The heavy dumping of snow on the US East Coast made for a light dusting of posts this week.

Kevin found the ICTR’s recent acquittal of Augustin Ndindiliyimana after 11 years of pre-trial detention a stain on the tribunal’s reputation. He also was not convinced by Eugene Kontorovich’s use of Belgium’s extension of the right to die to terminally ill minors as an argument to attack on Roper v Simmons, and later replied to Eugene’s response.

For those hungry for more reading: Kevin recommended a post by Sergey Vasiliev on the relationship between Perisic and Sainovic while Julian recommended Stephan Talmon’s book chapter on the question of UNCLOS jurisdiction in Philippines arbitration against China, and Duncan announced the winners of the 2013 ASIL Certificates of Merit.

Finally, Jessica wrapped up the news and I listed events and announcements.

Have a nice weekend!

Eugene has graciously responded to my earlier post; you can find his new post here. It’s well worth a read. I just want to offer a few  thoughts on Eugene’s response, because I think it fails to address the core of my critique: that it is incorrect to claim, as Eugene did in his first post, that Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is based on the idea that “minors are not really responsible for their actions.” I argued that, on the contrary, Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is part and parcel of its opposition to the death penalty itself.

Eugene’s new post provides no support for his original thesis. Here is what he argues, in order:

The EU’s position is that the death penalty is wrong under any circumstances; however, the juvenile death penalty is even wronger. And this distinction could presumably only be due to the reduced decision-making capacity of juveniles.

Thus in their amicus brief in Roper, the EU did not argue that the death penalty was unconstitutional – though they stated their opposition – rather, they argued the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional even if the death penalty itself were constitutional. (As amici, they were in no way limited to the facts of the case, and could have submitted a much broader argument.) The EU’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty repeatedly points to an “international consensus” against it, reflected in various treaties and U.N. documents. These instruments specifically do not bar the death penalty, but do prohibit the juvenile death penalty. Thus the consensus which the EU pointed to is itself based on a belief in a fundamental distinction between juvenile and adult death penalties.

It is true that there is an international consensus against the juvenile death penalty. And it is highly likely that some of the states that are part of the international consensus oppose the juvenile death penalty because they believe juveniles have a “reduced decision-making capacity.” But nothing in the EU amicus brief suggests that European states oppose the juvenile death penalty because of the diminished moral capacity of juveniles. As I noted in my earlier post, Europe opposes the death penalty for everyone, adult and juvenile, because — in the words of the Council of Europe — “everyone’s right to life is a basic value and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential to the protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings.” Yes, Europe would be more than willing to argue that “the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional even if the death penalty itself were constitutional.” But that is because the international consensus against the juvenile death penalty is much stronger, not because Europe believes juveniles “are not really responsible for their actions.” In other words, the EU’s amicus brief does not care why some states permit the adult penalty but permit the juvenile death penalty (which may well reflect a view of juvenile moral capacity); it simply cares that even those states still reject the juvenile death penalty.

To be sure, if the EU thinks the juvenile DP to be even worse, it will not be reflected in its internal policies – but it would be reflected in its external ones. An indeed, in dealing with third countries, the EU makes a fundamental distinction between the juvenile and adult death penalty. As spelled out in the EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, Europe will provide aid and have good relations with countries that practice the death penalty, Europe’s position is that where the death penalty exists, it should always be subject to certain “minimum standards”:

Where states insist on maintaining the death penalty, the EU considers it important that the following minimum standards should be met: … iii) capital punishment may not be imposed on … Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of their crime;

Eugene does not quote the EU’s minimum standards in full, and the text he does not quote complicates his argument that Europe views the juvenile death penalty as “worse” than the adult death penalty because of the “reduced decision-making capacity of juveniles.” Here is the paragraph in full, with the omitted text in bold:

Capital punishment may not be imposed on:
• Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of their crime;
• Pregnant women or new mothers;
• Persons who have become insane.

