Search: battlefield robots

...be satisfied (the “if you give a mouse a cookie” problem). The NGO advocates fundamentally (i) oppose the CIA ever using force, (ii) oppose targeted killing outside of some legally novel concept of a “hot battlefield” as a violation of human rights law, (iii) do not accept that a process is governed by the rule of law unless an Article III judge has ruled on it (and depending on the outcome, not necessarily even then), rather than any process of accountability among the political branches alone, and (iv) have grave...

...social science faculty and graduate students interested in learning about empirical research. There is more information available about the workshop here. The New York City Bar is hosting an event entitled T argeted Killing Away from a “Hot Battlefield:” Exploring the Legal Issues on May 28, 2013. Click here to register. The University of Amsterdam’s Research Project on Shared Responsibility in International Law (SHARES) will organise a seminar on Distribution of Responsibilities in International Law in Amsterdam on 30 and 31 May 2013. This seminar will consider extra-legal perspectives on...

...by this approach, omission liability ensures accountability at the level of operationalisation of LAWS in the battlefield. Thus, despite the silence of the ICCSt. in this regard, the ICC could fill this gap by drawing from the various sources of applicable law. On balance, it appears that reliance on customary international law might be misplaced as the elements of State practice and opinio juris cannot be strongly established. A more viable route to institute general omission liability is through general principles, with care being taken to avoid the sampling biases....

...U.S. citizens; the question was whether this congressional grant of detention power extended not only to a battlefield in Afghanistan (as in Hamdi), but also to the United States. Last year, Feinstein successfully introduced an amendment to the FY2012 NDAA that carefully preserved the status quo by specifying that the act did not alter existing law or authorities relating to the detention of individuals arrested in the United States, regardless of citizenship. But Feinstein’s amendment to this year’s NDAA weakens the effect of that language. While the new amendment would...

...in relatively short order). See, e.g., Slip. Op. at 51, 52-53. This is at the heart of the mess that Roberts and Kennedy stumble into as they talk past one another in their discussion of direct vs. collateral review. Where the pre-habeas process is battlefield interrogation by U.S. soldiers, as the Solicitor General came close to suggesting in Hamdi, habeas courts will be searching and skeptical. Where the pre-habeas process offers a legitimate chance for innocent detainees to prove that innocence to an independent decisionmaker, the procedures and standards applied...

...beyond an active battlefield or theater of operations, there are obviously diplomatic considerations that require caution. Should not the “sole organ” of our nation in international affairs (to quote the dicta most often cited by proponents of exclusive executive power in foreign affairs) consider them? In Yoo’s own words: “Poring over the files of kill-list nominees recalls Lyndon Johnson’s role in tightly controlling bombing strikes during the Vietnam War. During Operation Rolling Thunder, Johnson held Tuesday lunches when he and his advisers picked targets to avoid attacks that might provoke...

...has its origins in the 1929 Convention. What is the significance (if any) of the mixed practice under that Convention? Does the discussion at the 1999 Montreal Conference leave interpretative options open (other than for the plaintiff!). It looks as if this case could give the rules of treaty interpretation a good workout. Perhaps the failure of the Montreal Conference to resolve the issue (along with some other key issues in carriage by air) allows scope for what Jan describes as a “battlefield” and for continuation of unresolved political issues....

...Hariri, chief of the transitional council’s military committee, reviewed the documents and concluded that they explain the presence of brand-new weapons his men encountered on the battlefield. He expressed outrage that the Chinese were negotiating an arms deal even while his forces suffered heavy casualties in the slow grind toward Tripoli. “I’m almost certain that these guns arrived and were used against our people,” Mr. Hariri said. Senior rebel officials confirmed the authenticity of the four-page memo, written in formal style on the green eagle letterhead used by a government...

...by the alleged terrorist; such participation is the minimum necessary to connect an individual to a NIAC who is located away from the battlefield and is not a member of an “organized armed group” participating in that conflict, and there is no credible argument that “material support” qualifies as active participation. Wittes and Chesney, by contrast, simply ignore the issue entirely. But let’s assume that the rules of IHL in NIAC do apply to the detention of alleged terrorists apprehended in the U.S. and in other locations that are not...

...escalation jumps up further, this calculation may change. Hence, it will be useful to continue thinking about the elements a settlement would need to address, and how it would address them. This would depend on the constellation on the battlefield, the maintenance of international resolve in this matter, and the level of further civilian casualties Ukraine is willing to accept. In short, a settlement will only come about if both sides find themselves in a situation where they have no other, or better, choice. Let us be ready for that...

...military targeting practices means these systems will increasingly shape how commanders see and interpret the battlefield, bringing a whole range of risks. When the conditions of their design remain opaque, and the aims of their developers go unexamined, accountability is not secured but displaced. It is imperative that governance debate moves beyond a focus on human operators to engage more directly with the socio-technical conditions of system design. Photo attribution: “Responsible AI in the Military Domain – REAIM 2023” by Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0...

...unpredictable. More data does not automatically lead to clearer perceptions of the battlefield or a better understanding of the adversary. For instance, Karp stated that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) integrate Palantir’s software capabilities into their targeting practices. Yet, the mass destruction and genocidal violence in Gaza show that AI technologies have provided the IDF not with tools of precision to execute limited military operations, but rather with more potent means of surveillance and lethal violence. Second, by supporting the narrative that data-driven military targeting is automatically more efficient, tech...