Search: battlefield robots

...have a similar role for accountability agents, (whether lawyers or some other type of accountability agent) in the field. As I note in the book: Contractors largely fall outside this organizational accountability framework. While they may receive some training in the rules regarding the use of force, that training does not typically include updated advice on the battlefield about how the rules apply in specific scenarios likely to arise on that battlefield. Contractors also do not receive ongoing situational advice from military lawyers .… Finally, the accountability system that has...

...on the notion that, “[t]here is nothing in international law that …prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.” (i.e., an Al Qaeda commander who is fighting the United States in Afghanistan but has traveled to Yemen seeking recruits and cash for arms.) First, I should make clear that lethal targeting outside an active battlefield is, in certain circumstances, permissible under international law. For example, as...

...“fully consistent with human nature”. Hence, most individuals under normal circumstances would perceive them as the right thing to do, even without previous knowledge of IHL. More pragmatically, they are intuitive also because they reflect basic military logic. According to the principle of military necessity, contradicting behaviours would bring no effective contribution to the party’s military endeavour. However, it is exactly these fundamental principles that are regularly violated on the battlefield. The relationship between knowledge and compliance is indeed not one of direct causation. Even when soldiers know exactly what...

Thanks to Opinio Juris for hosting this symposium. I read the blog regularly so know to expect a lively and interesting discussion. My article addresses the international legal rules for detaining “non-battlefield terrorism suspects”—i.e., suspected terrorists not captured on a conventional battlefield or in the theater of combat. Despite the extensive literature on the rules that govern the “war on terror,” and on the treatment of detainees in particular, there continues to be significant confusion about when, and under what conditions, a state may lawfully detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects. On...

Human Rights Watch’s Tom Malinowski and Ben Wittes — whom, for the record, I consider a friend — have been having an interesting and useful dialogue about targeted killing. Here is how Malinowski lays out HRW’s position: Our position on targeted killing is that its use can be legally justified so long as it is limited to situations involving a combatant on a genuine battlefield or its equivalent beyond the reach of law enforcement, or in a law enforcement situation when the threat to life is imminent and there is...

...wrong. The big issue, then, is (1). Here I think we simply disagree. I don't believe that IHRL can limit the normal rules of targeting under IHL -- and I think saying "limit" is more accurate than "above and beyond" in this context, because if an attacker has to use less than lethal force or has to capture an enemy combatant, the rules of IHL are being narrowed, not supplemented. I also don't know where the "traditional battlefield" vs "away from the traditional battlefield" distinction comes from. That distinction may...

...replied. Graham cited the example of someone who is not carrying a gun or fighting on a battlefield. “If our intelligence agencies should capture someone in the Philippines that is suspected of financing Al Qaeda worldwide, would you consider that person part of the battlefield?” he asked. He added that he had asked the same question of Holder, who replied that he agreed that person was on the battlefield. “Do you agree with that?” the senator said. “I do,” Kagan replied. That said, I should back up and note there...

...international law. The Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation requires that the courts find Congress’s intent to do so is clear. If al-Aulaqi is within the scope of the AUMF, this requirement would appear to be satisfied. The AUMF should not be interpreted to apply or to be delimited to any specific location. There were no active war zones in which the U.S. was engaged when it was adopted. Those battlefields were created pursuant to its authority. Others may be created (even quite temporarily) if the object of those hostilities...

isn’t a circumstance when one of the military’s many Predators, Reapers, drone-like missiles or other deadly robots effectively automatizes the decision to harm a human being.” The Directive seeks to “‘minimize the probability and consequences of failures’ in autonomous or semi-autonomous armed robots ‘that could lead to unintended engagements’, starting at the design stage.” Its solution – unlike HRW’s call for what its report terms an “absolute ban” – is based upon constant reviews of the military system (unintended effects on weapons systems might occur because of changes to non-weapons...

The debate over autonomous weapons is not so visible in the United States, but the ban campaign launched by Human Rights Watch a year ago – an international NGO coalition called the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” – has been quite active in Europe and at the UN, where a number of countries raised the issue in their statements to the General Assembly’s First Committee (disarmament issues). Matthew Waxman and I have been writing about this issue for several years; we have a short policy paper on the topic available...

...places. Matt and I have also seen how much interest is developing among international law and national security academics around this topic, as well as around robots and the law more generally, and we’re delighted to be part of it. We welcome substantive comments, here at OJ or as well by email.   Lethal autonomous machines will inevitably enter the future battlefield — but they will do so incrementally, one small step at a time. The combination of inevitable and incremental development raises not only complex strategic and operational questions...

...distinguished just combatants from unjust combatants or else ignored the combatant/civilian distinction altogether and just focused on individual contribution to the war. Yet, (un)justness of cause is mired in uncertainty (what Dill terms “an epistemically-cloaked forced choice”) and the complexity of the battlefield makes it impossible to determine individual contribution to the war. Consequently, any attempt to design a more nuanced doctrine of targeting will end up being impossible to administer and too vague to offer real guidance for belligerents, thereby violating the rule of law – a moral principle...