Search: UNCLOS

not to walk down the arbitration path meant for UNCLOS arbitration involving major powers and for the discussion on UNCLOS ratification in the US. When the Philippines’ government decided to continue with the arbitration anyway, Julian didn’t consider this to be a futile exercise, or at least not any more futile than when China had decided to participate. Kevin didn’t share Julian Assange’s optimism that a successful run in the upcoming Australian elections would lead the US to have to drop charges against him. As our regular readers will remember,...

...the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) being accepted by the UNSC as the legal framework applicable to ocean endeavours, including countering illicit activities at sea. It was emphasised that international disputes should be determined peacefully and in accordance with international law, as was done by India in its maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh. This reaffirmed the primacy of international law, which was adopted and endorsed by member states of the UNSC. The primacy of international law augments in what India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishanakar said earlier, this month, that...

...migrants who may not fulfil the requirements for regular entry. One of the arguments voiced in the national debate is that UNCLOS was not drafted with migrant vessels in mind, reflecting the concern that SAR duties are being abused by smuggling networks. The Convention does not limit rescue obligations to ‘legal’ or ‘regular navigation’ and does not include any exception from the duty to rescue. Article 98 UNCLOS explicitly states that the duty covers ‘any person’ found at sea in danger of being lost, in other words, regardless of immigration...

...My guess is that Chinese thinking is turning in a different direction, especially as its claims date from the pre-UNCLOS period and as its naval power continues to expand. This editorial in the government-approved China Daily might be indicative. As tension heats up in the South China Sea, some bordering countries insist on solving the dispute simply within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but this insistence ignores history and violates inter-temporal law, a doctrine of international law. This seems like a...

...Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a party to UNCLOS, Canada is strictly limited by Article 311 of the Convention in the extent to which it can attempt to alter the effect of UNCLOS by bilateral treaties. Any attempt to do so would have no effect on the navigation rights of Russia, the EU member-states, or any other state. Moreover, any such bilateral agreement would likely be viewed by the other coastal state members of the Arctic Council as inconsistent with the spirit of the 2008 Ilulissat...

...be to seek arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS, just as the Philippines has done. Of course, China would have the same defense and likely the same reaction to any Vietnam claim: that China’s Article 298 declaration excluding disputes over matters involving “sea boundary delimitations”or “involving historic bays or titles….” would exclude jurisdiction. Moreover, China might further argue that Article 298 also allows it exclude “disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to...

the continental shelf as opposed to the deep sea seabed (e.g., the boundaries to the West). Accordingly, all states have some interest in the delimitation, due to the exclusive rights of the coastal state over the declared continental shelf area (see Article 77 UNCLOS on the concept of exclusive rights). That is why the coastal state(s) cannot, under the regime of the UNCLOS, make the determination alone. UNCLOS establishes a compromise between the interests of the coastal state(s) and the interests of all other states. The fact that other zones...

Jeremy Rabkin, a long time critic of contemporary international law and institutions, has a more detailed and persuasive attack on the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea in this week’s Weekly Standard than his previous joint op-ed with Jack Goldsmith some weeks back. As the U.S. Senate gears up for ratification hearings, Rabkin’s voice will no doubt be heard. His main objection is to UNCLOS’s dispute settlement provisions, which he believes will unduly threaten the U.S. Navy’s freedom on the seas to protect U.S. national interests. Here is...

...to fully articulate U.S. interests in treaty-making (let alone give a balanced overview of the arguments over UNCLOS). Thus, I think the more noteworthy thing here is the fact that the remarks are coming from the President himself. It’s one thing to call out the Senate on a specific treaty like the Disabilities Convention, but this slap is more systemic. President Obama has not had a good record when it comes to making treaties through the Article II Advice and Consent process. With the exception of the new START treaty,...

...flag-state or that of the nationality of the accused crew. UNCLOS Article 97 establishes that rule for incidents on the high seas (which this doesn’t seem to be) and even then only for cases of a collision or any other incident of navigation.” But, this was a shooting not a collision, and I don’t see the navigational incident argument either. Thus, I don’t think Article 97 limits prescriptive jurisdiction to the flag state — Italy — or that of the accused (also Italy). Nor do I think the SUA Convention...

Ian Henderson Dear Nikolaos, Thank you for the very interesting and informative post. Certainly a complex part of the world. Articles 19, 21, 40 and 54 of the UNCLOS make it clear that hydrographic surveys would require the permission of the coastal State(s) during innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sealanes passage. Can you please advise why the conduct of seismic surveys within the continental shelf and the EEZ of another State are contrary to international law? Is there a part of UNCLOS that I have overlooked or is it...

...Last week, Korea made a partial submission to the Commission seeking to identify the outer limits of Korea’s continental shelf, which, unsurprisingly, overlap with China’s claim. The map here is illustrative. Moreover, in a note dated December 28, 2012, Japan asked the Commission not to consider China’s submission because the distance between the coasts in the area covered by the submission is less than 400 nautical miles, and pursuant to UNCLOS Article 83, the delimitation must be effected by agreement of the parties. As a result, Japan is maintaining its...