Search: Syria Insta-Symposium

it seems to me, is this: either the US believes in unilateral humanitarian intervention or it doesn’t. If it does, it should have been willing to use militarily force in Syria long ago, when tens of thousands of civilians were being indiscriminately slaughtered by the Syrian government. If it doesn’t, the fact that civilians are now being indiscriminately slaughtered by the Syrian government through the use of chemical weapons should be irrelevant. Murder by chemical weapons is terrible. But so is any kind of murder. As Walt says, “[d]ead is...

...The Strategic Culture Foundation, a Moscow-based think tank headed by former Politburo member Yuri Prokofiev, has explicitly drawn a parallel to Syria, noting that “the realization of a national radical project [in Ukraine] would have meant a second Syria, including acts of genocide, internal displacement, destruction of large industrial facilities, ripe with environmental and industrial disasters.” If the facts are relatively undisputed, why, then, have Russia and the West drawn such diametrically opposite normative assessments of the situation? First, Russia’s own well-documented efforts to stifle civil society have created a...

or appropriate as a course of action? If the United States maintains a military presence in Syria after the end of the conflict with ISIS, the only possible basis could be self-defense: Syria has not consented to the U.S. military currently being in or remaining in Syria and the U.N. Security Council has not authorized and is unlikely to authorize a multinational operation in Syria. Can self-defense be a justification for a state to use force to prevent the resurgence of conflict? Or to deny a safe haven to terrorist...

[Jeff Deutch, PhD, is Research Director at Mnemonic and co-founder of Syrian Archive. Libby McAvoy, Esq., is a legal fellow with Mnemonic and the Video as Evidence program at WITNESS.] Photo credit: Syrian Archive. Whether in Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Hong Kong, Myanmar, the United States, Nigeria, Brasil, or elsewhere, over the last ten years civil society actors have produced and shared more content documenting human rights violations than ever before in human history. Encouraged by domestic courts and international accountability mechanisms, the ask to activists and human rights defenders is...

he claims that, in relationship to the situation in Syria, the Permanent Members “have exercised the veto exactly as anticipated when the UN Charter was negotiated.” In fact, current practice is far removed from the substance of the 1945 negotiations. Examining each of Russia’s 12 vetoes (sometimes joined by China) related to Syria, we see vetoes of resolutions to: (1) condemn continued widespread and gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (draft resolution S/2011/612); (2) condemn bombing and shelling of population centers and condemn the detention of thousands in...

...for the financing of a terrorist enterprise in Syria. In this part II, the authors analyze the decision of the French Court rescinding the charge of complicity in crimes against humanity and shed light on the broader significance of the Lafarge case in the field of criminal corporate accountability. Interpreting complicity: The cornerstone of criminal corporate accountability for grave crimes ECCHR and Sherpa filed extensive briefings in conjunction with the legal complaint outlining, first, the international consensus affirming that the atrocities perpetrated by IS at the time amounted to crimes...

[ Vito Todeschini is an Associate Legal Adviser at the International Commission of Jurists’ MENA Programme] On 9 October 2019, Turkey launched operation “Peace Spring” in the territory known as Rojava, in north-east Syria. The operation aimed at driving the Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) out of a number of towns close to the Turkish border and to create a “safe zone” where to resettle Syrian refugees. After days of fighting, a United States-brokered ceasefire has temporarily halted major hostilities in view of the evacuation...

Last week, Asaf Lubin offered a compelling post at Just Security wondering why Israel’s repeated attacks on Hezbollah arms shipments in Syria have not received the same kind of jus ad bellum scrutiny as the US’s recent attack on a Syrian airfield. Today, Charles Dunlap provides his answer on the same blog: the Israeli attacks are clearly legal, so why would anyone scrutinise them? Here are the relevant paragraphs: [I]t appears to me that the Israeli strike sought to destroy weapons in transit before Hezbollah can burrow them into densely-populated...

even in the Group of Friends of RtoP, there are states that find RtoP contentious. The practical and doctrinal fray increases after Libya, and Nahlawi excellently sets the stage for post-Libya UNSC dynamics and how the issues of intervention and regime change implicated in the international community’s response to Libya stymied UNSC action in Syria. But there is more to that story. Upon delving into the state practice and opinio juris behind Russia and China’s vetoes, which were purportedly to prevent military intervention and regime change in Syria, Nahlawi shows...

...in Syria that doesn’t seem to clearly fit into the Geneva Convention’s categories for either international or non-international armed conflicts. On a domestic legal front, the US Congress has not specifically authorized the action in Syria as well, making its domestic legality questionable at the very least. The next President will have to decide how to frame the Syria conflict under international and US constitutional law. My guess is that both Clinton and Trump would follow the Obama approach of treating the conflict as a non-international armed conflict against the...

destroying all existing chemical weapons under international verification by the OPCW; 2. monitoring chemical industry to prevent new weapons from re-emerging; 3. providing assistance and protection to States Parties against chemical threats; and 4. fostering international cooperation to strengthen implementation of the Convention and promote the peaceful use of chemistry. See their annual reports here. Although Syria is not a signatory to the CWC, given the OPCW’s expertise, it is a fair assumption that they would be involved in some capacity in any international control of Syria’s chemical weapons. The...

...the Palestine mandate on a consideration separate from that of title. France was refusing to allow the Council to deal with Britain’s claim until the Council would consider its claim to a mandate for Syria. The Syria mandate, however, was being delayed because Italy, another Council member, objected to certain provisions of the document France had drafted to govern Syria. A year earlier, the Council had said that the two mandates could take effect simultaneously once France and Italy came to agreement on the Syria mandate document. At the Council’s...