Search: UNCLOS

...abiding by the rules for freedom of navigation set forth in UNCLOS, while disagreeing dramatically on what each side is allowed to do. From the U.S. perspective, its navy should be allowed to enter the 12 nm territorial seas around China’s “islands” as long as they abide by the rules of innocent passage. But the Chinese will say that freedom of navigation doesn’t permit this activity. Most states agree with the U.S. definition of freedom of navigation. But some states (including neighboring South China Sea coastal states) do agree with...

...alone - not to get recognized by the UN. We certainly don't plan to ignore international law. Rather, we will try to carve out as much freedom as we can get within international law. This probably means being outside EEZs (> 200nm from any land). This means UNCLOS 60 doesn't apply, nor does UNCLOS 89 (we aren't claiming sovereignty, we are just a ship with a flag). Since the flagging nation is unlikely to protect us, it behooves any seastead to avoid doing things which will piss off existing countries....

that arbitral tribunal has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. This is just semantics in my view. What if China phrases it as something like: Arbitration is an option when mutually agreed to. Absent mutual agreement, the primary means for resolving disputes under UNCLOS is through negotiations (Article 279), exchange of views (Article 283), and conciliation procedures (Article 284). The right to opt-out of UNCLOS provided maritime boundary arbitration at any time is guaranteed by Article 298. Many nations have explicitly exercised that right include Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark,...

Here is the website for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a (very long) video of the hearings on UNCLOS and the written testimony of Secretary of State Clinton, Defense Secretary Panetta, and Gen. Dempsey. I am in grading hell right now, so I haven’t had time to go through the hearing video. It looks, from my quick glance, to be the same exact arguments that have been made over the past 20 years on UNCLOS. (Did Sen. Lugar give that same statement back in 2002? Hard to say)....

...Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a party to UNCLOS, Canada is strictly limited by Article 311 of the Convention in the extent to which it can attempt to alter the effect of UNCLOS by bilateral treaties. Any attempt to do so would have no effect on the navigation rights of Russia, the EU member-states, or any other state. Moreover, any such bilateral agreement would likely be viewed by the other coastal state members of the Arctic Council as inconsistent with the spirit of the 2008 Ilulissat...

...attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Part two will explore how the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and the laws of naval warfare (LoNW) will (or more possibly should) treat submarine data cables for the purposes of targeting in military operations. Wilful or Negligent Damage by Vessels While Article 2 of the 1884 Paris Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables (Paris Convention), and Article 113 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) create an obligation for a state to criminalise wilful or...

...climate change, things are clearer. States parties have negotiated two annexes attached to the UNFCCC. Nations that are not included in these annexes are recognized as developing countries. Some other international treaties have employed the “developed/developing” division without offering definitions. UNCLOS and ICESCR serve as examples in this regard. Nevertheless, the United Nations (UN) has furnished references for related terms found in UNCLOS, such as “developing landlocked States” (Article 69.3) and “least developed States” (Article 161.1.d). This reminds us to look at the approaches adopted by international organizations to define...

...of posts focused on the role that international law may or may not have in resolving China’s various maritime disputes (e.g., 1, 2). Others were concerned with the debacle over Russia’s detention of the crew of the Greenpeace Arctic Sunrise (see, e.g., 1, 2, 3), whether US actions regarding UNCLOS are a precedent for Russia and China balking at UNCLOS dispute settlement, and various other UNCLOS related topics (such as this). And there is the issue of China’s aircraft identification zone (1, 2). The end of the year brought new...

...a different view, emphasising the potential legal stability of the status of an ‘island’ notwithstanding sea-level rise effects. Antigua and Barbuda have stated that ‘sea-level rise cannot lead to the requalification of islands as rocks’, implying that the status of an ‘island’ would be undisturbed by the effects of sea-level rise. This position also underpins the view held by members of the Pacific Islands Forum and the Alliance of Small Island States that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) supports ‘maintaining maritime zones established in...

...A history of egoism This negotiation has been shaped by an older debate. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea took place against the backdrop of a broader attempt to construct a New International Economic Order. Significant parts of the treaty that was the outcome of that conference – the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – reflected this, in particular Part XI, the seabed regime. Resources mined in seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction were the ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’, and profits...

...the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) being accepted by the UNSC as the legal framework applicable to ocean endeavours, including countering illicit activities at sea. It was emphasised that international disputes should be determined peacefully and in accordance with international law, as was done by India in its maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh. This reaffirmed the primacy of international law, which was adopted and endorsed by member states of the UNSC. The primacy of international law augments in what India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishanakar said earlier, this month, that...

...the rules governing the international trading system. Greater agreement over the scope and application of a normative regime would suggest fewer disputes, and fewer underlying disputes could explain the paucity of dispute settlement cases before ITLOS. Or, perhaps the reason is structural. UNCLOS Art. 287 gives state parties three choices for resolving their ocean law disputes – (1) ITLOS; (2) the ICJ; or (3) various types of arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with UNCLOS Annexes VII or VIII. Thus, unlike the WTO’s compulsory panel/appellate body system, ITLOS faces real competition...