The EU’s suggested ban on executing the insane clearly does reflect the idea that insane persons have a ”reduced decision-making capacity.” But the ban on executing “pregnant women or new mothers” doesn’t. Their decision-making capacity is not reduced — yet the EU insists that death-penalty states not execute them, either. So which category are juveniles closest to — the insane (who should not be executed because they are not responsible for their actions) or pregnant women and new mothers (who shouldn’t be executed because it’s inherently wrong to execute them)? There is no way of knowing from the EU’s Guidelines on the Death Penalty — which means that the Guidelines don’t support Eugene’s argument that Europe views the juvenile death penalty as worse than the adult death penalty because ”minors are not really responsible for their actions.”

Let me add another point of Belgian inconsistency. Allowing minors to take their lives, or have them been taken, necessarily makes assumptions about their capacity that is at odds with many liberal features of international law. International treaties, including the Rome Statute of the ICC, make the recruitment of child soldiers a crime, and European countries have been active in promoting the expansion of these norms.

Being a child soldier (under 15) is not a crime, only enlisting them. Crucially, the consent of the child, her parents or any psychologists is not a defense. Indeed, consent is presumed, as the crime covers accepting voluntary enlistees. As the Special Court for Sierra Leone put it:

The act of enlisting presupposes that the individual in question voluntarily consented to be part of the armed force or group. However, where a child under the age of 15 years is allowed to voluntarily join an armed force or group, his or her consent is not a valid defence.

But is this still a far cry from euthanasia? Not if the underlying issue is one of capacity to make life-imperiling decisions. And it is important to point out 15 year old may join armed conflict in when the defeat of their side would lead to the massacre or oppression of them and their families and the destruction of their way of life. Yet international law still prohibits their recruitment. This does not mean it can never be rational for a child to join armed forces, but rather that we make a categorical judgement that even if it is sometimes rational, they lack the judgement to make decisions that imperil their lives.

The emphasis is mine — because I think Eugene’s argument actually proves my point, not his. Eugene’s claim is that the prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers, which European states have enthusiastically supported, reflects Europe’s view that juveniles have a ”reduced decision-making capacity.” But the bolded text, which I completely agree with, indicates that, on the contrary, international law prohibits the recruitment of child soldiers because it is wrong to let juveniles engage in combat, even if they are capable of making a rational decision to do so. Differently put, international law presumes that child soldiers consent to recruitment because recruiting child soldiers is wrong even when consensual, not because juveniles can never rationally decide to become child soldiers.

The bottom line is this: there is nothing inconsistent about Belgium’s legalizing juvenile euthanasia while rejecting the juvenile death penalty and opposing the recruitment of child soldiers. Belgium simply believes that executing juveniles and recruiting child soldiers is inherently wrong, while permitting terminally ill children to make an informed decision to end their own lives is not. Those are normative positions, and Eugene is free to think they are unwise. But they are not based on an inconsistent view of whether juveniles are responsible for their actions.

I’m currently in Belgium, teaching an intensive course on international criminal law at Katholieke University Leuven. So I was struck by Eugene Kontorovich’s most recent post at the Volokh Conspiracy, in which he uses a new Belgian law permitting euthanasia for minors to criticize the Supreme Court’s abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Here is the crux of his argument (emphasis mine):

Aside from its inherent significance, Belgium’s move requires us to revisit Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 Supreme Court case that ruled it inherently unconstitutional to apply the death penalty to anyone under 18. European nations had long waged a moral campaign against America’s allowance of the death penalty for 16-18 year olds, which they called barbaric and savage. After all, minors are not really responsible for their actions. America was labelled a human rights violator, an international outlier.

Finally, in Roper, the Court caved in to this pressure. Indeed, it cited the European position as support for its conclusion – other countries do not allow for such a thing.

Why can a 17 year-old rapist-murderer not face capital punishment? Because, as Justice Kennedy wrote in a 5-4 decision, science has shown that minors, even 17-year-olds, are too immature to truly understand the consequences of their decisions, or the meaning of life and death. Juveniles are prone to “impetuous and ill-considered actions” that they should not be made to lose their life for, even if the action involved taking the life of another.” Moreover, juveniles are susceptible to peer pressure, Kennedy wrote. (Of course, one of the concerns in allowing euthanasia is external pressure from doctors, parents and others.)

