Search: crossing lines

...can’t judge the intentions of another country by looking at its force — like by looking at its force posture. So it’s a challenge to identify effective, confidence-building measures in cyberspace. We’ve got to find a way. For example, the United States is working closely with Russia to reach an agreement that would establish links between our computer emergency response teams and our nuclear risk reduction centers to build cooperation and to set up lines of communication in the event of an alarming incident. . . . The tactic of...

...hawkish in responding to such measures. So, perhaps it’s not surprising that China’s now also beginning to push its case legally, invoking UNCLOS’s provisions on delineating continental shelf rights beyond its 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Specifically, UNCLOS Article 76 provides in paragraphs 7-9: 7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting...

...the “discursive turn” in the Court’s judicial style, which I describe and defend in my paper, could reopen debates about supremacy or direct effect, or even fracture the Court along the lines of the Berlin Wall. But there is more to Oliver’s argument. He suggests an alternative future of a Court engaged in a jurisprudence of “mutual monitoring and peer-review” which treats with respect the normative pluralism that presently structures the European legal space. My article sketches out a few possible answers to the first set of concerns and I...

...organize the world along lines of social or racial inclusion and exclusion and to legitimize and domination and suppression” and (2) that they were “more pluralist at the time than admitted”, thus challenging the argument that “takings occurred in a legal vacuum”. There is a solid methodological reason for this dual role understanding, as it allows Stahn to avoid the inter-temporal problem: the idea that legal phenomena should be studied under the law as it existed at the time of their occurrence, not the time of their evaluation. This means...

...as well. We agree that the US and other countries have internal divisions that complicate their attempts to deal with climate change. We argue, however, that the differences in China are of a far greater magnitude than the blue state/red State divisions in the US and have more serious consequences for climate change. Eastern China is 5 times richer than Western China and the most serious fault lines that produce social instability—rich and poor, industrialized and agrarian, urbanized and rural—fit the East/West divide. Moreover, in the US, blue states turn...

...sequester them and do not condemn them as prizes–is a wrong to those states.” Almost three decades later, Philip Jessup argued along the same lines that, even under the League of Nations system ostensibly requiring states to sanction aggressors, “While each member [of the League] may decide for itself regarding the necessity for its own action [in a particular case], it cannot object to other members exercising a like freedom of judgment[.]” Nor did the UN Charter, which assigns sanctioning authority to the UN Security Council but does not ex...

...liberal democracy is possible beyond the state as constituted by citizens. I think I come out somewhere in between. I agree with Alex that citizenship most readily translates to other forms of territorial governance. Citizenship in the European Union, for example, doesn’t pose a major theoretical challenge. It doesn’t look all that different from citizenship in federal states such as the US. But anything else is much trickier. I’m hardly proposing the end of history here. But conflict and group definition will increasingly be drawn along non-territorial lines. How does...

...far along the paper is. Because of the nature of the workshop, we can only include working drafts that have not yet been accepted for publication. We also workshop early stage projects. If you are interested in presenting on an early stage project, please let us know the working title and a few lines about the idea you are pursuing. Finally, if you are interested in being a discussant, please let us know. We will do our best to get back to everyone in November, and, for those whose working...

...for example, Congress could have added language to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 along the following lines: “In the event of a conflict between the Geneva Conventions and the procedures specified herein, courts shall apply the procedures embodied in this Act.” Such language would preclude courts from applying the Geneva Conventions by making clear that Congress intended to supersede the Conventions as a matter of domestic law. However, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 does not contain any such provision. Section 3 of the Act creates a new Chapter...

...than “politicizing” the Court (in order to assuage its legitimacy-problem), there is something important to be said for a more minimalist, indeed, “weak” ECJ. The democratic benefits of allowing judges to enter dissenting opinions seem uncertain in the EU-context. You do not want a “supreme” ECJ, which sharply divides over ever more, and ever more controversial, but hugely consequential, constitutional-legal issues (e.g. the “true” balance between market-freedoms and social rights) along, say, national lines or those of “old Europe” versus “new Europe.” You may not want to jeopardize direct effect...

...as “case-specific deference to the political branches.” Deference does not mean obsequiousness, but it does mean due regard. As in the sovereign immunity field, there remains a need to balance the vindication of individual rights with the preservation of peaceful and constructive foreign relations. Courts are part of this process. In this sense, debates about the ATS are proxy wars for ongoing debates about the role of tort litigation as a regulatory tool and the role of courts in providing private remedies. On these issues, the battle lines are drawn....

...to compromise has opened, moreover, there is no obvious stopping point. There may be situations where the best case scenario falls short of even Mark’s relatively deferential standards. For example, deference to a dictator’s imposition of blanket amnesty paired with some minimal truth-telling process might be necessary to prevent imminent atrocities, even though the arrangement might fail some of Mark’s preferred criteria, such as those pertaining to good faith and democratic legitimacy. Should the specific guidelines still constrain in that circumstance, or should the Court revert to a general choice-of-evils...