Search: crossing lines

...believe that it is always or even usually the case that the U.S (or any country) must do so. Is it always a good idea to create more domestic law and regulation on any subject regardless of the policy consequences? Why shouldn’t such decisions be made on a case-by-case basis (through our normal democratic and constitutional processes)? All of this suggests that lines about the U.S. “standing alone” and refusing to join the “rules that apply to the rest of the world” are a waste of time. If you want...

...provisions). In taking the example of businesses operating in proximity with the Israeli settlement enterprise, I would say that “bright lines” can be drawn. Through a robust reading of CA1, “home” States of businesses (as we refer to them) have an obligation to prevent their businesses from contributing to the settlement enterprise, amongst other IHL violations in situations of armed conflict. I felt the same about Eve Massingham’s contribution on weapons with the scope of CA1 in Chapter 8, which has been at the very heart of CA1 advocacy, particularly...

...and it is worth mentioning at the outset that it would have been very difficult to organise events in Turkish universities on certain ‘sensitive’ political issues. And yet, it is still worth asking what would happen if we tried to organise a two-day conference on the Question of Palestine in the UK, along the lines of the conference at Boğaziçi University, which addressed various topics including the occupation, resistance, apartheid, zionism, and the right of return. What institutional obstacles might arise, and could such an event even take place?  In...

...law (set out in Section 11.9.2) are also virtually identical to the 1956 version (§369): The Occupying Power may subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions: (1) that are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the GC; (2) to maintain the orderly government of the territory; and (3) to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. The Manual then lists...

...the language of international law is used by both leaders. Putin’s argument plays on American fears and worries but it is framed in the rhetoric of international law. There are some scare lines, such as: “A strike would increase violence and unleash a new wave of terrorism.” There is a description of a “reeling” Afghanistan where “no one can say what will happen after international forces withdraw.” And, he adds, don’t forget the divisions in Iraq and Libya. It is not in “America’s long-term interest” to have U.S. military intervention...

...really emerged several decades later. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 6 (2010) (arguing that 1970s were the key period). We ourselves have no particular expertise in this area, but our emphasis on reciprocal interaction between the national and international levels of law-making provides evidence that might be deployed in sorting out these claims. Roberts helpfully suggests new lines of inquiry in which quantitative analysis can help to play a role. One might, he notes, apply our survey methodology to the various proposals articulated in the 1930s...

...battlefield or combat activities, the benefits of AI are not as evident as the swelling chorus of AI advocates might suggest. Particularly pertinent here are questions of whether AI systems can or indeed should be taking on a significant role in critical selection and targeting functions, whether they should be making lethal decisions, be involved in ‘accelerated sensor-to-shooter timelines’, play a crucial role in predictive suspect selection and classification, or otherwise assume decisive powers in areas where the ethical stakes are patently high. In recent years, these questions have become...

...disease. While ostensibly adopted to protect public health, such interventions have rarely been accompanied by social relief programmes, such as income support and debt suspension, that are necessary to avoid collateral damage to economic and social rights, including the rights to health, social security, work, and housing. Instead, responses to the pandemic have largely magnified the fault lines of racial, socioeconomic, disability, gender and age inequalities, intensifying the suffering of those already at greatest risk and falling short of State obligations to ensure that responses to public health emergencies do...

...sequester them and do not condemn them as prizes–is a wrong to those states.” Almost three decades later, Philip Jessup argued along the same lines that, even under the League of Nations system ostensibly requiring states to sanction aggressors, “While each member [of the League] may decide for itself regarding the necessity for its own action [in a particular case], it cannot object to other members exercising a like freedom of judgment[.]” Nor did the UN Charter, which assigns sanctioning authority to the UN Security Council but does not ex...

...and applying nudges to online news feeds that they think will help so-called ‘non-elites’ make ‘smart’ decisions (see this work of Michael Sandel at 81-112). Aside from the condescension that arises with practices and communications that run along the lines of ‘we know better than you’, which inhibits public trust (see, for example, here and here), nudging raises additional human rights considerations. There are a number of human rights dimensions to the current pandemic that have been highlighted (see, for example, here), including with respect to misinformation (see here and...

...the presumption to restrict ATS claims, then, it would have to introduce a new wrinkle or two. It could say that it applies to jurisdictional statutes (or at least to this one), or it could adopt the presumption as a prudential rule suitable for common-law claims. Once it found a basis for using the presumption, it could say that the presumption is overcome for the high seas but not for foreign territory, along the lines of the Kavanaugh dissent in Doe VIII. In itself, such an outcome wouldn’t be all...

...order and seeks ‘hard guarantees in the form of legal norms that protect the interests of the different actors’ as well as hierarchies with clear lines of authority. Otherwise, the necessary support for international cooperation would be undermined. De Boer is in good company here – not only in that of the many constitutionalists populating the field today, but also of those pluralists who, afraid of the potentially radical implications of their idea, opt for some ultimate relief through a common legal frame. Such a frame is indeed immensely appealing...