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As many readers of this blog know, Elizabeth Andersen, the  Executive Director of the American Society of International Law, has been named the new director of the American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative. Consequently, the ASIL has a search underway for a new Executive Director. The search announcement states, in part: The American Society of International Law (“ASIL” or “the...

A new High Level sanctions review has been initiated at the UN, sponsored by the UN Missions of Australia, Finland, Greece and Sweden, in combination with Brown University and the sanctions consulting firm CCI. The purpose of the review is to assess existing sanctions and develop forward looking recommendations to enhance effectiveness. A similar process took place in 2006, known...

[David Golove is the Hiller Family Foundation Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law. Marty Lederman is a Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center. This contribution is cross-posted at Just Security.] The Supreme Court has finally issued its decision in United States v. Bond.  Although it appeared the Court might be on the brink of a momentous decision that would have substantially diminished the historical reach of the treaty power, or of Congress’s power to ensure the nation’s compliance with its treaty obligations, none of the radical theories put before the Court attracted more than three votes.  Bond clearly is significant.  But its significance lies not in what the Justices did, but instead in what a majority of them declined to do.  In short, the decision sustained the constitutional status quo. In an opinion written by the Chief Justice, a six-Justice majority did what one of us had proposed (and the other had hoped the Court might do)—namely, to use a plain-statement presumption in order to construe the statute in question so that it does not apply to the discrete conduct involving the two private individuals in this particular case.  The Chemical Weapons Convention, and the federal statute implementing that treaty, were drafted broadly, presumably so that they would not fail to cover the sorts of cases of dangerous use of chemicals that the treaty-makers plainly had in mind.  The result, however, is that the words of the statute, read literally, would also make a federal crime out of virtually any “nonpeaceful” use of toxic chemicals, including all run-of-the-mill poisonings traditionally handled under state law.  This goes well beyond anything that motivated the treaty-makers.  The Chief Justice is surely correct that, notwithstanding the breadth of the treaty and statutory language, “there is no reason to think the sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like Bond’s common law assault.”  The paradigmatic case that the treaty is designed to address, wrote the Chief, is the sort of chemical attack depicted in John Singer Sargent’s haunting 1919 painting “Gassed.”  But as the Chief jibed, “[t]here are no life-sized paintings of [Carol Anne] Bond’s rival washing her thumb” after she had touched the toxic chemicals that Bond had spread on her car, mailbox and front door.* The Chief Justice therefore construes the federal statute not to cover Bond’s conduct.  [See Curt Bradley in defense of the Court’s plain-statement analysis.]  The precise scope of the majority’s statutory construction remains a bit obscure.  (Presumably the law is not limited to conduct that is apt to inspire great paintings!)  But this much is clear:  The Court explains that the statute does apply in cases where toxic chemicals are used for “assassination, terrorism, and acts with the potential to cause mass suffering”—presumably even if such offenses are wholly intrastate and/or where they do not involve any foreign nationals.  The Chief writes that such cases do not implicate federalism concerns because “[t]hose crimes have not traditionally been left predominantly to the States.”  But of course it has predominantly been state law that traditionally handled such "noneconomic, violent criminal conduct," and the Chief Justice does not explain why creation of a parallel federal offense would not implicate the federalism concerns reflected in the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions since Lopez (1995).  Accordingly, the Court’s confirmation of Congress’s power to implement treaties by criminalizing such conduct is quite important, as we explain further below. The most important aspect of Bond, however, was not its statutory interpretation but the fact that the ground-breaking constitutional limitations offered up to the Court each failed to attract the support of a majority of Justices. a.  Limiting Congress’s Power to Implement Treaties The Cato Institute filed an amicus brief urging the Court to hold that even in cases where the President and the Senate conclude a valid treaty, Congress lacks any specific power to pass legislation necessary and proper to ensure that the United States abides by its treaty commitments.  This deeply counterintuitive argument—that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation to help the President and the Senate make treaties, but not to help the federal government implement the nation's agreements—was first suggested by Cato’s lawyer, Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz, in 2005 (that is to say, more than two centuries after adoption of the relevant constitutional provisions).  As we explain in Part II of our amicus brief in Bond, this argument is simply implausible on historical, textual, and structural grounds—not to mention inconsistent with a series of Supreme Court decisions, including the unanimous opinion in Neely v. Henkel (1901) and Justice Holmes’s celebrated 1920 decision in Missouri v. Holland. In his opinion concurring in the judgment in Bond,

As David Kaye notes, treaty-power advocates everywhere may be breathing a collective sigh of relief with the Supreme Court's decision in Bond v. United States. I'm not so sure how big a difference it makes, given the Senate's persistent refusal to put an expansive treaty power to work. From an academic perspective the decision is a big let-down. No big...

[Jean Galbraith is an Assistant Professor at Rutgers School of Law - Camden] Thank you to Opinio Juris for letting me guest blog on Bond. The most notable thing about the Bond decision is a resounding silence.  As a matter of law, it should have been easy to find for the government.  The statutory text reads plainly in the government’s favor, and constitutional text, practice, and precedent easily support the conclusion that the federal government can override federalism interests in implementing constitutionally valid treaties.  Yet not a single justice sided with the United States.  This silence is particularly perplexing given that three justices at oral argument seemed sympathetic to the government. That is the major silence, but there are silences of reasoning in the opinions as well.  In what follows, I focus on two silences.  The first is the lack of consideration in the majority opinion of how treaty-implementing statutes might differ as a matter of statutory construction from ordinary statutes.  The second is the startling absence of constitutional history from the Framing onward in Justice Scalia’s concurrence.

