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Search: battlefield robots

22 Nov

Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and a number of other former U.S. Department of Justice officials filed an amicus brief yesterday in Al-Marri v. Wright, a case currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (see the WPost article here). As a legal argument, the amicus brief offers little that is new or surprising. It argues that the “enemy combatant” designation cannot be used against civilians capture outside the battlefield – this is quite likely to be the next front in the legal war over “enemy...
22.11.06 | |

26 Jan

...security and counterterrorism, articulated the notion of a global NIAC when he stated “[t]here is nothing in international law that…prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.” When we look at this statement from the perspective of the consenting State rather than from the perspective of the attacking State, two things become obvious. The first is that the attacking State’s claims to IHL targeting authorities are...
26.01.16 | |

07 Aug

...it is an entirely legal one. Rather, it reflects the political tension inherent in achieving “just peace.” I agree, as a principle, that the international community cannot condone agression to aggrandize territory. Yet the allocation of geographic territory under permanent ceasefires or peace agreements has frequently “rewarded” — or recognized the reality of — gains on the battlefield. The international community should be concerned with the voluntariness of the agreement, the practicability of enforcement of ceasefires, and whether maintenance of the agreement conforms in all respects with principles of international...
07.08.06 | |

20 Jan

...Law of Naval Operations provides that incidental injury or collateral damage must not be “excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack.” The concept of proportionality appears in somewhat different terms in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I. Proportionality is at issue not only in battlefield applications, but in the strategic context as well, as reflected in Daniel Webster’s letter to Mr. Fox concerning the Caroline incident (noting that Her Majesty’s Government would have to show that the Canadian authorities did nothing “unreasonable or excessive”?)...
20.01.07 | |

14 May

...administration. But as we’ve noted, the domestic and international law relevant here is immensely complicated and hardly clear cut. I agree that U.S. citizenship doesn’t give you carte blanche to wage war. But, as one critic quoted in the article points out, it does protect you from being wiretapped without a warrant or interrogated without your Miranda rights. So isn’t it weird that the U.S. Constitution doesn’t give you due process before you die in a drone attack, away from any conventional battlefield that is launched by an non-privileged combatant?...
14.05.10 | |

28 Feb

...human rights and the law of war mutually exclusive. Considering the world as a comprehensive battlefield in which democracies are combating the war on terror is contrary to the rules of war. As in other different sectors of international law, the scope of a regulation is primarily territorial. Since we cannot consider the entire world as a battlefield, outside the zone of operations, there are no combatants, and thus no targets a priori. The reasoning of those who think that the term “war” to refer to international struggle against terrorism...
28.02.10 | |

21 Jul

...embassies, the Cole etc. are such overwhelming crimes that I think they negate the possibility of a truth and reconciliation type process. Feel free to make any normative argument you want, but I think my empirical point is accurate. Truch commissions investigate bad acts committed against good people, looking at bad acts againt bad people would be unprecedented. Kevin Jon Heller So all the detainees at Guantanamo who were picked up away from the battlefield by warlords looking for bounties, against whom the US government has no evidence of any...
21.07.08 | |

31 Jul

Howard Gilbert POWs are not limited to battlefield capture, and need not be people who have engaged in combat. With a conventional enemy army, anyone in uniform may be captured, including the cook who spent the war peeling potatoes or the file clerk who shuffles paper. Any member of the enemy armed services contributes to the war effort, and the purpose of detention in international law is to deny the enemy army their services for the duration of the hostilities. In the current conflict the enemy does not wear a...
31.07.08 | |

03 Jul

...circumstances; Israeli intelligence is good, but, for instance, it is unlikely to have access to contact information for someone in every home in Gaza in order to make a warning phone call that provides specific directions. More, the nature of the battle and battlefield in Gaza makes providing a clear "escape corridor" difficult; unlike a war between militaries, in which civilian areas are mostly free of targets and combatants (rendering relatively easy the identification of areas that will be free of combat), the battlefield in Gaza is mutable and determined...
03.07.15 | |

09 May

Michael Another pragmatic reason for rejecting our current standards of prisoner/detainee treatment is the negative impact it has on surrender rates in battlefield encounters. Anecdotal evidence both from WWII and the Gulf Wars indicates enemy combatants surrendered to our forces at higher rates because of our known moderation in prisoner treatment. I fear we have now lost that reputation and the next war we fight may be bloodier as a consequence. Michael Another pragmatic reason for rejecting our current standards of prisoner/detainee treatment is the negative impact it has on...
09.05.08 | |

02 May

...detention of combatants seized on the battlefield, she warned that "if the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel." The threat posed to states by international terrorism is of a nature entirely unlike the traditional state-on-state war (or even intra-state wars like civil wars and rebellions) that the laws of war developed to regulate, and thus the laws of war need to adapt to adequately account for the new type of...
02.05.08 | |

05 May

...but retreating from the battlefield remains a lawful target, but that is because operationally it is apparent that such actions are inconsistent with clearly expressing an intention to surrender. No surprise to the operators there. Another issue which I think you alluded to, and one that Alan is better placed to comment on than I, is that there is a distinction between land forces and maritime (and, I add, air). At the simplest level, a lone sailor on deck with his or her hands in the air is unlikely to...
05.05.11 | |