In association with the International Commission of Jurists

General

16 Dec

[Daniel Abebe is Professor of Law and Walter Mander Teaching Scholar at the University of Chicago] In Congress Underestimated: the Case of the World Bank, Professor Daugirdas studies the World Bank to gain better traction on two important debates in the foreign affairs law literature, namely the extent to which the President, vis-à-vis Congress, is dominant in foreign affairs and the claim that international organizations like the World Bank weaken democracy by enfeebling domestic legislatures.  As I understand it, her argument is that contrary to the conventional wisdom of presidential dominance, Congress has used the threat of reduced World Bank funding and specific voting instructions to force the President to at least embrace, if not implement, Congress’s preferences.  Moreover, Congress’s influence on U.S. policy at the World Bank challenges the view that international organizations undermine democracy by enfeebling Congress’s capacity to influence policy outcomes.  If correct, her overall argument challenges existing conceptions of the relationship between the President and Congress in foreign affairs, and complicates our understanding of the interaction between domestic legislatures and international organizations. Congress Underestimated: the Case of the World Bank is filled with rich institutional detail about the World Bank’s internal operations and the negotiations between Congress and the President over World Bank policy.  Although much of the detail warrants discussion, due to the space constraints of a blog post I will focus my comments on the two related arguments and the evidence offered in support.  Let me start with the presidential dominance claim and move from there.
|
16 Dec

[Paul B. Stephan is the John C. Jeffries, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law and David H. Ibbeken '71 Research Professor at the University of Virginia School of Law.] Many scholars believe that a shift of authority to international organizations benefits the Executive Branch more than Congress. The Executive interacts directly with these organizations and bears undiluted accountability for the consequences of their actions. Congress deals with them sporadically and has weak institutional interests. Members are elected by local, rather than national, constituencies and therefore have an incentive to focus on local rather than national effects of foreign affairs, the actions of international organizations included. Therefore, some have suggested (myself included), Executive Branch actors might prefer international delegations as a means of hobbling legislative oversight. To oversimplify greatly, people like me have argued that internationalists who wish to deepen and broaden international cooperation through institutions might find themselves playing into the hands of the Imperial Presidency. Kristina Daugirdas’s excellent article pushes back against the widely held belief that international institutions augment Executive power at the expense of Congress. Rather than theorize, she does research. Her careful study of the history and pattern of legislative oversight of the World Bank demonstrates the Congress has the capacity effectively (and significantly) to influence U.S. policy toward the Bank, and even to alter the Bank’s behavior. Creation of the Bank did not lead to a surrender of the legislature’s prerogatives, but rather gave members (especially in the House) a new pressure point for extracting concessions from the Executive. The key factor that enables Congress to ride herd on the Bank, Daugirdas observes, is the Bank’s need for periodic new funding. This was not always true, as the Bank was designed to generate a positive return on its founding capital. The creation of a more aggressively redistributionist institution in the form of the International Development Association in 1960 changed this dynamic, because the IDA depends on frequent infusions of new capital. Because Congress must approve any U.S. contributions, it can hold the funding hostage to its policy preferences. Moreover, it has demonstrated an ability to monitor the Bank and thus to respond to slippage between its instructions and the Bank’s performance. In early years, when Congress instructed the U.S. Executive Director not to vote in favor of certain loans, the U.S. representative behaved as required but did nothing to alter the votes of other Directors. After Congress responded through more aggressive pressure on the funding lever, the Bank shifted course. Although the need for regular funding is the salient variable, also important is the role of departmentalism within the Executive Branch. The White House, with its own agenda as well as acting as the focal point for all the Executive’s components to express their interests, may have a particular policy, but the Treasury has the responsibility for managing the United States’s relationship with the Bank and deals regularly with Congress. When Congress has been unhappy, Daugirdas shows, it focuses its displeasure on Treasury, which in turn works hard to steer the Bank’s behavior in the direction Congress wants, whatever the White House might prefer. This article does several wonderful things.
|
16 Dec

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world: Middle East The UN sent its first delivery of humanitarian aid by air to Syria from Iraq and said it plans to deliver more food and winter supplies to the mainly Kurdish northeast in the next 12 days. Yemen's parliament called for a stop to drone attacks in a...

|
15 Dec

Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Freie Universität Berlin have announced a new joint 3-year interdisciplinary Doctoral Program entitled “Human Rights under Pressure – Ethics, Law and Politics” (HR-UP), funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Einstein Foundation Berlin. HR-UP offers young researchers a unique opportunity to conduct cutting-edge research on the most pressing contemporary challenges for human rights, including issues...

|
14 Dec

This fortnight on Opinio Juris, Deborah reminisced about her handshake with Nelson Mandela during her time as a junior White House staffer and Roger posted about the day Mandela was free. Mandela's example was invoked at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, where trade ministers reached their first trade agreement in years. Julian argued that the WTO however does not need the Bali Package...

|
13 Dec

Most reporting on the nuclear agreement with Iran has tended to generalize about the types of sanctions and the impact of the deal on these various measures, so it would be easy to assume that United Nations sanctions are being eased or lifted, but this is not the case. The deal primarily eases unilateral sanctions by the United States and...

|
13 Dec

A nice light-hearted exchange at today's U.S. State Department media briefing, which shows some folks in government like Jen Psaki still have a sense of humor. Reporter: “So has the U.S. already issued a visa to Santa?” Psaki: Santa does not need a visa. He has a visa waiver in the United States. (Laughter.) So he can get to every house, and...

|
10 Dec

I love Canada, and I have long been intrigued by plans to unite the U.S. and Canada in deeper political and economic integration (See this post from 2005(!)). So I have been excited to see the idea getting some mainstream media love with discussions of Diane Francis's new book  Merger of the Century: Why the U.S. and Canada Should Become One...

|
09 Dec

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world: Middle East The UN General Assembly has elected Jordan to the Security Council to replace Saudi Arabia, which had rejected the seat in an unprecedented act to protest the council's failure to end the Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Syria's Bashar al-Assad will remain president and lead any transition agreed...

|
08 Dec

The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the U.S. government agency that regulates offshore fishing, has proposed a new set of regulations to reduce bycatch of Bluefin tuna by economic disincentive. The Washington Post reports that: “Under the proposal, the NMFS would sharply cut back the number of bluefin tuna that individual fishing vessels are allowed to capture accidentally, setting a quota...

|