The Majority Opinion

As Peter Spiro has noted, the majority ducks the constitutional question of whether the Treaty Power plus the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to criminalize domestic poisonings like that of Ms. Bond.  Following a hint dropped by Justice Kennedy at oral argument, the Court does this by holding that there needs to be a “clear statement that Congress meant the statute to reach local criminal conduct.”  It isn’t enough for Congress to use broad language that seems to cover the act at issue; instead, Congress apparently has to do something more to signal specific intent to reach “local” conduct.  Congress didn’t do so here, so Ms. Bond wins. I won’t deconstruct the merits of this approach, although I think Justice Scalia does a good job in his concurrence of showing why it is problematic.  But I do want to mention that it leads to an interesting divergence between the interpretation of a treaty and the interpretation of implementing legislation.  The Court spent very little time on the interpretation of the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, merely noting its “doubts” that the Convention was meant to reach ordinary domestic poisonings.  If it had wanted to, the Court could doubtless have done more to interpret the Convention this way (e.g., by explicit discussion of “object and purpose” or perhaps by drawing on rule-of-lenity-related principles in international and comparative law).  But instead the Court accepted a wedge between the interpretation of a treaty and of its implementing legislation.  Federalism principles do not matter to treaty interpretation (given that these principles are country-specific) but do matter to the interpretation of implementing legislation.  If this canon of construction is about Congressional intent, then it strikes me as odd, because there is a countervailing consideration not mentioned by the Court. This is that when Congress uses language that closely tracks a treaty’s language in implementing the treaty, Congress presumably does so because it wants convergence rather than divergence with the treaty.

Justice Scalia’s Concurrence

The decision is here. The Court found unanimously that the federal government overreached in prosecuting Carol Anne Bond under a federal statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention for what was otherwise a simple assault in a lovers' quarrel. The six-justice majority decided the case on non-constitutional, statutory grounds -- interpreting the statute (and the treaty) not to cover such conduct, but...

So, Professor of Law, what are you going to do after you retire from your tenured post teaching and finish writing all the articles and books you want to write? Well, I guess I'll become President (of Malawi)! On Saturday, [Peter] Mutharika, now 74, a soft-spoken professor with a proper English-educated accent and who smoked a pipe while he taught in the 1970s,...

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world: Africa China and the African Development Bank jointly unveiled a US$2 billion multilateral investment fund last week, marking a symbolic shift in their partnership.  A bombing in a bar in Nigeria's northeast has killed at least 14 people and injured another 14 in the second attack targeting football fans...

Lawfare reports today on a study published in Political Science Quarterly about how ordinary Pakistanis view US drone strikes in their country. According to the post, the study "[c]hallenge[s] the conventional wisdom" that there is "deep opposition" among Pakistanis to drone strikes and that "the associated anger [i]s a major source of the country's rampant anti-Americanism." I don't have access to the...

Calls for Papers Following a successful conference organised by the Qatar University, College of Law and the Qatari Branch of the ILA on the Syrian Crisis and International Law they now plan for a special issue of the International Review of Law on the same theme.  To this end, they are looking for contributions discussing: public international law, including collective security and...

The New York Times reports that:
The presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus formally signed an agreement on Thursday to create a limited economic union — an alliance hobbled by the absence of Ukraine but one long pursued by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to confirm his country as a global economic force. “Today we are creating a powerful, attractive center of economic development, a big regional market that unites more than 170 million people,” Mr. Putin said during the ceremonies. He underscored the significant energy resources, work force and cultural heritage of the combined nations.
This treaty, which was signed this past week but is not expected to come into force until January 2015, marks the next step in transforming the still-nascent Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) into the Eurasian Union (EEU). Russian pressure for Ukraine to turn away from association with the European Union and towards Moscow-led Eurasian integration was one of the roots of the current crisis. As the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with China and the Central Asian states is Russia's answer to U.S. military alliances, Eurasian economic integration is meant to be Russia's response to EU and U.S. economic power.  According to a chronology in a report by the Centre for European Policy Studies, the creation of the EEU was first suggested by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in 1994. There was not much movement until the negotiation and signing of a customs union treaty among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 2007. The basic requirements of the Eurasian Customs Union came into force in 2010, which were essentially trade policy coordination measures establishing a common external tariff among its members. However, the deepening Eurasian economic integration was given a boost by an op-ed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in October 2011. In early 2012, the member states deepened ECU’s institutions by starting the operations of the Eurasian Economic Commission, a supranational entity that was contemplated in the 2007 treaty,  to manage the external trade regulations of the member states, including relations with the WTO. That also marked the establishment of  the "single economic space" (SES) among the member countries which, in the words of the Centre for European Policy Studies paper, "envision[ed] further regulatory convergence and harmonisation of national laws" in particular economic sectors. The treaty that was signed on May 29th is ostensibly to move from customs union towards a full economic union, with free movement of goods, capital, and people among the member states, but reality has so far proven to be less sweeping and heroic than the rhetoric that marked the occasion. The most obvious issue is that the EEU was originally envisioned to include not only Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, but also Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and especially Ukraine. Ukraine would have added  a populous country with  economic potential and an an economy that (unlike Russia and Kazakhstan) was not based on natural resource exploitation. But Russia’s intervention in Ukraine  backfired: not only did it fail to bring Ukraine into the EEU fold but, according to a Radio Free Europe report, it has weakened the EEU by having: