Search: Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Law of Occupation

Critical approaches to human rights; Critical approaches to the sources of international law; Critical approaches in the teaching of international law; The role of various actors in constructing narratives of international law, such as academics, judges, activists and/or institutions; and Critical approaches and the turn to history in international law. For more information, please contact either Sarah (Sally) Thin (she/her; sarah[dot]thin[at]maastrichtuniversity[dot]nl) or Wim Muller (he/him; wim[dot]muller[at]maastrichtuniversity[dot]nl). The full CfP can be found here. Call for Papers for 6th NLIU-Trilegal Summit on Corporate and Commercial Laws: The Centre for Business and...

[Craig Martin is a Professor of Law and the Co-Director of the International and Comparative Law Center at Washburn University School of Law.] Questions regarding the meaning, importance, and operation of “lawfare” were recently discussed at a great conference on Legal Resilience in an Era of Hybrid Threats at the University of Exeter. Several speakers explained how lawfare is being used by adversaries of Western states, and urgently argued that “we” must ourselves engage in lawfare as part of a comprehensive response to such hybrid threats. Yet I was left...

eliminate any ambiguity, Congress passes Law B, making conduct X plainly unlawful, and further "declares" that the new prohibition should be applied retroactively because, in Congress's view, the preexisting Law A had already proscribed that same conduct. Would the Court have to agree with that interpretation of Law A? I don't think so. And the same should be true for Congress's interpretation of what the LOAC prohibited during the period when Hamdan acted. Marko Milanovic I completely agree with Marty. There is a subtantial difference between legal interpretation and legislation...

the search for the general practice of states and opinio juris takes into account the variety of forms of states. In the considered wisdom of all the states including the United States in acceding to the Statute of the ICJ we recognize customary international law as law to be applied. Clearly in that bargain states consider that such law has some value to them. You take a far to United States centric view of international law. What about customary international law as a public good that all states are providing...

...the statute in accord with international law. In addition, reasonable respect for international comity has long been treated as within the discretion of US courts, and appropriate exhaustion could also be seen as a matter of comity. Jordan Doug: Charming Betsy can (and should) only be used to support extraterritoriality because, as you note, the ATS must be interpreted consistently with customary international law and it is customary international law that permits the U.S. to exercise universal jurisdiction over violations of customary international law. International "comity" (as a former Chief...

The following is a guest-post — actually a short book-proposal — by my friend Mark Osiel, the Aliber Family Chair in Law at the University of Iowa. I have agreed to post it despite the inordinate jealousy I feel toward his remarkable productivity. Mark would greatly appreciate comments and criticisms, especially examples and counter-examples of what he is trying to get at. Rethinking the Law of War Crimes: “Collateral Damage”and “Distinction” Current law on war crimes is deeply disappointing to most people – public and legal professional — who pay...

[David Sloss is the Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Global Law and Policy at Santa Clara Law School] In Samantar v. Yousuf (2010), the Supreme Court directed lower courts to apply common law rules to resolve immunity defenses raised by individual foreign government officers, except in cases where a treaty provides the controlling rule. The Court remanded Samantar to the lower court to decide, in the first instance, the proper content of the common law rule. The Fourth Circuit heard oral argument on this issue last...

There is a friendly debate going on at Prawfsblawg about whether people who have PhDs or JSDs in law are entitled to refer to themselves as “Dr. so-and-so.” Skepticism seems to be the order of the day; here are quotes from Paul Horwitz and Jeff Yates, respectively: Although I think there’s a good deal to be said for obtaining JSDs or Ph.D’s in law, we might think about whether that trend represents a similar claim to authority and respect for law as an academic discipline; and if those folks start...

...and only in a state of war could civilians/non-combatants be intentionally targeted. Chris "Volokh largely ignores Campos' argument that Reynolds is openly and enthusiastically endorsing assassinations that are illegal under U.S. and international law." Isn't it most sensible to construe Reynolds as implicitly advocating a change in the law? Kevin Heller Chris, No. I think a law professor is capable of advocating a change in policy instead of murder. Chris "I think a law professor is capable of advocating a change in policy instead of murder." But I don't understand...

brief were mentioned by name in the oral argument. The Goldsmith brief was not primarily about extraterritoriality – it was much more about whether this was international law as such, or instead some kind of well-intentioned but nonetheless faux-international law committed to the hands of US courts. (I have sometimes referred to it here at Opinio Juris as the “law of the hegemon” which US district courts have been persuaded by ATS plaintiffs’ lawyers, mistakenly in my view, to regard as “international law.”) This then combines with a general worry...

international law in any case. The assassination ban does not include lawful acts of self-defense. Consider again the Koh speech on this topic. It too emphasizes that the ban is to be understood as not including lawful self-defense: [U]nder domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute “assassination.” (Emphasis added.) This is one of several places in which the Koh...

composed of international treaties, international customs, and general principles of law and judicial decisions can only be utilized as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law rather than as an actual source of law. However, the U.S. may again make use of the gap between the understanding shared by small group of legal experts and the general public’s misunderstanding of international law so as to label China’s non-recognition of the award as non-compliance with international law. In fact, neither the U.S. nor the Philippines has much credibility...