Search: UNCLOS

...UNCLOS is especially relevant here, as it states that acts of piracy committed by a warship – whose crew has mutinied and taken control – are to be treated as piracy carried out by a private vessel. By taking control of Odysseus’ ship, Eurylochus and his followers secede from the official army of Ithaca and engage in acts of piracy. Their actions – attacking, stabbing, and detaining Odysseus – fit the “illegal violence” criterion of piracy under UNCLOS. After being stabbed unconscious, Odysseus awakens in chains on the island of...

...Failures on UNCLOS” on 1 February, at 17:00 GMT / 18:00 CET. This is the inaugural seminar in Volterra Fietta’s seminar series to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The distinguished panel of speakers will be: Malcolm Evans, Professor of public international law at the University of Bristol; Nilüfer Oral, Director of the Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore and an elected member of the International Law Commission; Alex G. Oude Elferink, Director of the Netherlands...

not to walk down the arbitration path meant for UNCLOS arbitration involving major powers and for the discussion on UNCLOS ratification in the US. When the Philippines’ government decided to continue with the arbitration anyway, Julian didn’t consider this to be a futile exercise, or at least not any more futile than when China had decided to participate. Kevin didn’t share Julian Assange’s optimism that a successful run in the upcoming Australian elections would lead the US to have to drop charges against him. As our regular readers will remember,...

As this Voice of America report notes, the Philippine government is determined to forge ahead with its UNCLOS arbitration, even though China is refusing to participate in the arbitration. This seems to be a sensible strategy, at least from a legal point of view, because it is plainly within its legal rights to do so. But would a one-party arbitration be futile? The VOA quotes Prof. Myron Nordquist of UVA on this point: But how would one-party arbitration work, exactly? Professor Myron Nordquist of the Center for Oceans Law and...

...migrants who may not fulfil the requirements for regular entry. One of the arguments voiced in the national debate is that UNCLOS was not drafted with migrant vessels in mind, reflecting the concern that SAR duties are being abused by smuggling networks. The Convention does not limit rescue obligations to ‘legal’ or ‘regular navigation’ and does not include any exception from the duty to rescue. Article 98 UNCLOS explicitly states that the duty covers ‘any person’ found at sea in danger of being lost, in other words, regardless of immigration...

...My guess is that Chinese thinking is turning in a different direction, especially as its claims date from the pre-UNCLOS period and as its naval power continues to expand. This editorial in the government-approved China Daily might be indicative. As tension heats up in the South China Sea, some bordering countries insist on solving the dispute simply within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but this insistence ignores history and violates inter-temporal law, a doctrine of international law. This seems like a...

...therefore unlikely that there will be one legal definition that fits all USVs. How USVs are classified under the law of the sea impacts on where, when and how they are used in armed conflicts. Only warships have belligerent rights in naval warfare, according to which only warships can use armed force. Warships are defined in Article 29 UNCLOS as:  a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the...

...be to seek arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS, just as the Philippines has done. Of course, China would have the same defense and likely the same reaction to any Vietnam claim: that China’s Article 298 declaration excluding disputes over matters involving “sea boundary delimitations”or “involving historic bays or titles….” would exclude jurisdiction. Moreover, China might further argue that Article 298 also allows it exclude “disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to...

the continental shelf as opposed to the deep sea seabed (e.g., the boundaries to the West). Accordingly, all states have some interest in the delimitation, due to the exclusive rights of the coastal state over the declared continental shelf area (see Article 77 UNCLOS on the concept of exclusive rights). That is why the coastal state(s) cannot, under the regime of the UNCLOS, make the determination alone. UNCLOS establishes a compromise between the interests of the coastal state(s) and the interests of all other states. The fact that other zones...

Jeremy Rabkin, a long time critic of contemporary international law and institutions, has a more detailed and persuasive attack on the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea in this week’s Weekly Standard than his previous joint op-ed with Jack Goldsmith some weeks back. As the U.S. Senate gears up for ratification hearings, Rabkin’s voice will no doubt be heard. His main objection is to UNCLOS’s dispute settlement provisions, which he believes will unduly threaten the U.S. Navy’s freedom on the seas to protect U.S. national interests. Here is...

...to fully articulate U.S. interests in treaty-making (let alone give a balanced overview of the arguments over UNCLOS). Thus, I think the more noteworthy thing here is the fact that the remarks are coming from the President himself. It’s one thing to call out the Senate on a specific treaty like the Disabilities Convention, but this slap is more systemic. President Obama has not had a good record when it comes to making treaties through the Article II Advice and Consent process. With the exception of the new START treaty,...

...flag-state or that of the nationality of the accused crew. UNCLOS Article 97 establishes that rule for incidents on the high seas (which this doesn’t seem to be) and even then only for cases of a collision or any other incident of navigation.” But, this was a shooting not a collision, and I don’t see the navigational incident argument either. Thus, I don’t think Article 97 limits prescriptive jurisdiction to the flag state — Italy — or that of the accused (also Italy). Nor do I think the SUA Convention...