Yet now we see Belgium thinks kids are responsible enough; the Netherlands similarly allows euthanasia as young as 12. These countries may be the way of the future, as they have been in other areas of progressive mores. Roper misread their belief system. It is not one of paternalistic concern for youth.

Eugene does not provide a link for his assertion that Europe opposes the juvenile death penalty because “minors are not really responsible for their actions.” But I don’t think that’s surprising, because Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is not based on that idea. Europe has abolished the juvenile death penalty because it rejects the very idea of the death penalty itself, not because it believe minors are not responsible for their actions. After all, no European state other than Belarus permits the death penalty for anyone. It is thus irrelevant for Roper‘s purposes that Belgium and the Netherlands believe that minors are capable of making an informed decision to end their own lives; that in no way undermines their opposition to the juvenile death penalty. To sustain Eugene’s argument, he would have to identify a state that (1) permits the death penalty for adults while prohibiting it for juveniles on the ground that juveniles, unlike adults, are not responsible for their actions, but (2) allows juveniles to take their own lives on the ground that they are capable of making an informed decision to do so. Belgium and the Netherlands don’t qualify.

It’s also worth noting that, in his zeal to level a “gotcha” at Roper, Eugene misstates Belgian criminal law. Here is what he says about Belgium’s rejection of the juvenile death penalty (emphasis mine):

It is not one of paternalistic concern for youth. Rather, a system that permits the euthanasia of innocent 12 year-olds but not the punishment of guilty 17-year-olds is one that exalts autonomy without culpability.

Of course, with the juvenile death penalty, only a small fraction of minors who committed capital crimes would be sentenced to death. On a case by case basis, hosts of psychologists, jurors, and judges would have to be convinced that the particular defendant truly knew what they were doing.

So it comes out that the juveniles cannot really make accountable decisions when it comes to killing people, unless it is themselves. Or to put it differently, Belgium will not hold children responsible when they hurt others, but gives them free license to hurt themselves. Perversely, in Belgium, the youths who are considered grown up enough to be euthanized have not done anything wrong at all, unlike Simmons, who tied up his victim and thew him off a bridge.

This is simply false. Belgium most certainly holds juveniles criminally responsible for their actions — it simply doesn’t permit executing them. In Belgium, children between the ages of 12 and 15 can be prosecuted in juvenile court and imprisoned until they are 20. And children who are 16 and 17 — the latter being the age that Eugene singles out — can be prosecuted for murder in the Court of Assize and sentenced to a maximum of 30 years in adult prison. Eugene may think a 30-year sentence for a 17-year-old who commits murder is too lenient, but he cannot seriously contend that Belgian criminal law does not permit “the punishment of guilty 17-year-olds,” that it is based on the idea that “juveniles cannot really make accountable decisions when it comes to killing people,” or that it “will not hold children responsible when they hurt others.”

I often agree with Eugene on issues other than Israel (piracy and universal jurisdiction in particular). But his attempt to use Belgian criminal law to attack Roper is fatally flawed.

Although the ICTY’s recent high-profile acquittals have been getting all the attention, it’s worth noting that the ICTR Appeals Chamber has just acquitted two high-ranking defendants, Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the former chief of staff of the Rwandan paramilitary police, and François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, the former commander of a military reconnaissance battalion, on the ground that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that they had effective control over gendarmes suspected of participating in the 1994 genocide. The acquittals are obviously notable in themselves, but what’s particularly striking — and more than a little disturbing — is that Gen. Ndindiliyimana was originally sentenced to time served because he had spent 11 years in pre-trial detention:

Mr. Ndindiliyimana, who was arrested in Belgium in 2000, was convicted in 2011 of genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity and murder, and he was sentenced to 11 years. He was freed after time served.

