Search: battlefield robots

...as it would have been too much for Iran to admit past violations when agreeing to the JCPOA. The main point of the peace agreement is not a comprehensive justice mechanism of the sort that would be viable if Russia had been utterly vanquished on the battlefield. We do not need another Treaty of Versailles. But taken in total, the proposed text undermines peremptory norms to an inexcusable extent. Providing the “Empire is Over” Clause would underline that we are not entering a new era where the logic of empire...

...advocates; full discovery versus secrecy provisions. While it is tempting to think of administrative detention as lying between the criminal and law-of-war models, depending on how these matters are resolved, an administrative system can be even less liberty-protective than traditional battlefield hearings or more liberty-protective than criminal prosecution (a point Monica makes on p. 409). And these are just variations of procedural or institutional design. I’d like to hear more discussion about substantive questions of administrative detention law. Monica is quite right when she says: The availability of meaningful legal...

...charges brought against him demonstrates that the jury weighed the evidence carefully. Unlike Senator Obama who voted against the MCA and favors giving Al Qaeda terrorists direct access to U.S. civilian courts to contest their detention, I recognize that we cannot treat dangerous terrorists captured on the battlefield as we would common criminals. Of course, that’s not quite Obama’s position. That campaign issued this statement: I commend the military officers who presided over this trial and served on the hearing panel under difficult and unprecedented circumstances. They and all our...

...by the alleged terrorist; such participation is the minimum necessary to connect an individual to a NIAC who is located away from the battlefield and is not a member of an “organized armed group” participating in that conflict, and there is no credible argument that “material support” qualifies as active participation. Wittes and Chesney, by contrast, simply ignore the issue entirely. But let’s assume that the rules of IHL in NIAC do apply to the detention of alleged terrorists apprehended in the U.S. and in other locations that are not...

...have, for so long, actually reflected both States’ will and accounted for battlefield realities. My sense is that, in CNA, the criteria cannot operate long without provoking harmful distrust of the law’s efficacy. The Article set out to highlight what I perceived to be a threatening dissonance between that law and the realities of a rapidly changing and increasingly relevant realm of combat. It seems our discussion reveals potential normative and theoretical points about the evolution of the law of war as well. Professor Corn and I are perhaps like-minded...

...So that is part of the discussion necessarily, even if only to establish status. And this is a discussion driven by legal considerations – if one is engaged in targeting people who are not on the conventional or overt battlefield, or wearing uniforms, or in a camp, or what have you, then it is necessarily far more “intelligence” driven as a form of using force. The intelligence has a strategic use, of course, but it also has a legal function – necessity and, in the special sense I have used...

...because there is zero chance that Bush will be detained anywhere (much less in Canada). In fact, the likely rejection of AI’s view on this by more and more states will undermine AI’s goals in the long run. In any event, I somehow doubt that in the spring of 2013, Amnesty will await (hopefully) then-former President Obama with a similar memorandum (following the legal opinions of folks like Mary Ellen O’Connell that Obama has committed violations of the laws of war) over his authorization of drone attacks outside the battlefield....

...Republic of China government declared sovereignty over the Islands in 1947; only France voiced objections. The Silent International Community after the Armed Conflicts in 1974 The law of occupation is a matter of jus in bello, but the sovereignty of the battlefield is not. As is also noted by Dr. Nguyen, the claim of reparation relies on a prior wrongful act of occupying foreign territories. The international community generally does not acquiesce to unlawful attacks of foreign territories. For example, the disputed Six-Day War in 1967 received a unanimous Security...

...be done “whenever circumstances permit and particularly after an engagement” but “without delay” from this moment on (CIHL Rule 112). Moreover, this is an obligation of means, which belligerents shall observe diligently, for example, by concluding arrangements to set up teams to look for and gather victims from the battlefield areas (API, art. 33 (4)) or by allowing humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC, to carry out this work (API, art. 17 (2)). In contexts where the dead have already been interred and it is suspected that their death results from...

...happened to those people — to those children — is not only a violation of international law, it’s also a danger to our security. Let me explain why. If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them. Over time, our troops would again face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefield President Obama was speaking primarily to a...

...close connection to the first rule, the dead should be buried individually, as far as possible, depending on the number of dead bodies to be interred. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions instruct parties to use individual graves to bury the dead of the adverse party, including the bodies of combatants, picked up on the battlefield—unless the situation does not permit it (art. 17 (1) GCI; 20 (1) GCII). This preference for the individual disposal of the enemy’s dead is even stricter regarding prisoners of war or civilian internees who may only...

...1979 for the top-secret test of a new missile system. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army took South African Defense Force chief Constand Viljoen and his colleagues to the front lines, and Viljoen routinely flew visiting Israeli military advisors and embassy attachés to the battlefield in Angola where his troops were battling Angolan and Cuban forces. There was nuclear cooperation, too: South Africa provided Israel with yellowcake uranium while dozens of Israelis came to South Africa in 1984 with code names and cover stories to work on...