Upcoming Events: May 6, 2012

Last week’s announcements can be found here. If you are organizing a conference or other event and would like to see the call for papers or the program announced on Opinio Juris, please contact us. Calls for Papers Applications for the Helsinki Summer Seminar on International Law (August 21-30, 2012 ) on International Law and Capitalism: Exploring the Legal Architecture of the Global Political Economy close...

[Gabor Rona is the International Legal Director of Human Rights First. He first posted his thoughts  here about Monday's counterterrorism speech by John Brennan.] I’m grateful to Bobby Chesney, over at Lawfare, for taking the time to react to my post on the recent Brennan speech. As with so many of the more thoughtful defenses of U.S. counterterrorism policy, Bobby relies heavily on...

The Chen Guangcheng saga is not yet completed, and indeed, as the NYT puts it, "what briefly looked like a deft diplomatic achievement for Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton [has] turned into a potential debacle."  I do hope Mr. Chen will find safety and justice soon, but I am not optimistic. Until we discover his final fate, I thought I'd...

[Gabor Rona is the International Legal Director of Human Rights First] The Obama administration’s charm offensive on targeted killings continues in response to calls from a broad spectrum of political and legal observers for greater government transparency. The latest entry is Monday’s speech by John Brennan, the president’s chief counterterrorism advisor. Each successive speech by a government official brings some new...

Of course, that means it's been a much better week for anyone who isn't so keen on the prospect of attacking Iran.  I'm not sure the nails are in Netanyahu's political coffin quite yet, but the carpenters are certainly gathering their supplies.  First up, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, Chief of Staff of the IDF, rejecting the notion that Iran is...

The blog, which has been uniformly excellent to date, is dedicated to exploring maritime piracy in all its dimensions.  Here is the description: Piracy is on the rise because of failed states and crushing poverty. A majority of modern pirate attacks originate in the Horn of Africa in Somalia although there is now a growing problem in the Gulf of Guinea. This...

[Valentina Azarov is a Lecturer in International Law and Human Rights, Al-Quds Bard College, Al-Quds University, Palestine (on leave)] This is the fifth response in our Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Law of Occupation. Earlier posts can be found in the Related Links at the end of this post. Those who believe in the progressive development of international law but remain fully aware of the deficiencies of its enforcement, have good reason to view the proposed functional approach to the law of occupation with cautious optimism. However, there must be a further elaboration and concretization of its mechanism or process, lest this approach to operationalising the way the law of occupation is applied contributes to the law’s indeterminacy. This brief response therefore seeks to ask guiding questions and postulate some predicaments in order to elaborate the content of the functional approach, and explain the ways in which it relates to the binary, or on/off, approach. Some basic considerations include: what are the elements and purpose of the protective function of the law of belligerent occupation? How is this function expected to be fulfilled, operationally? The interpretation of the law of occupation I suggest is teleological and genealogical: conscious of the historical context of the law, the manner in which its provisions were drafted and the purpose they were meant to serve. Most contributions to this symposium have shared this interpretation, in that they have taken as a starting point the fact that the law of occupation is charged with the arduous task of tying the hands of the occupier in order to safeguard against abuses of the law.  Given that belligerent occupation is a phenomenon of war, and that it would be unwarranted to assume good faith between enemies in wartime, no commonality of interest should be presumed to exist between the occupier and the occupied population. The law must thus guard against the occupier’s adoption of the ‘pick and choose’ approach, especially in situations where an occupier maintains ‘effective control’ but attempts to limit its scope of influence so as to claim that it has relinquished its responsibility in certain domains. The law of occupation was meant to protect the occupied population against such disingenuous, abusive attempts by the occupier to mask the extent of its continued influence over their lives.

[Col. (Ret.) Pnina Sharvit Baruch is a Former Head of the International Law Department of the IDF Military Advocate General's Office] This is the fourth response in our Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Law of Occupation. Earlier posts can be found in the Related Links at the end of this post. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond in brief to some of the points made in the excellent contributions of fellow bloggers. At the outset, as a former practitioner, I admit that I prefer functional approaches to the law over rigid dichotomies. From my experience, strict formulas are unsatisfactory when facing complex situations and the situation between Israel and the Palestinians is as complex as they come. As noted in my earlier post, I think it questionable to view the functional approach to occupation offered in some of the posts as reflecting the existing law, as opposed to lege ferenda. However, I set this question aside for present purposes and wish to discuss this concept on its merits. The underlying problem with the concept of "functional occupation" is that it takes a situation which does not possess the most fundamental feature of occupation – effective control – and insists on still calling it occupation. This is done not because the set of rights and obligations pertinent to occupation are suitable to such a situation, but rather in order to "prevent occupiers from relinquishing responsibility when control is transformed" and to ensure that "as long as an occupying party continues to exercise some degree of control, it will continue to be held accountable" (as Gross puts it). In other words the reasoning is not based on finding the suitable categorization of a given situation and applying the relevant rules thereto, but rather on deciding which rules should apply and then terming the situation accordingly. This is a conceptual problem. Even if one believes that certain obligations should be imposed even after effective control has ended, it may well be that the legal basis for imposing them lies beyond the limits of the law of occupation. This is my reading of the Al-Bassiouni judgment given by Israel’s Supreme Court.