Eleven years in pre-trial detention at an international tribunal is simply unacceptable. And Ndindiliyimana’s acquittal on all charges after 11 years in pre-trial detention simply adds insult to injury. All in all, a bad day for the ICTR’s reputation.

One of the most frustrating things about China’s response to the Philippines arbitration has been the brevity of its legal discussion and analysis.  In particular, I’ve long thought that China had a pretty good argument that the Annex VII UNCLOS arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the dispute since, in many ways, territorial disputes are at the heart of the Philippines’ case.

But neither the government nor Chinese scholars have offered much flesh to this argument.  The closest statement I’ve seen was Judge Xue Hanqin’s impromptu remarks at the Asian Society of International Law conference last fall and a very brief Global Times essay.. But all that has now changed due to a book chapter  released by Professor Stefan Talmon of the University of Bonn.  From his abstract:

The chapter examines whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the case, whether the claims brought by the Philippines are admissible and whether there are any other objections which the tribunal will have to decide as a preliminary matter. It aims to offer a (not the) Chinese perspective on some of the issues to be decided by the Tribunal. The chapter is to serve as a kind of amicus curiae brief advancing possible legal arguments on behalf of the absent respondent. It shows that there are insurmountable preliminary objections to the Tribunal deciding the case on the merits and that the Tribunal would be well advised to refer the dispute back to the parties in order for them to reach a negotiated settlement.

I’ve only taken a quick look at Prof. Talmon’s pretty comprehensive discussion, and it really does read like an “amicus brief” for China on the question of jurisdiction.  I will have to consider more carefully Prof. Talmon’s claim that the 9-Dash Line claim can fit into the “historic waters” exception to jurisdiction, but overall it seems like a very careful and persuasive treatment.

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

• A Red Cross spokesman says a vehicle carrying five people has gone missing in northern Mali and an official from the group known as the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa said that an al-Qaeda-linked group in Mali has kidnapped them.
• The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICC alleged that Congolese war crimes suspect Bosco Ntaganda was instrumental in organizing and ordering militias of “child soldiers” to attack civilians. The Court’s press release from the opening of the confirmation of the charges hearing can be found here.
• Additionally, the ICC will open a preliminary examination into violence in the Central African Republic to determine whether atrocities committed there constitute possible war crimes.

Asia

• A Pakistani anti-drone campaigner, Kareem Khan, who was due to testify before European parliaments, has gone missing in the city of Rawalpindi. More from human rights organization Reprieve here.
• China and Taiwan held their first government-to-government talks since they split 65 years ago after a brutal civil war.
• War took an increasing toll on Afghanistan’s civilians in 2013 as fighting intensified between the government and insurgents, the United Nations said in a report, with total casualties rising 14 percent.

Americas

• Colombia’s FARC rebels accused former President Alvaro Uribe of involvement in alleged spying on government negotiators at peace talks in Cuba, and said their delegation’s communications were also intercepted.
• For more on spying in the Americas: Brazilian security forces are using undercover agents, intercepting e-mails, and rigorously monitoring social media to try to ensure that violent anti-government protesters do not ruin soccer’s World Cup this year, officials told Reuters.
• And for the complete spying in the Americas trifecta, Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill report that the National Security Agency is using complex analysis of electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets for lethal drone strikes, as Obama officials weigh launching a drone attack on another US citizen, this time allegedly in Pakistan.

Middle East

• Iran’s military has successfully test-fired two new domestically made missiles, ahead of talks with world powers to try to reach an agreement on curbing Tehran’s nuclear program.
• Israel’s Jerusalem municipality approved building plans on Wednesday for 558 new homes in the occupied West Bank, land that the Palestinians want for a future state.
• Turkey and Israel are getting closer to normalizing relations, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Negotiators from the two countries have been holding talks to resume diplomatic ties that were severed after an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound aid ship in 2010 left nine dead.

