in a jurisprudence of “mutual monitoring and peer-review” which treats with respect the normative pluralism that presently structures the European legal space. My article sketches out a few possible answers to the first set of concerns and I...

...hawkish in responding to such measures. So, perhaps it’s not surprising that China’s now also beginning to push its case legally, invoking UNCLOS’s provisions on delineating continental shelf rights beyond its 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Specifically, UNCLOS Article 76 provides in paragraphs 7-9: 7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting...

...battlefield or combat activities, the benefits of AI are not as evident as the swelling chorus of AI advocates might suggest. Particularly pertinent here are questions of whether AI systems can or indeed should be taking on a significant role in critical selection and targeting functions, whether they should be making lethal decisions, be involved in ‘accelerated sensor-to-shooter timelines’, play a crucial role in predictive suspect selection and classification, or otherwise assume decisive powers in areas where the ethical stakes are patently high. In recent years, these questions have become...

...disease. While ostensibly adopted to protect public health, such interventions have rarely been accompanied by social relief programmes, such as income support and debt suspension, that are necessary to avoid collateral damage to economic and social rights, including the rights to health, social security, work, and housing. Instead, responses to the pandemic have largely magnified the fault lines of racial, socioeconomic, disability, gender and age inequalities, intensifying the suffering of those already at greatest risk and falling short of State obligations to ensure that responses to public health emergencies do...

...sequester them and do not condemn them as prizes–is a wrong to those states.” Almost three decades later, Philip Jessup argued along the same lines that, even under the League of Nations system ostensibly requiring states to sanction aggressors, “While each member [of the League] may decide for itself regarding the necessity for its own action [in a particular case], it cannot object to other members exercising a like freedom of judgment[.]” Nor did the UN Charter, which assigns sanctioning authority to the UN Security Council but does not ex...

...for example, Congress could have added language to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 along the following lines: “In the event of a conflict between the Geneva Conventions and the procedures specified herein, courts shall apply the procedures embodied in this Act.” Such language would preclude courts from applying the Geneva Conventions by making clear that Congress intended to supersede the Conventions as a matter of domestic law. However, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 does not contain any such provision. Section 3 of the Act creates a new Chapter...

...can’t judge the intentions of another country by looking at its force — like by looking at its force posture. So it’s a challenge to identify effective, confidence-building measures in cyberspace. We’ve got to find a way. For example, the United States is working closely with Russia to reach an agreement that would establish links between our computer emergency response teams and our nuclear risk reduction centers to build cooperation and to set up lines of communication in the event of an alarming incident. . . . The tactic of...

...than “politicizing” the Court (in order to assuage its legitimacy-problem), there is something important to be said for a more minimalist, indeed, “weak” ECJ. The democratic benefits of allowing judges to enter dissenting opinions seem uncertain in the EU-context. You do not want a “supreme” ECJ, which sharply divides over ever more, and ever more controversial, but hugely consequential, constitutional-legal issues (e.g. the “true” balance between market-freedoms and social rights) along, say, national lines or those of “old Europe” versus “new Europe.” You may not want to jeopardize direct effect...