Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

Toner replied: “I believe Assistant Secretary Feltman said that.” Although defecting does not guarantee that Kussa will avoid being prosecuted by the ICC, his willingness to provide useful intelligence to the UN-authorized forces will no doubt make him a lower-priority suspect. The OTP has limited resources and can only prosecute a small number of suspects in any given situation; why prosecute someone who did the right thing and turned on Gaddafi? Indeed, if enough officials followed in Kussa’s footsteps, Gaddafi would have to fight to the death all by himself....

or longer than the sentence the suspect could expect to receive at the ICC, even if the national prosecution is based on completely different conduct than the ICC’s investigation. The upcoming Gbagbo complementarity fight, I think, will likely illustrate why my theory of complementarity makes sense. Finally, it’s worth noting that should the ICC agree with me, it does in fact have an out — Art. 89(4) of the Rome Statute, which provides as follows: If the person sought is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the...

I noted a few days ago that the OTP made a serious legal error when it suggested that Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Saif could succeed even if Libya had to try Saif in absentia. Fortunately, the OTP has recognized its mistake and withdrawn its submission: The Prosecution wishes to retract its reference to the possibility of conducting trials in absentia in Libya. Article 17(3) of the Statute indicates that “the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its...

Beyond that, the legal landscape is less clear. Most interesting to me is your choice of authority to support your perfect complementarity position. You start by saying: "International jurisprudence accepts the logic and necessity of applying IHRL in war. The explicit terms of both IHRL and IHL instruments are in accord." You then cite ICJ advisory opinions and other special tribunals rather than actual sources of international law for the proposition of perfect IHL/IHRL complementarity. It is espcially inappropriate, I think, to refer to ECtHR decisions, a body that primarily...

Eugene Kontorovich Kevin, I'm in agreement almost across the board. Any thoughts on what puzzled me - why no discussion of complementarity, which could be more straight forward than gravity? Kevin Jon Heller Eugene, Fair question. I agree that analysing complementarity would have been another (and also better) way to go. But I think the gravity point is so obvious that it was the more logical choice. Complementarity would have involved passing judgment (even if favorable) on Israel's willingness to investigate and prosecute, which is always sticky. Concluding the Comoros...

...Kevin responded to comments disagreeing with his claim that politically-motivated acts are traditionally excluded from the definition of piracy, and added his final word (for now). Kevin also described another problem with qualifying the Sea Shepherd’s actions as piracy: that some states -not including the US- do not consider the area where the events are taking place as part of the high seas, but rather as under Australia’s sovereignty. Kevin also revisited Libya’s admissibility challenge in the Saif Gaddafi case. Considering Libya’s decision to let the trial in Zintan go...

The inestimable Mark Kersten devotes his new column at Justice Hub (ignore the scary portrait) to an unusual issue: whether international criminals should be able to pursue higher education once they are released from prison. The column focuses on Thomas Lubanga, who recently stated his desire to complete a PhD at Kisengani University after he is released. Here is Mark’s takeaway, reached after he discusses the (very different) examples of Saif Gaddafi and Sam Kolo: Still, these stories raise important questions: should convicted and alleged war criminals be allowed –...

In my previous post, I noted that Libya’s admissibility challenge should fail regarding Saif Gaddafi because the government cannot demonstrate that it is able to obtain him from the Zintan militia that is holding him. It’s now clear that the Libyan government has even less chance of obtaining al-Senussi: Mauritania’s president has said former Libyan intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi must be tried there before being extradited. President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz said Mr Senussi, who fled after last year’s uprising, must first face charges of illegal entry into Mauritania. Libya...

...It is true that in the Gaddafi and Al-Senussi case, Libyan authorities vigorously opposed the idea of surrendering the suspects to the ICC, arguing that the country had the will and ability to prosecute them. However, this time, things may be different. There is a clear difference of standing and political value between Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi or Abdullah Al-Senussi and Abd al-Rahman al-Milad. Further, surrendering al-Milad would be not necessarily reflect upon the effectiveness of the Libyan judicial system. Rather such a course of action could be taken by Libyan...

...the request of President Assad. Although several states criticized this decision, none deemed it unlawful (160). Libya offers a similar example, where the Gaddafi government’s repressive and violent response to Arab Spring protests led the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions and refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Like with Syria, numerous states concluded that the Gaddafi government was no longer legitimate and had lost the consent of the Libyan people. And like the SOC in Syria, several governments recognized the National Transitional Council as the true representative...

This post is a continuation of the analysis of proceedings at the Philippine Supreme Court, relating to the withdrawal of the Philippines from the International Criminal Court. C. R.A. 9851: A Double Bind? The sufficiency of the “The Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity” or R.A. 9851 in addressing mass atrocity crimes was referenced in the Philippine note verbalenotifying the U.N. Secretary General of withdrawal from the Rome Statute. The relevance of R.A. 9851 touches upon not only complementarity, but also the...

the book questions why states ratify the Rome Statute yet seek to undermine it when the Court exercises jurisdiction. Through the theme of complementarity, the book focusses on the inconsistent practice of the ICC in regard to complementarity. Lastly, the book discusses the Court’s entanglement in domestic politics and how those with political power have instrumentalised law and institutions. Through these four themes that cut across most situations before the Court, the book aims to offer perspectives into the interplay between state interests and norms of international criminal justice. States...