Europe

• The Vatican was denounced by a UN human rights committee for failing to prevent priests raping and molesting tens of thousands of children over decades and for adopting policies that allowed abuse to continue once detected.
• The European Union must be ready to impose sanctions on Ukraine if it persists in using violence against protesters, the Czech foreign minister said, warning against what he saw as Soviet-style authoritarianism.
• European partners have threatened to review their relations with Switzerland after voters narrowly backed a proposal to curtail immigration into Switzerland from the EU in a referendum.

I had the great pleasure the last several months to serve on ASIL’s Book Awards Committee (along with Jutta Brunnée, Jean d’Aspremont, Saira Mohamed, and a very well organized chair in Jacob Cogan).  I’m pleased to announce that the Society’s Executive Council has selected three winners for 2014 based on our nominations.  The winners (plus the Committee’s accompanying citation) are as follows:

Certificate of Merit for a Preeminent Contribution to Creative Scholarship:  Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (Oxford University Press 2013).

The awards will get presented at this year’s ASIL Gala Dinner.  I’m looking forward to seeing the authors there and having a chance to congratulate them personally on their achievements.

Sergey Vasiliev, an excellent young ICL scholar, has posted at the Center for International Criminal Justice a superb — and very long — analysis of the relationship between Perisic and Sainovic entitled “Consistency of Jurisprudence, Finality of Acquittals, and Ne Bis in Idem.” I agree with almost everything Sergey says, although I don’t think we should consider the Perisic AC’s adoption of the specific-direction requirement to be “clear error” (a basic requirement of any argument that the Appeals Chamber should reconsider the judgment) simply because the Sainovic AC says that it was. As Bill Schabas notes in his recent post, the legal issue can hardly be considered settled by Sainovic, given that the judgment was not unanimous, was decided by different appeals judges and the two dissenters (on the specific-direction point) in Perisic, and included a judge who was inexplicably in the majority in both Perisic and Sainovic. I also find it odd that Sergey doesn’t like my claim that the OTP’s motion for reconsideration belongs in the dustbin, given that he unequivocally rejects — on ne bis in idem and human-rights grounds — the idea that the OTP should be given what it wants: namely, Perisic’s acquittal overturned and a conviction entered.

But those are minor points. The post is must-read for anyone interested in the specific-direction requirement or the sudden implosion of the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber.

Calls for Papers

• The ICTBEL Organising Committee has now issued a call for papers to be presented in June 2014 conference, which will be held in Edinburgh, United Kingdom. International Confer­ence on Trade, Business and Economic Law (ICTBEL) provides an opportunity for academics, practitioners, consultants, scholars, researchers and policy makers with different backgrounds and experience to present their papers in the conference. Papers may address, but are not restricted to, the main theme from any of the following sub-themes. Unlisted but related sub-topics are also acceptable: International Trade Law, International Economic Law,  International Business Law, Corpo­rate/Commercial Law, Climate Change, Sustainable development and International Trade, Im­pact of Liberalisation and globalisation on trade, business and investment, Globalisation and Free Trade,  Trade Policy,  Economic and Finance,  International Trade Frauds,  Money Laun­dering regulations, Bribery and Corruption, Foreign investments,  Mergers and Acquisition,  Ju­risdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, International commercial arbitration and litigation, Im­port and Export, Letters of Credit,  WTO and related agreements. An abstract between 300-500 words written on a topic within the broad conference theme of in­ternational trade, business and economic law should be submitted by e-mail before April 14, 2014.

Events

• As Jessica already mentioned last week, on Monday, February 10, 2014 at the American University Washington College of Law, the ICRC presents: “Targeting The Sleeping Fighter and Other Hard Legal Issues: A Discussion on the Use of Force in Non-International Armed Conflict.”  The live-link for the event is here.
• The University of Oslo’s  PluriCourts Center on the Legitimate Roles on the Global Judiciary is organizing, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, a conference on “The Long-Term Future of the European Court of Human Rights” (Oslo, April 7-8, 2014). The conference is targeted at scholars as well as international and national judges, governmental experts working on the reform of the Court, and representatives of applicants to the Court. The aim is to inspire the reform process and inform the work of the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH). Speakers will include: Dean Spielmann, President of the European Court of Human Rights, and several Judges of the Court; Andreas Paulus, Judge at the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany; members of CDDH; Luzius Wildhaber, University of Basel and former President of the ECtHR; Ed Bates, University of Southhampton; Başak Çali, Koç University; Laurence Helfer, Duke University; Dinah Shelton, George Washington University; Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad, University of Strasbourg; Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein, Co-Directors at PluriCourts, University of Oslo. For information on registration and the detailed program, please visit the conference website.

