Does the U.S. Really Need The Law of the Sea Treaty to Make Claims in the Arctic?

Does the U.S. Really Need The Law of the Sea Treaty to Make Claims in the Arctic?

Here is another persuasive account of why the U.S. is disadvantaged by not joining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  The case is fairly simple: There is a lot of oil and natural gas up there, and the U.S. can’t negotiate with other countries to divvy it up until it signs on to UNCLOS.

The 5.5 million-square-mile area north of the Arctic Circle — part of the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark (which owns Greenland), Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden — contains up to 25 percent of the Earth’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. . . .
But to remove those resources you have to own them, and nations are now scrambling to claim vast new areas of sea bottom. They can do so by proving them to be extensions of their continental shelves. In summer, U.S., Russian, Canadian, and Danish scientists aboard icebreakers conduct studies to support claims submitted to a U.N. commission. In theory, the U.S. could gain an undersea region as big as California.
That’s the good news, but the bad news is that the United States is last in the claims race. The U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has begun examining claims from Russia and Norway, which could be granted before the U.S. formally joins the process. Although the U.S. is gathering information for a claim, it cannot be submitted — nor can the U.S. have a say in the claims of other nations — until the government signs an international treaty. The agreement under which the apportionment of riches will go forward — the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention — lays out a comprehensive set of rules governing ocean issues, including protection of marine environments. All Arctic nations except the U.S. have signed. “If this were a ball game,” one Coast Guard admiral told me, “the U.S. wouldn’t be on the field or even in the stadium.”
This seems right to me, and is a compelling reason for joining UNCLOS that may overcome objections in the U.S. Senate.  Having said that, if the U.S. does not join UNCLOS, it is of course not bound by any of the determinations of the UN Continental Shelf Commission.  It would be harder, but in theory the U.S. could simply work out bilateral deals with all of the claimants on delimitations on the continental shelf.  Am I missing something? I admit this might be really hard and complicated, but I think it is a viable option if the U.S. doesn’t join UNCLOS. Since passage of UNCLOS is hardly assured, even in the current U.S. Senate, perhaps the U.S. needs a Plan B?
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John Noyes
John Noyes

Julian: I think the points you raise argue strongly in favor of U.S. accession to the LOS Convention. I do not see that a “bilateral deals” approach could work.  Even under the LOS Convention, of course, states still must make bilateral agreements (or proceed to arbitration, etc.) to delimit disputed continental shelf maritime boundaries with their neighbors.  The CLCS is concerned with continental shelf outer limits, not boundaries between adjacent states.  The CLCS will in fact not make its recommendations concerning the outer limits of any part of the continental shelf that is the subject o a maritime boundary dispute, unless the disputing states make joint submissions to the CLCS (something that several states parties to the Convention have done); or states may make partial submissions to the CLCS (related to areas in which there is no disputed boundary with a neighbor) and save submissions related to disputed areas until after the maritime boundaries have been delimited.  No “bilateral deals” can substitute for the CLCS function, which is to make recommendations concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines — that is, where the continental shelf borders on the Area (deep seabed) beyond the… Read more »

Caitlyn Antrim
Caitlyn Antrim

The Arctic is not the only area in which the US has interests beyond the EEZ. Consideration of a “Plan B” should draw from past experience with regard to the mineral resources of the deep seabed. After the US decided not to join the LOS Convention due to President Reagan’s objections to the deep seabed mineral provisions, the US sought to set up a “reciprocating states” agreement for mutual recognition of minesite claims on the deep seabed. The US succeeded in establishing this regime, but only to the point that the other parties to the arrangement joined the Convention in conjunction with the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Part XI. Up to that point, the other parties in the reciprocating states agreement had kept their options open by negotiating with the US and by participating in the Preparatory Commission for the LOS Convention. When the Convention came into force, our allies joined it and, as required by the Convention, gave the new International Seabed Authority full authority over recognition of minesite claims, leaving the US isolated and unable to provide exclusive access except against other US firms. The collapse of the Reciprocating States regime and the isolation and demise of… Read more »

Anonsters
Anonsters

Let me just say that those were two of the most interesting comments I’ve ever read at OJ. Well done, commenters. 🙂