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(Amended:  Kevin suggests in the comments that this is a cheap shot at the UN, and after sleeping on it, I agree.  I've amended it, but in case anyone wants to see what Kevin is objecting to - and I agree he's right that it's unnecessary sarcasm - the original is below the fold.  I've amended the title as well.) Economist blogger Emma Bond quotes an email (including the above post title) mentioning a UN entity with the following title:
Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of the General Assembly on the Integrated and Coordinated Implementation of and Follow-up to the Major United Nations Conferences and Summits in the Economic and Social Fields
(H/T Hayes Brown and his Water's Edge blog.)  The email is somewhat sarcastic about the oft-remarked alphabet soup of UN agencies.  But it points to another feature of the UN, often remarked upon by managerial experts at the UN itself, viz., that though there are many mechanisms for creating agencies and entities, it has far fewer mechanisms for eliminating them once created, whether because the original purpose has gone away, the functions performed by one actor duplicate those of another or have been absorbed, or because whether the function is useful or not, it should be eliminated to free up resources for other things.  While this is generally true of national governments, particularly large ones, the highly diffuse nature of the UN and its institutions, along with many vested interests - some national and some internal to the UN itself - makes the problem more intractable. It is not an irrelevant question at the moment, however, given the increasing pressures on the UN budget (rather budgets, given that peacekeeping, in particular, is larger than the mandated UN budget) with developed world governments in difficult times.  Budget negotiations over the general budget were strained this cycle, as even the Europeans, for obvious reasons, pressed to hold down budgets - but at the same time budgets have been creeping up.  Budget negotiations over the peacekeeping budget were just wrapped up a few days ago, and likewise showed the strain of increased pressure to do more peacekeeping - particularly given that it is widely perceived as a useful and fairly effective activity, despite the problems with procurement corruption scandals, sexual abuses by peacekeeping forces, and other questions of operations management - at a time when developed countries are under fiscal pressures. One suggestion I make in my book, Living with the UN - one that is also frequently heard among UN efficiency experts inside the organization or hired to consult to it - is that the UN simply ratchet down the number of conferences, international meetings, roadshow events taking place in places other than the UN's existing centers.  They are expensive and it is unclear what the long run value is as compared to simply undertaking the activity in existing venues, and often using existing processes.  I suggest that the US adopt this as policy and simply announce that it is going for a moratorium on international conferences in favor of undertaking the actual negotiations giving rise to the conference in the venues and processes already existing.  Pretty obviously, this is not a suggestion that is going anywhere, but it points to the difficulties in forcing highly diffuse UN agencies to have to make internal tradeoffs over scarce internal resources.

The Office of the Prosecutor has filed its response to Libya's challenge to the admissibility of the cases against Saif Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi.  There are a number of interesting aspects to the response.  First, it says nothing about the case of al-Senussi.  That's a curious omission, given that the response specifically points out with regard to Saif (para. 41)...

Maybe the EU will stick to its guns on its controversial airline emissions tax, but I somehow doubt they will not eventually be forced to cave. (Reuters) - Senate lawmakers and the Obama administration on Wednesday stiffened their opposition to a European law that targets emissions from commercial jetliners and applied new pressure on Brussels and the United Nations to resolve...

I have just published an article in the Utah Law Review that I wanted to flag for our readers. The focus is on the WTO security exception, one of the least appreciated aspects of WTO law. Given that the security exception is self-judging, it is curious that Member States rarely abuse the privilege by invoking it in bad...

The brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi (the militant allegedly killed by a drone strike earlier this week), claims that the US’ drone program is inhumane and makes a mockery of the US claims of upholding human rights standards. IPS offers an opinion piece about how drones fire both ways. In what could have been retaliation for the killing of Abu Yahya...

Just a quick note of welcome to a new blog from my friends at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs.  As I noted a while back, Ron Deibert and others have been putting together a great annual interdisciplinary conversation about cyberthreats, the most recent of which was Cyber Dialogue 2012.  Now they're moving the conversation into blog form.  The first...

More news in targeted strikes, complementing our book symposium this week: US officials claim that Abu Yahyi al-Libi, a high-level al-Qaeda militant, was killed in a CIA drone strike in northern Pakistan yesterday, despite Pakistan’s urging the US to stop the targeted killing program. A strike in Afghanistan aimed at a top-level official killed him as well as six Taliban fighters...

I want to call readers' attention to a wonderful new Oxford book to which I've contributed a chapter: International Prosecutors, edited by Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters, and Cedric Ryngaert.  Here is the publisher's description: This volume examines the prosecution as an institution and a function in a dozen international and hybrid criminal tribunals, from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court. It...

More today about targeted killing, to complement our book symposia: The US’ targeting of senior al-Qaeda leaders is straining relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan has condemned the most recent US drone strikes. Foreign Policy offers a look at the top Pakistani diplomat charged with renewing a good rapport with the US. The G7 will hold emergency talks about the Eurozone today. Talks...

[Marina Aksenova is a Researcher/PhD Candidate in complicity issues in international criminal law at the European University Institute.] The Special Court for Sierra Leone recently convicted Charles Taylor to 50 years of imprisonment. This pronouncement stirred public debate as to whether this sentence is acceptable. Kevin Jon Heller, for example, expressed his concern about the length of Taylor’s sentence, mainly because it resonates with the Trial Chamber finding that Taylor is a mere accomplice, rather than a primary perpetrator of the crimes committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war. Arguably, 50 years of imprisonment is a disproportionately lengthy sentence for this type of criminal participation. This conclusion, in turn, leads to a more general question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to find Taylor responsible as a perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise – a mode of liability that usually justifies heavier sentences. It appears that the judges of the SCSL placed Taylor “in a class of his own” when deciding upon his punishment. His leadership role as the former president of Liberia, and not the particular way in which he got involved in the crimes, appears to have played the central role at sentencing. More detailed analysis will have to wait until the sentencing judgment is released, some initial thoughts could be outlined here. I would like to defend the length of the sentence imposed on Taylor and the mode of criminal participation under which he stands convicted. I am not trying to assess the evidence presented in the proceedings and the appropriateness of Chamber’s findings on the merits. Rather, my goal is to support the hypothesis that complicity, as a mode of liability, is compatible with a relatively heavy punishment given to Taylor. I agree with the Trial Chamber’s decision to assign relatively little weight to Taylor’s form of participation, mainly because it is just one of the factors to be considered at sentencing, and not the definitive one. This is especially true in the absence of the sentencing regime in international criminal law, which would require the judges to follow guidelines or certain rules at sentencing or give reasons for the departure, as it is the case, for example, in England and Wales. In fact, most national jurisdictions follow the principle nulla poena sine lege by stipulating sentencing tariffs in the statutes or formal sentencing guidelines. Usually, these provisions explain the relative importance (if any) to be attributed to the mode of participation of the convicted person.

Perhaps as a good primer to our upcoming book discussion this week, a few drone-related news items: Despite Pakistan's requests to the US to stop the program, the third drone strike in Pakistan in as many days has taken its toll on new victims; irrespective of the method of civilian or combatant counting, there are at least 27 dead. The Washington Post...