Announcements

• OUP have just published a new debate map on the disputes in the South and East China Seas and has made some relevant OUP content freely available here.
• The European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC) is accepting applications for the 18th edition of the European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation (E.MA).  E.MA provides students with the opportunity to share knowledge and skills with leading scholars from 41 prestigious European Universities and renowned Human Rights experts, in the classroom and during a week-long field trip. Applications for the academic year 2014/2015 are processed on an on-going basis. The Second Round Deadline is March 15, 2014. Apply now.
• The Antonio Cassese Initiative for Justice, Peace and Humanity and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights open their application process for the Summer School 2014 on Transnational Justice: Conflict and Human Rights from July 7-11, 2014.
• The Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law is proud to announce the call for applications for the 15^th annual Program of Advanced Studies on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law which runs from May 27th to June 13th 2014. The program offers 19 courses taught by more than 40 prominent scholars in the field of human rights, in both English and Spanish. The Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides through this Program the unique opportunity to learn and interact with judges of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Special Rapporteurs of United Nations, members of the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, recognized members of NGOs and professors from all over the world. The program welcomed more than 165 participants from over 25 countries with differing backgrounds and levels of experience for an intensive three weeks in Washington, D.C. Additionally, the Academy hosts special events, such as panels, a film series, and site visits to international organizations. The Diploma is offered to a select group of 35 law professionals who fulfill the admission requirements. Access more information here.
• The Summer Academy on the Continental Shelf (SACS) will be held from June 21-28, 2014 under the auspices of the University of the Faroe Islands. You can download the information folder here.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us.

The year is now officially in full swing on Opinio Juris with our first symposium of 2014. Up for discussion were both lead articles of the latest AJIL issue. The first article, on the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, was introduced here by Karen Alter, Larry Helfer and Jacky McAllister and was followed by comments by Solomon Ebobrah, Kofi Kufuor, and Horace Adjolohoun. Karen, Larry and Jacky’s response can be found here. The second article, by Julian Davis Mortenson and introduced here, discussed the role of travaux préparatoires in treaty interpretation. Ulf Linderfalk offered vigorous two part (1, 2) rebuttal. Other comments came from Richard Gardiner and Bart Szewczyk.  Julian’s reply is here.

Kevin mourned Maximilian Schell; criticized President Obama’s certification concerning US participation in the UN’s Mali stabilisation mission and the ICC; and was even more critical of the ICTY’s OTP request to the Appeals Chamber to reconsider Perisic. On the last issue, Kevin also recommended a post by Bill Schabas.

Julian, who was elected to the ALI, posted on the US’ first public statement China’s South China Sea Nine Dash Line is inconsistent with international law. Deborah tried to keep up up-to-date on the difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda and Peter engaged in a thought experiment on Olympic free agency.

Finally, Jessica listed events and announcements and wrapped up the news.

Many thanks to our guest contributors and have a nice weekend!

[Julian Davis Mortenson is Assistant Professor of Law at Michigan Law.]

I am most grateful for the thoughtful comments offered by Bart, Richard, and Ulf. Their observations are well-informed, generous, and extremely useful in advancing the conversation about treaty interpretation. So first and foremost, sincerest thanks to each of them.

In my response, I hope (1) to clarify the question that seems principally at issue in the discussion so far, and (2) to suggest how the historical evidence helps answer that question. As Ulf rightly points out, the article’s aim is not to march through a unified field theory of treaty interpretation in the exhaustive fashion of a single subject treatise. It is, rather, to debunk a theoretically central misunderstanding about the interpretive role of travaux under the VCLT as a historical document.

