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Search: battlefield robots

14 May

...administration. But as we’ve noted, the domestic and international law relevant here is immensely complicated and hardly clear cut. I agree that U.S. citizenship doesn’t give you carte blanche to wage war. But, as one critic quoted in the article points out, it does protect you from being wiretapped without a warrant or interrogated without your Miranda rights. So isn’t it weird that the U.S. Constitution doesn’t give you due process before you die in a drone attack, away from any conventional battlefield that is launched by an non-privileged combatant?...
14.05.10 | |

26 Jan

...security and counterterrorism, articulated the notion of a global NIAC when he stated “[t]here is nothing in international law that…prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.” When we look at this statement from the perspective of the consenting State rather than from the perspective of the attacking State, two things become obvious. The first is that the attacking State’s claims to IHL targeting authorities are...
26.01.16 | |

07 Aug

...it is an entirely legal one. Rather, it reflects the political tension inherent in achieving “just peace.” I agree, as a principle, that the international community cannot condone agression to aggrandize territory. Yet the allocation of geographic territory under permanent ceasefires or peace agreements has frequently “rewarded” — or recognized the reality of — gains on the battlefield. The international community should be concerned with the voluntariness of the agreement, the practicability of enforcement of ceasefires, and whether maintenance of the agreement conforms in all respects with principles of international...
07.08.06 | |

30 Jul

...the United Nations, evidence enough that protecting civilians is not the primary purpose of warnings? International law here asks us to make assumptions about the motivations of a belligerent, which is difficult enough in a court room. On a battlefield what we are left to do is look to a belligerent’s general concern for human life and commitment to international law. We tend to grant those to Israel and deny them to Hamas. When Hamas advises civilians to ignore warnings the IDF asks us to believe that the motivation is...
30.07.14 | |

20 Jan

...Law of Naval Operations provides that incidental injury or collateral damage must not be “excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack.” The concept of proportionality appears in somewhat different terms in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I. Proportionality is at issue not only in battlefield applications, but in the strategic context as well, as reflected in Daniel Webster’s letter to Mr. Fox concerning the Caroline incident (noting that Her Majesty’s Government would have to show that the Canadian authorities did nothing “unreasonable or excessive”?)...
20.01.07 | |

13 Nov

...is well worth noting that even during its heyday in Afghanistan, one of its largest "bases" was in its Pakistani birthplace, and even before the Northwest frontier started to go steadily into the pits after 2006, it was by far the dominant power in the area. And in any case, the Taliban's open refusal to follow international law, particularly on the battlefield, makes the legitimacy of both its rule in Afghanistan and its armed formations dubious to say the least, and coupled with its less-than-legit activities across the frontiers (largely...
13.11.09 | |

19 Feb

...any system to investigate or punish war crimes, let alone desire. National investigations might be inherently biased in favor of their nationals. As for national tribunals, assuming you get that far, the problem is that an asymmetrical battlefield provides plenty of ambiguity. That ambiguity results in doubt of guilt at trial -- and a national tribunal will naturally resolve any doubt in favor of its national (if for no other reason than a lack of self-awareness and self-identification with the accused coupled with a lack thereof with the victim). Even...
19.02.09 | |

12 Jun

...Hamdi. If you think adhering to precedent is question-begging, then you do not respect the rule of law because you find respect for the rule of law to be illogical. It seems to be the case that you consider foreign enemy combatants on foreign battlefields who kill American civilians abroad to be a part of the "We the People" that the Constitution protects, and, unremarkably, I can find no support for that in any of the Anti-Federalist papers that you cite. So I have no idea what Constitution you pretend...
12.06.08 | |

10 Nov

...legally allowed to shoot such individuals as soon as you can identify them as such without the benefit of even the flimsiest trial right on the battlefield. Naturally, I am not advocating this action be taken in all cases (in no small part because not only is it highly distasteful and liable to be abused in horrible ways- which should be reason enough in all but the most trying circumstances- but also because I have a feeling that most of those involved are not the Islamist "Old Guard" form Afghanistan,...
10.11.09 | |

12 Aug

...So you can roll this thing anyway that you wish, but you seem at least to me to always end up with the fact that even our enemies who I detest have minimum rights once captured - however you qualify the battlefield or even if you do not qualify it as a battlefield. As does every human. The debate then merely turns to whether this or that state will recognize that right. Of course one of those basic rights being not to be tortured. If a state does not recognize...
12.08.10 | |

07 Apr

...be targeted. Human rights law generally applies in time of war on the battlefield or during self-defense targetings, but applicable human rights instruments such as the ICCPR apply to a person within the actual power or effective control of the United States -- which is not the case in this instance. See generally http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717 Concerning international law and enhancement of presidential power, see, e.g., Paust, Van Dyke, Malone, International Law and Litigation in the U.S. 271-73 (3 ed. 2009) (West - American Casebook Series). Jordan J. Paust Kal Raustiala Response......
07.04.10 | |

07 Aug

...period of his liberty of an enemy combatant that would have been forfeit on the battlefield. From a utilitarian perspective, I would suggest that it is exceedingly unwise to treat an enemy combatant as a civilian criminal defendant. Under civilian criminal law, you are deciding whether to punish the perpetrator after the fact. Thus, one can afford to release ten guilty people so that one innocent person is not punished. However, the equation fundamentally changes when you are at war. Holding an enemy combatant as a prisoner of war is...
07.08.08 | |