Search: UNCLOS

the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention — lays out a comprehensive set of rules governing ocean issues, including protection of marine environments. All Arctic nations except the U.S. have signed. “If this were a ball game,” one Coast Guard admiral told me, “the U.S. wouldn’t be on the field or even in the stadium.” This seems right to me, and is a compelling reason for joining UNCLOS that may overcome objections in the U.S. Senate. Having said that, if the U.S. does not join UNCLOS, it is of course...

...in lesser-known foreign affairs issues. Still, I value these hearings not simply because they give a sense of what the nominee will be like as Secretary, but also for the signals the hearings send about what topics are on the rise in terms of priority and attention for both the State Department and the SFRC. To that end, I was interested to see what treaties came up during Tuesday’s hearing. Three in particular caught my attention: (1) START extension talks; (2) the CTBT; and (3) UNCLOS. Newly-minted SFRC chair John...

...hard to argue that Israel committed piracy but since neither Israel nor Turkey are members to UNCLOS, maybe it would be useful to look into customary law a little more before closing the debate. Though I would be surprised if the answer was Israel committed piracy. My guess is UNCLOS reflects CIL on this regard... Ali Julian The piracy issue, as put forth in your post, is a diversion and a side show. So I am not going to even write about it. The Israeli propaganda on this case, which...

...on is a rock, not an island within the meaning of UNCLOS Art. 121(3), and hence cannot grant China a 12 mile territorial sea even if China did have sovereignty. Since some of these rocks/islands fall within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone, this is not a sovereignty issue but a UNCLOS issue. I am not sure that the Philippines is right about this, but they certainly have a good case. It is also worth noting that the Chinese statement is conspicuously silent on China’s obligation under UNCLOS to at least...

It’s official. US ratification of UNCLOS is dead (at least for this year). And, perhaps more significantly, the treaty was sunk by two senators, Robert Portman and Kelly Ayotte, both of whom appear to be on Republican nominee Mitt Romney’s vice-presidential short list. Their announcements, in a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, brings the number of announced U.S. Senators opposing US ratification to 34. This effectively kills UNCLOS for this Congress. The joint letter by Senators Portman and Ayotte cites most of the same objections set forth ably...

...accelerating global warming, which is a key driver of climate change (2021 IPCC Report,  p. v & 6).  The oceans serve as a “fundamental climate regulator” (2019 IPCC Report,  p. 78). Interfering with this key climate regulator can further degrade the global climate system. Therefore, it is not surprising that ITLOS AO affirmed that the 169 States party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have “specific obligations to take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from anthropogenic GHG emissions and...

and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. The most logical reading of this language here is that the legal issue between Ghana and Argentina: is there immunity for the warship? — is not a UNCLOS question. And nothing in Argentina’s request for provisional measures makes me think that it is should be thought of as a UNCLOS question. As Professor Happold notes: Subsection A of Section 3 of Part II of UNCLOs deals with...

...China will do now. It seems likely that they will continue to ignore the arbitration and question its propriety. But China can no longer claim that the arbitration cannot proceed without China’s participation. This article from the reliably hawkish state-owned Global Times offers a pretty clear-eyed analysis, correctly noting that UNCLOS itself grants the ITLOS arbitral tribunal the power to determine its own jurisdiction, and that UNCLOS also specifies the procedure for appointing arbitrators. It also notes that China’s position is going to be somewhat more difficult, and that the...

or its outcome. UPDATE: That was fast. The SFRC voted 17 to 4 to favorably recommend the Senate give its advice and consent to accede to UNCLOS. Next up — the full Senate. I’m assuming that in addition to debates over accession itself, we might also see some debate over what understandings and declarations to append to the Senate resolution of advice and consent (the Senate will probably not come up with any reservations since UNCLOS Art. 309 prohibits reservations or exceptions not expressly permitted by other articles of UNCLOS)....

...and compliant with UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS, states may only claim maritime rights such as an EEZ from land features like a nation’s coastline or its islands. Second, and more importantly, the spokesperson further stated that “No country including China has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.” By making such a statement, this phrase suggests that the “nine-dashed line” doesn’t represent a claim to maritime rights (such as historic rights), much less a claim to sovereignty over the water space enclose by the line. More likely, the line indicates...

...a sovereign territory of the coastal State, the EEZ does not entail sovereignty but it grants the coastal State sovereign rights over natural resources (see UNCLOS, Part V). During the UNCLOS negotiations, there was a group of twenty-three States arguing that the territorial sea could extend up to 200nm. Allegedly, they were aware that their proposal would not receive universal acceptation, and thus they decided to support the proposal of the creation of the EEZ, which ended up being successful.  Before the issue was settled by UNCLOS, there were intense...

...fishing, however, several States, including Australia, China, Ireland, Spain and the UK, objected that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions except in disputes involving the international seabed. Writing separately, Judge Lucky characterized the States’ jurisdictional objections as “cogent, clear and articulate, as well as considerably persuasive,” but he ultimately rejected them (Separate Opinion of Lucky, J.). In doing so, Judge Lucky opined that UNCLOS “is akin to (comparable with) a national constitution” and that, just as the “living constitution” doctrine advocates argue, UNCLOS “must ‘grow’ in accordance with...