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Just a quick note of welcome to a new blog from my friends at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs.  As I noted a while back, Ron Deibert and others have been putting together a great annual interdisciplinary conversation about cyberthreats, the most recent of which was Cyber Dialogue 2012.  Now they're moving the conversation into blog form.  The first...

More news in targeted strikes, complementing our book symposium this week: US officials claim that Abu Yahyi al-Libi, a high-level al-Qaeda militant, was killed in a CIA drone strike in northern Pakistan yesterday, despite Pakistan’s urging the US to stop the targeted killing program. A strike in Afghanistan aimed at a top-level official killed him as well as six Taliban fighters...

I want to call readers' attention to a wonderful new Oxford book to which I've contributed a chapter: International Prosecutors, edited by Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters, and Cedric Ryngaert.  Here is the publisher's description: This volume examines the prosecution as an institution and a function in a dozen international and hybrid criminal tribunals, from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court. It...

More today about targeted killing, to complement our book symposia: The US’ targeting of senior al-Qaeda leaders is straining relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan has condemned the most recent US drone strikes. Foreign Policy offers a look at the top Pakistani diplomat charged with renewing a good rapport with the US. The G7 will hold emergency talks about the Eurozone today. Talks...

[Marina Aksenova is a Researcher/PhD Candidate in complicity issues in international criminal law at the European University Institute.] The Special Court for Sierra Leone recently convicted Charles Taylor to 50 years of imprisonment. This pronouncement stirred public debate as to whether this sentence is acceptable. Kevin Jon Heller, for example, expressed his concern about the length of Taylor’s sentence, mainly because it resonates with the Trial Chamber finding that Taylor is a mere accomplice, rather than a primary perpetrator of the crimes committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war. Arguably, 50 years of imprisonment is a disproportionately lengthy sentence for this type of criminal participation. This conclusion, in turn, leads to a more general question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to find Taylor responsible as a perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise – a mode of liability that usually justifies heavier sentences. It appears that the judges of the SCSL placed Taylor “in a class of his own” when deciding upon his punishment. His leadership role as the former president of Liberia, and not the particular way in which he got involved in the crimes, appears to have played the central role at sentencing. More detailed analysis will have to wait until the sentencing judgment is released, some initial thoughts could be outlined here. I would like to defend the length of the sentence imposed on Taylor and the mode of criminal participation under which he stands convicted. I am not trying to assess the evidence presented in the proceedings and the appropriateness of Chamber’s findings on the merits. Rather, my goal is to support the hypothesis that complicity, as a mode of liability, is compatible with a relatively heavy punishment given to Taylor. I agree with the Trial Chamber’s decision to assign relatively little weight to Taylor’s form of participation, mainly because it is just one of the factors to be considered at sentencing, and not the definitive one. This is especially true in the absence of the sentencing regime in international criminal law, which would require the judges to follow guidelines or certain rules at sentencing or give reasons for the departure, as it is the case, for example, in England and Wales. In fact, most national jurisdictions follow the principle nulla poena sine lege by stipulating sentencing tariffs in the statutes or formal sentencing guidelines. Usually, these provisions explain the relative importance (if any) to be attributed to the mode of participation of the convicted person.

Perhaps as a good primer to our upcoming book discussion this week, a few drone-related news items: Despite Pakistan's requests to the US to stop the program, the third drone strike in Pakistan in as many days has taken its toll on new victims; irrespective of the method of civilian or combatant counting, there are at least 27 dead. The Washington Post...

I want to congratulate my friend Andrew Cayley, the Chief International Co-Prosecutor of the ECCC and a barrister at London's Doughty Street Chambers, on being named QC in England.  Given the constant turmoil that has roiled the ECCC over the past year, the news is a welcome (re-)affirmation of Andrew's legal ability.  The ECCC is lucky to have him....

The Pre-Trial Chamber has held that Article 95 of the Rome Statute applies to requests for surrender, thereby agreeing with Dapo and Jens and disagreeing with me. It's a poorly reasoned decision, giving a completely counterintuitive reading to the "such evidence" language in the article (pretending that the clause in question doesn't actually contain the word "such") and ignoring all...

This week on Opinio Juris, Roger Alford marked Memorial Day with the Battle of Blenheim poem, and Deborah Pearlstein weighed in on the discussion about Chris Hayes’ controversial suggestion that the label of “hero” is too often used to refer to US service personnel. Deborah also posted a snippet from the NY Times report on Obama’s “Kill List” in the conflict...

Fred Shapiro and Michelle Pearse have just published in the Michigan Law Review "The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time." It is a fascinating read, and includes some choice nuggets about international law scholarship. Among the more interesting findings is that of the recent era (1990-2009) only three international law scholars were among the most-cited: Curtis Bradley,...

Rather than deride opponents as the "black helicopter" crowd, the proponents of US ratification of UNCLOS should take seriously the upcoming hearings as a chance to weigh the complex policy choices presented by UNCLOS.  Prof. Craig Allen of the University of Washington offers this very sensible and persuasive take at (of all places) Fox News: The decision to ratify a treaty...

[Stephen G.A. Pitel is Associate Professor at Western University, Faculty of Law] On May 30, 2012, residents of Ecuador started an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking to enforce a judgment in their favour of an Ecuadorian court against Chevron.  The amount of the judgment is a staggering $18 billion.  Chevron has announced that it will resist the enforcement litigation in Ontario. Under Ontario’s common law, confirmed relatively recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in Beals v Saldanha, the test for whether a court will enforce a foreign judgment ordering the payment of money has three requirements.  First, the judgment must be final.  Second, the court granting the judgment must have had jurisdiction on a particular basis.  This is sometimes called jurisdiction in the international sense or jurisdictional competence.  Third, the judgment must be for a fixed sum of money and not a tax or penalty.  In general see Stephen G.A. Pitel & Nicholas S. Rafferty, Conflict of Laws at 159-73. On the first requirement, a judgment is considered to be final even though there is time remaining within which to launch an appeal or an appeal has in fact been launched (as is the case here): Nouvion v Freeman (1889), 15 App Cas 1 (HL) at 10-11 and 13.  However, in such a situation it is relatively straightforward for the defendant in the enforcement proceedings to obtain a stay of the action on the basis that the court should await the results of the appeal.  It would seem likely that Chevron could have the Ontario proceedings stayed pending the results of the appeal in Ecuador.  Even if the enforcement proceedings are stayed, starting them can still have advantages to the plaintiff.  The stay does not stop the plaintiff attempting to obtain a Mareva injunction to freeze assets or other forms of interlocutory relief.