[This post is part of the Third Harvard International Law Journal/Opinio Juris Symposium.]
I want to thank Scott Kennedy for his insightful comments. Kennedy’s work has been instrumental in increasing our understanding of the forces driving the rising use of trade remedies in China and other emerging powers. He is certainly correct to point out that many questions remain unanswered. My hope is that this article will spark others to join in examining this phenomenon and debating the consequences of maintaining the global antidumping regime in its current form.
I agree with Kennedy that the methodology for the retaliation analysis is not as robust as one might hope. As I myself note in the discussion of the methodology in the article, my approach presents a real risk of Type I errors. I did try to limit the possibility of Type II errors by examining whether an action may be in response to another protectionist tool besides antidumping sanctions and found little change in my results. But the possibility exists that my approach may be both over- and under-inclusive in what it considers to be retaliation.
Proximity in timing is but an indicator of a retaliatory motive, and I agree with Kennedy that further confirmation through case studies would help buttress my retaliation argument. Unfortunately, I found that policymakers involved in deciding antidumping petitions were willing to only go as far as to discuss overall trends, but not specific cases, even when promised anonymity. This reticence limited my ability to rely upon case studies in my methodology. Here’s to hoping that others will find greater success in getting government officials to open up further about specific cases in future studies.