An Idea for Revitalizing Multilateralism

[ANDRAS VAMOS-GOLDMAN is a former Canadian diplomat, international lawyer, social entrepreneur and university professor who played key roles on the UN Security Council team, in the Sierra Leone Special Court Management Committee, and in helping to establish the International Criminal Court and Justice Rapid Response (first Executive-Director).

ELODIE TRANCHEZ PhD is an international human rights lawyer specialising in UN human rights strategic litigation; co-founder and co-director of the Geneva Institute for Multilateralism, Human Rights and Faith. She teaches public international law, including the law of treaties and the law of international organizations at the University for Peace (UPEACE).]

A number of useful ideas have emerged in response to the decline in multilateralism and the erosion of the international law-based order. Middle-power cooperation and diversification of relationships are positive steps, in a world that has regressed into power-based transactional relations. Yet less serious attention has been paid to the crisis in our system of international institutions, that have provided both the marketplaces and the service centers for addressing collective challenges.  

The operative word is “serious”, because while there are numerous proposals (including UN 80), most do not address the basic problem of the international organizational system. That legacy international institutions no longer reflect the reality of how the world actually works, and who its important players are. This has made them appear to be decreasingly relevant, and consequently at risk of abandonment.

Which would be a huge mistake, since it is the institutional structure that makes rules-based, transparent international engagement possible. Revitalizing international institutions, therefore, has to be an essential component of rebuilding a more resilient international system. One that can again pick up the work of advancing humanity’s common needs. Specialized multilateral bodies, for example the Word Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, where the ongoing regulation of sectoral international engagement takes place are arguably the first places to start.

The heart of the challenge is that legacy international institutions are generally based on a mid-20^th century concept of the world. Where nation-states were almost the sole dominant international actors, making them the only legitimate participants with agency in international decision making. Today, the international community is awash with a variety of powerful actors. For profit, social impact, sub and super-national entities, many with global reach or impact already play outsized roles in international decision-making.

Yet most international actors other than nation-states lack the ability to participate in the governance and decision making of international organizations. While “observer status” is not uncommon, this just gives a right to be in the room, without any stake or agency in what happens there. The narrowness of the group of legitimate stakeholders with agency forces actors other than nation-states to transact their international business elsewhere. Away from the fora that were specifically created as global and regional marketplaces. Away from fora with rules and transparency, where there is the possibility of some accountability.  Into places like the World Economic Forum and the Munich Security Conference.

This has contributed to the shift away from multilateralism, towards transactional international relations. It is also undermining the ability of legacy international institutions to deliver the services mandated by their members. Services ranging from developing essential international regulation to delivering emergency humanitarian assistance. Services without which humanity would find it difficult to function. As international institutions are seen as less relevant marketplaces, it can be observed that they also begin to be denied the support necessary to deliver services.

One way to revitalize such institutions is by enabling the participation with agency of significant actors other than just nation-states. This would help to reverse the current trend of switching international decision-making from existing purpose-built institutions, to informal fora without rules or transparency, making for a stronger international law-based system. Reconfirming the relevance of legacy international institutions as global marketplaces would also enable them to fulfil their other role as deliverers of mandated services. By increasing the number of voices with a stake in international institutions, it will also make it more difficult for potential hegemonic entities to dominate.

In considering who needs to join legacy multilateral decision-making rooms, and on what terms, precedent and practice, while useful, must not constraint forward-looking thinking.  The current period of significant societal upheaval, while scary, is also an opportunity to make changes that would be unlikely to gain support or traction under less pressing circumstances.

One such group of actors are significant sub‑national governments (provinces, states, cantons, formal regions, as well as large cities). The measure of “significant” should be some combination of size, population, economic or strategic factors and specialized interests.  This is not a novel idea. There are many precedents where such actors already participate in multilateral fora, with the blessing of their national governments (see, for example, Fulgenzi).

It is not suggested that sub-national entities should challenge the predominance of nation-states by participating at the same level of agency. Numerous precedents exist for limited forms of decision-making. These could range from mandatory consultation like in the International Labour Organization (ILO) where employers and workers’ representatives have to be consulted before decisions are made, to weighted or fractional voting (like at IMF or World Bank).  

