Search: battlefield robots

...beyond an active battlefield or theater of operations, there are obviously diplomatic considerations that require caution. Should not the “sole organ” of our nation in international affairs (to quote the dicta most often cited by proponents of exclusive executive power in foreign affairs) consider them? In Yoo’s own words: “Poring over the files of kill-list nominees recalls Lyndon Johnson’s role in tightly controlling bombing strikes during the Vietnam War. During Operation Rolling Thunder, Johnson held Tuesday lunches when he and his advisers picked targets to avoid attacks that might provoke...

...at a recent symposium on the Boundaries of the Battlefield, co-ordinated by my fellow Assistant Editor, Jessica Dorsey, and Başak Çalı posted the second part of her series on international judicial review, comparing two cases of the European Court of Human Rights. In addition to our regular Events and announcements post, Julian announced that Tom Graham, member of the WTO’s Appellate Body, will give the Shapiro lecture at Hofstra on February 6. Roger congratulated David Caron on his appointment as the new dean at the Dickson Poon School of Law...

Critics of the U.S. war on terrorism often deride it as a bad metaphor or an excuse to conduct controversial detentions, interrogations and military trials. But what the Pentagon refers to as the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) has many of the characteristics of a typical armed conflict, even outside of the main battlefield in Afghanistan. As the NYT reports: The United States military since 2004 has used broad, secret authority to carry out nearly a dozen previously undisclosed attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in Syria, Pakistan and...

...include non-state actors is appropriate. Sunday’s operation was another example of state practice undertaken with the belief that the boundaries of the battlefield are not determined by geopolitical lines but rather by the location of participants in an armed conflict, whether the participants are states or non-state actors. This continues to be the standard for determining where the law of armed conflict is properly applied. The second and third sentences of this statement are correct, but they in no way follow from the first sentence. IHL applies to the operation...

...a handful of areas.Finally, Professor Borgen states "we have actually been focused on the Middle East to the detriment of the Atlantic Alliance and Latin American relations." I disagree... we may have been focusing on the Middle East, but with good reason, while Europe and Latin America have engaged in introspective navel gazing in comparison. USpace ..absurd thought -God of the Universe thinkscommunism is SUPEReven though it never worksbecause we are not robotsabsurd thought -God of the Universe feelscommunism is fairfools can't or won't think it throughidiots just keep scheming.....

...read Quirin as you do. It was not articulating a battlefield status, the term "unlawful combatants" referred to combatants whose conduct made them subject to punishment for a law of war violation. However, I wouldn't go so far as to say that the Bush era use of that term was a precursor to "membership" targeting. I am not even sure that membership in a terrorist group is sufficient for targeting in current U.S. practice, as you assert. As Kevin's comments suggest, more is typically alleged to be present then simple...

..., every commander is also a soldier , who needs to obey orders , whether – those of his superior , or above all – Political authority , In such : 3) We need to think , whether , at least , some liability , should be shifted , also to politician . If so , they would think twice before any military action , and we shall have less victims by all means . It's their call finally , for which, commanders, at the battlefield, may pay heavily. And...

...without the responsibility of their superiors. For , one will have to prove first , or deal first : with - effective control , lack or not , of education and instructions, before dismissing any commander , and superior . On the battlefield, not an easy task!! All that , without expressing here , any opinion concerning the Marmara vessel case , since, what happened there, factually , is far as hell from the common assumptions. But , the Israeli governments , always choose not to deal with judicial arenas...

...at any time and in any place. There is no requirement that there be a battlefield already in place before a soldier is attacked (or else who could fire the first shot since there is no battle without the shot, but there could legally be no shot without the battle first). Thus the legality of a Predator strike depends on the status of the target and not his location. If he is a regular soldier in a regular army, or if he is a member of an armed unit of...

...— this was an enormously positive step. Second, on the substance. On first read, I think this is a great statement. It addresses an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. But it also asserts self-defense several times as an alternative. I had been greatly concerned, frankly, that the administration’s lawyers would narrowly confine the justification for targeted killing using drones to situations that would really only cover the military using them on active battlefields. But on first read, this statement does not do that at all....

...an B52, or .50 cal round from an M82A1 sniper rifle against an enemy military commander is ordinary combat. Although literally a targeted killing, it is no different from any battlefield death involving an aimed weapon. Certainly it no longer falls within any reasonable defnition of "extrajudicial execution". There will still be some who argue that even if an attack on a Taliban comander in Afghanistan is combat, the same attack launched five minutes later after he crossed the Pakistan border is somehow legally different. US practice seems to agree...

...tried by their state of nationality for "aiding the enemy" regardless of where their acts occurred. Ex parte Milligan essentially establishes that in U.S. territory they must be tried by Article III courts if not tried (and potentially committed) in an area of active conflict that has "closed the courts." In occupied or combat zones, though, the offense stems from a different source. The protection of civilians on the battlefield in the laws of war began as (and to some extent still is) a bargained-for exchange. This is very clear...