The article is thus fundamentally a historical inquiry. But it also has obvious doctrinal implications. While those implications are not the article’s central concern, I will briefly expand their logic as outlined on page 5 of the draft posted on SSRN. I take some time to spell this out because—with the exception of Richard’s kind and detailed approbation of the historical analysis—the commentaries in this symposium understandably engage less with the particulars of the history than with its doctrinal implications for contemporary interpretive practice.

So here is a sketch of the case for those implications:

• First:  Every mainstream understanding of treaty interpretation contemplates the use of travaux to resolve ambiguity that remains after the methods described in Article 31 are applied. We argue about the use of travaux in other circumstances. But no one seriously contests that they are not just available but potentially decisive in the face of ambiguity. (This is why any perceived doctrinal circularity is illusory. Since all parties to the debate are in agreement on at least this point, for doctrinal and argumentative purposes we can treat the relevance of drafting history in cases of ambiguity as an axiom requiring no proof.)
• Second:  The complex, multilayered, and rather-quirkily-drafted provisions of Article 31 and 32 are a textbook example of such ambiguity, both in their individual meanings at the subsection level and in their overall structural interrelationship. One might reasonably rely (for example) on the structural separation of Articles 31 and 32 to conclude that they instantiate an interpretive hierarchy that disfavors travaux. But one might also reasonably rely (for example) on the existence of the “special meaning” and “confirm[ation]” provisions to conclude that they do not. This ambiguity is stubborn, and no amount of deductive gymnastics can make it disappear.
• Third:  Because the treatment of travaux under Articles 31 and 32 is ambiguous, every mainstream theory of treaty interpretation must concede a potentially decisive role for the VCLT’s drafting history in resolving that ambiguity. Putting it as one might in a legal brief:  assuming arguendo with the most conservative commentators that resort to travaux is available only in the case of ambiguity, that condition is easily satisfied here.
• Fourth:  Careful review of the VCLT travaux—and it is on this point that the article focuses—demonstrates that Articles 31 and 32 were understood to reject a hierarchical or mechanistic view of interpretation. The holistic view of interpretation adopted by the drafters extended in particular to the use of travaux, which were viewed as automatically incorporated among and conceptually equivalent to the many other (potentially contradictory) indicators of legal meaning enumerated in the VCLT.

With the exception of the last bullet point, these statements are obviously asserted rather than demonstrated. But if each of them holds up, then as a matter of modern legal meaning the VCLT instantiates neither an interpretive hierarchy generally nor a hostility (suspicion, inhospitality, etc.) toward drafting history specifically. The Vienna settlement erected neither barriers, nor thresholds, nor negative presumptions regarding the use of travaux. Instead, it incorporated drafting history as a central and indeed crucial tool for identifying correct legal meaning.

Bart puts his finger right on the most important open question about this bottom line doctrinal conclusion. Given the conceded prevalence of learned professions that such a hierarchy does exist, it’s not out of bounds to argue that subsequent practice under the VCLT conflicts with its original meaning. (Note that, as explored in a shorter paper available here, the VCLT does not tell us how to resolve such a conflict. But bracket that for now.)

Partly because of the stark contradiction that Ulf observes between actual interpretive practice and professions of interpretive principle, however, it is my strong instinct that no such practice has in fact arisen among states parties to the VCLT. But the burden here will be on anyone seeking to dislodge the Vienna settlement. They will have to show, in the precise terms of Article 31, that contrary “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty . . . establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” If you can’t make that showing, then it’s hard to avoid the following doctrinal conclusion:  Drafting history is generally and automatically available as a source of meaning in every single case.  And that’s true even if—as Richard so nicely shows with the meaning of “poison” under the Rome Statute—the particular travaux of a particular treaty might not in fact illuminate a particular question facing a particular interpreter at any particular moment.