[William S. Dodge is The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. From August 2011 to July 2012, he served as Counselor on International Law to the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, where he worked on a variety of immunities matters. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the State Department or of the United States.]
In
Jones v. United Kingdom, a chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the United Kingdom did not violate Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees a right of access to court, by dismissing civil suits alleging torture on grounds of immunity. Jones and others sued the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and some of its officials in UK courts alleging torture in violation of international law. In 2006, the House of Lords held that both Saudi Arabia and its officials were immune from suit under the UK’s State Immunity Act.
The ECtHR’s decision with respect to Saudi Arabia is not remarkable. In
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held by a closely divided vote that international law did not recognize an exception to state immunity from claims of torture. Since
Al-Adsani, the International Court of Justice has confirmed in
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), that there is no exception to state immunity for human rights violations. What is remarkable is the decision in
Jones to extend that immunity to foreign officials. In so doing, the ECtHR has effectively concluded that torture is an “official act” entitled to immunity from civil suit in the courts of other countries. That conclusion not only runs against current trends (as Philippa Webb has
noted), it is also mistaken as a matter of existing customary international law.
Under customary international law, foreign official immunity takes various forms. Heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers (the so-called “troika”) enjoy status-based immunity (immunity
ratione personae), which extends to all acts but lasts only during their time in office. Other officials—and all former officials—enjoy conduct-based immunity (immunity
ratione materiae), which lasts forever but applies only to acts taken in an official capacity. (The immunities of diplomatic and consular personnel are governed by treaties: to oversimplify, diplomats have status-based immunity and consular officials have conduct-based immunity.) The foreign officials sued in
Jones were not part of the troika, which means they were entitled to immunity under customary international law only if the conduct alleged was an “official act.”
It is important to bear in mind that customary international law permits States to grant foreign officials immunity from the jurisdiction of their courts that is greater than the immunity required by customary international law. In
Jones v. United Kingdom, the UK House of Lords interpreted the State Immunity Act to extend the immunity of the State itself to foreign officials for any act attributable to the State. The question technically before the ECtHR was not whether customary international law
required the UK to grant such immunity, but rather whether Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
prohibited it from doing so. It would have been possible for the ECtHR to conclude that the UK was within its rights to extend immunity to foreign officials alleged to have committed torture, even though such immunity is not required under customary international law. Instead, the court undertook to “examine whether there was a general rule under public international law requiring the domestic courts to uphold Saudi Arabia’s claim of State immunity in respect of the State officials” (¶ 201). In doing so, it got the analysis badly wrong.