Such changes have other benefits. Sub-national governments are often closer to practical challenges being considered by international institutions than their national governments. Challenges specific to certain climates, geographies or types of population concentrations can also cut across national borders, aligning the interests of similar regions in different countries. Many such cross-national affinities, on issues like the environment, climate, migration, health, trade, tourism and transportation already exist. Bringing them formally inside legacy international institutions will bolster both the relevance of the institutions and the chances for the resolution of such common issues.

If formal participation continues to be denied to significant sub-national entities, they are unlikely to stop interacting internationally. They will just intensify their efforts to transact where they can—in non-transparent, rule-absent “shadow fora”. Neither benefitting existing institutions, nor improving the chances of resolving common problems.

Sub-national governments are hardly the next most influential stakeholders after nation-states. This role is increasingly occupied by powerful non‑state actors, with both profit and social impact goals.  As these silos are increasingly breaking down, it may be more accurate to see them as “enterprises” with a mix of profit and social impact motivations. For tax, social responsibility, control of research, and pure competitive and survival reasons, “how” enterprises operate are increasingly blurring their “why” boundaries.  

Modern enterprises, like Novo Nordisk, to TATA, to Care or Save the Children can best be seen, therefore, on the “profit to social impact continuum”. The most “significant” among them play outsized roles internationally, from market innovation to global service delivery. The measure of “significance” for such enterprises would, therefore, involve factors such as international reach, size, economic and/or social impact and influence.

Significant enterprises already advocate and lobby, fund, convene, draft, and implement decisions effecting the international realm. In the absence of entry to purpose-built international institutions, their participation also takes place in “shadow-fora”. The suggestion to involve them in formal international decision making should not be seen as just a naïve attempt to end or legitimize such “outside influence”. Such enterprises will continue to “play” everywhere they can. Rather, it presents a real opportunity to restore a better balance between decisions taken in multilateral marketplaces with rules, and those that happen behind closed doors.

It is believed that if “significant” enterprises had an opportunity to participate in formal international decision making, they would take it. Even though such participation exposed their positions and arguments, values, methods, objectives and willingness to contribute to the global common good. Unlike today, when they enjoy influence without accountability.

 This is because operating in competitive environments, any opportunity for more direct access to greater decision-making and visibility is an advantage. As is the ability to represent their own interests, as opposed to relying on layers of politicians and officials, who lack the same level of expertise, training and loyalty.

Equally importantly, exceptional people who create or lead enterprises with global reach and impact must almost certainly resent having to work through, give false credit to (sometimes even make payment to) politicians and officials to have their ideas presented on the biggest stages in the world.  These factors may just make it worth-while for significant enterprises to invest in coming in the “front door”, rather than just continuing to “pay” so much at the “back door”. Or more cynically, to spend a little more, and have the use of both entrances.

A critical question is why nation-state governments would give up their monopoly positions in the “international room” even if it is only with limited agency? Most compellingly, without opening the legacy international organizational space to other important international actors, nation-states’ monopoly will soon be over empty shells of institutions, thus meaningless. Having more voices that share similar values, interests and expectations will also increase their combined weight, thus becoming an influence multiplier for national interests. This is one reason why coordination on international issues is already part of the domestic consultative process for international decisions in most countries. More cynically, national governments may view sharing responsibility with other entities from the same country for international decisions as a domestic political advantage.

Why would “we the people” consider it a good thing for even more layers of already influential entities to be open to the international decision making? Because people understand that such entities already exercise their influence without being required to put their goals, positions and arguments in the open and on the line. People will thus appreciate the importance of having such entities inside legacy international institutions, where rules and transparency can help shed light on where all international actors stand.

 The current highly transactional, blatantly predatory international environment is forcing all actors to focus on the pursuit of “leverage”. Even existential threats like the effects of climate change and the lack of AI regulation have been relegated to the backburner.  What could be greater collective leverage to reverse the present trend, than the revitalization of purpose-built legacy international institutions and a consequent, resilient international law-based order?