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The United States has formally referred military-commission charges against Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri for his alleged involvement in a number of terrorist attacks between 2000 and 2002.  Here is Bobby Chesney's helpful description of the charges: Charge 1: Using Treachery/Perfidy (10 USC 950t(17)) – the idea here is that the use of a civilian boat, civilian clothing, and so forth to...

This past summer, Uganda did something it had never done before: it put a rebel from the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on trial for international crimes. The trial of Thomas Kwoyelo marked yet another fascinating twist in Uganda's experience of confronting past atrocities. The government's Directorate of Public Prosecutions alleged that Kwoyelo was guilty of 12 charges of grave breaches of the fourth Geneva Convention and 53 counts of violating Uganda's penal code. Last week, however, judges deemed prosecuting Kwoyelo unconstitutional and ordered him to be set free. The primary obstacle to trying any former rebels in Uganda is the state's Amnesty Law (2000) which was passed with the backing of powerful local northern Ugandan leaders. It effectively guarantees that any individual who either escaped or was captured and subsequently renounced rebellion can be granted reprieve from any prosecution. The trial of Kwoyelo raised, once again, unresolved issues about the use of amnesty laws in societies emerging from violent political conflicts characterized by widespread atrocities. During three months of research, I had the opportunity to attend much of Kwoyelo's trial and speak to many of those involved and affected by his case. From its inception, there was always something peculiar and uncomfortably political about the proceedings. The case opened, quite literally, to the tune of a marching band. While rather clumsy in their approach – much to the chagrin of the presiding judges – Kwoyelo's defense team argued that prosecuting their client was unconstitutional. Because other former combatants, including some who were senior to Kwoyelo, had been granted amnesty, trying Kwoyelo constituted an infringement of his right to fair treatment and equality before the law. Not being able to decide on the constitutionality of the case, the ICD referred it to the Constitutional Court, which agreed with the defense and ordered Kwoyelo to be granted an amnesty and be released:
"We are satisfied that the applicant has made out a case showing that the Amnesty Commission and the Director of Public Prosecutions have not accorded him equal treatment under the Amnesty Act. He is entitled to a declaration that their acts are inconsistent with Article 21(1) (2) of the Constitution and thus null and void. We so find. We order that the file be returned to the court, which sent it with a direction that it must cease the trial of the applicant forthwith."
The importance of the Kwoyelo trial, both legally and politically, is rather obvious. Had Uganda successfully tried and convicted Kwoyelo (and they still might), it would have given the government a plank upon which to build a complementarity challenge to the ICC's jurisdiction, something the government had expressed interest in doing. However, the spectre of a successful trial also instigated fears in northern Uganda. Former senior rebel commanders explained their uneasiness of potentially becoming the Government's next targets for trial if Kwoyelo was denied amnesty. The instability incurred by revoking thousands of amnesties would be absolutely devastating to a region and people eager to move forward. Of course, the granting of an amnesty and the defeat of the government's case against Kwoyelo is equally as controversial. International human rights groups sent representatives to monitor the trial and provide assistance to government lawyers. Predictably, Human Rights Watch argued that amnesties “for crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity run counter to international law and practice.” In the wake of the Kwoyelo verdict, Amnesty International released a statement which declared that:
“What we are witnessing here is simply pervasive impunity for serious crimes and human rights violations...Neither Thomas Kwoyelo, nor others accused of committing war crimes should be granted amnesty.”
Human rights groups and fervent human rights advocates and scholars have been engaging in what amounts to talking amnesties out of reality. They claim not only that it is morally and legally wrong to grant amnesties but ominously warn that doing so is to risk ever becoming a functioning, liberal democracy. However, that granting amnesties for crimes such as those allegedly committed by Kwoyelo “run contrary to international law and practice” is not obvious. To borrow from the decision in an Appeal's Chamber ruling at the Special Court for Sierra Leone: a duty to prosecute international crimes and a prohibition on the use of amnesties may be crystallizing, but has not yet crystalized.

Former IMF Chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn has asserted immunity under international law from the lawsuit filed by Nafissatou Diallo, the maid who is accusing him of sexually attacking her.  “Mr. Strauss-Kahn enjoyed absolute immunity under customary international law not only while he was head of the IMF, but also for the period of time after he had resigned from his post and...

Over the last year, we've hosted a number of discussions centered on immunity issues and how US courts deal with them.  For the most part, however, these discussions focused on individuals claiming immunity from becoming the subject of criminal or civil proceedings.  Last week, however, the 11th Circuit gave us a very different type of immunity case -- the sovereign...

It was so promising. Everyone appeared to be on board when, last February, the international community decided that the situation in Libya should be investigated by the International Criminal Court. Not only did the UN Security Council refer the situation in Libya to the Court, but it did so unanimously. However, despite hefty rhetoric about the importance of bringing the Libyan leader to justice, Western states have been happy to instrumentalize the Court in order to isolate Gaddafi and have just as keenly abandoned their interest in bringing the Libyan tyrant to The Hague. Their initial and overwhelming zeal for international justice also obscured their complicity in sustaining Gaddafi's regime and its crimes against the Libyan people. Readers of the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 will note that the resolution imposes a temporal limit on the ICC's jurisdiction. While the Rome Statute declares that the Court can investigate events since July 1, 2002, the ICC was instructed to only investigate alleged international crimes in Libya since February 15, 2011. In addition, the referral explicitly removes citizens of non-state parties from the jurisdiction of the Court. Despite the questionably legal nature of such restrictions, the referral was celebrated as marking a new chapter in international justice and the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council. Yet, ironically, as the intervention in Libya began to succeed and Gaddafi became increasingly isolated, commitment to achieving international justice waned. That Western states sought to prohibit the Court from investigating any Libyan crimes prior to February 15, 2011 is unsurprising. Doing so would have exposed a litany of instances in which Western states propped up the Gaddafi regime and were complicit in systemic and systematic human rights violations. It doesn't take much research to discover the extent to which Western states and Libya developed a remarkably cozy political, military and economic relationship. Virtually every major Western state had significant dealings with Gaddafi and his regime. Despite protestations from human rights groups and Gaddafi’s victims, he was no longer the “criminal” tyrant who presided over a “reign of terror”, as described by Ronald Reagan. Instead, he was convinced to take responsibility for Lockerbie, renounce sponsorship for international terrorism and become a partner in the fight against radical Islam, and dismantle his nuclear and weapons of mass destruction programmes. Justified by realpolitik, Gaddafi became a “friend”, an “ally” and “one of ours”. It was a remarkable transformation and one which ushered in a wave of bilateral deals which helped keep his police state in power and his people oppressed. Getting Gaddafi on the right side of terrorism and nuclear proliferation was necessary and the concessions achieved by restoring Gaddafi's image were surely worth it. However, as Stephen Glover has argued: “What is not defensible is the subsequent indulging of this horrible man, and treating him as though he were a normal leader of a normal country.”

I think the Washington Post gets the right position on the utility and effectiveness of drones in targeted killing — including their limits.  The editorial principally addresses two different things, both raised in John Brennan’s summary statement of the administration’s counterterrorism policy at Harvard Law School a week ago.  The first is the question of whether there is a “legal geography of war,” as I have put it; the administration’s short answer, as is mine and the Post’s, is “no.”  The second is the question of whether drones, just as a strategic matter for the US (meaning, looking solely to US interests, rather than a universal moral or welfare-maximizing policy for everyone, all sides and all civilians), have knock-on bad effects that should put a damper on them. A few days ago I criticized the eminent columnist David Ignatius and his view that the US is “addicted” to drones.  His view is that the “blowback” effects of drone use can easily, and apparently already do, outweigh their utility to the United States, used to the extent we do today and propose to expand into the future — and that is so, he says, even though he concedes that they are indeed more precise and sparing of collateral damage.  I criticized that quite sharply — mostly because he then stops short, without telling us what the alternative is, except to launch fewer or no attacks.  After all, he doesn’t seem to want to urge that we launch attacks with less precise weaponry.  I guess I’d sum up Ignatius’ view — I think this is fair and a characterization he'd agree with, not snark — that he regards drones as tactically precise, strategically incontinent. (Update:  Chris got an excellent discussion of this going on his FB page; one of the comments is posted in the comments below, and I'm going to cut and paste the rest into the comments in the next day, in case anyone wants to follow that discussion or join in.  Thanks to Mark Shulman and Dan Goldfisher for taking time to respond, and I'll move their comments from FB here in the next day.)

I am delighted to announce that Mark Kersten will be guest-blogging at Opinio Juris for the next two weeks.  Mark is the founder of the superb blog Justice in Conflict, which I've recommended before.  Here is his bio: Mark Kersten is a PhD student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and author of the blog Justice in Conflict....

Check out the following ad for the new Audi A6: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeuveTXuNho&feature=relmfu You know you're in trouble when a German company is using the decaying state of America's infrastructure to sell cars.  Then again, when you think about it, the ad is actually kind of a Republican utopia: austerity and expensive, environment-destroying luxury goods all in one.  Why fix the roads when your...

I've been following the Kenyan confirmation hearing relatively closely, and I've continually found the reporting at allAfrica.com -- which aggregates articles from numerous leading African newspapers -- to provide extremely good coverage of the proceedings.  An article today from the Nairobi Star, however, caught my eye for all the wrong reasons (my emphasis): A dissenting judge of the International Criminal Court...