11
Feb
[The following summary is the abstract from Universal Exceptionalism in International Law by Anu Bradford (an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School) & Eric A. Posner (the Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School).] A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is an “exceptionalist” nation, one...
In each of the three largest economies with dispersed ownership of public companies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan—hostile takeovers emerged under a common set of circumstances. Yet the national regulatory responses to these new market developments diverged substantially. In the United States, the Delaware judiciary became the principal source and enforcer of rules on hostile takeovers. These rules give substantial discretion to target company boards in responding to unsolicited bids. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, a private body consisting of market professionals was formed to adopt and enforce the rules on hostile bids and defenses. In contrast to those of the United States, the U.K. rules give the shareholders primary decisionmaking authority in responding to hostile takeover attempts. The hostile takeover regime in Japan, which developed recently and is still evolving, combines substantive rules with elements drawn from both the United States (Delaware) and the United Kingdom, while adding distinctive elements, including an independent enforcement role for Japan’s stock exchange. This Article provides an analytical framework for business law development to explain the diversity in hostile takeover regimes in these three countries.
Eurodemocracy
Multilevel democracy is difficult. Voters have limited time and even less information. Political parties provide the indispensable integrative mechanism for the polity and bring order to the chaotic political marketplace. But parties form around core political concerns, and national parties translate poorly across different levels of government. In this article, David Schleicher turns to the European Union and perceptively analyzes the failure to generate meaningful Europe-wide political parties and campaigns as symptomatic of many forms of multilevel democracy, and thus perhaps less distinctly European. He takes the analytic framework he honed with regard to the absence of robust partisan competition at the local level and directs it now to political institutions that pale beside vigorous national-level politics – specifically, the European Parliament, an institution which inspires mostly apathy and neglect in European voters. The result is a proposal to jigger the institutional prerequisites for EP representation in order to incentivize cross-European political organization and politics. What emerges is creative and provocative.