The Challenges of the G-8

First, there is the problem of Russian democracy being undercut by Putin’s policies. Vice-President Cheney’s comments last month concerning Russia’s faltering democracy were not welcome by Putin. As some have noted, Russia, despite its economic weakness, was invited to join the G-7 in recognition of its moving toward democracy and a;lso as a means to encourage the transition. Today, Russia is arguably less democractic than it was in 1997. All of the other G-8 members are market democracies. Although Russia’s place int eh group is secure, it does not appreciate these differences—and the seeming vector of its changes—being mentioned.

Second, there is the problem of the Russian “near abroad.” The U.S. and European countries have stated that the G-8 presents an opportunity to address the seemingly intractable “frozen conflicts” in various post Soviet countries. The separatist problems in Moldova and Georgia, and the long-term conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan have led to instability in the region between Russia and the ever-expanding European Union. Russia has made it clear that it is not interested in putting these conflicts on the agenda.

(I have spent some time working on the international issues around the Moldovan conflict, which concerns the attempted secession of Transnistria, a strip of territory in eastern Moldova on the Ukrainian border. I am actually heading to Moldova today to keynote a conference on the legal issues of this conflict.)

Third, there is the related issue of energy security. While Russia sees this as an opportunity to discuss the peaceful use of nuclear power, others (especially the Europeans) want to discuss how Russia has used energy as a means of power projection against Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, with downstream effects in the EU.

The G-8, in its current and previous forms, has waxed and waned in importance over the last thirty years. It has provided a means of cooperation, through the definition of common areas of interest, and coordination, through the ongoing ministerial and lower-level meetings throughout the year between summits. But the G-8 has never faced a summit in which many issues concern the summit host itself and many other pressing issues—Israel/Lebanon, North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq—all require international cooperation.

These crises may exemplify the limits of the G-8. The G-8 is a means of policy coordination. It does not confer legality on a particular policy such as, say, military intervention. Let’s take a hypo that the U.S. wanted to use a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities and it was able to convince the other seven G-8 members to either agree or acquiesce to its decision. The U.S. then goes to the Security Council and its resolution is vetoed by China.

As a matter of fact, of course the U.S can still bomb. As a matter of law, unless the U.S. can make a credible claim of self-defense, the action would be clearly illegal. As a matter of politics, while the U.S. can point to consensus among the G-8, those against the bombing can point to the fact that the U.S. did not have Security Council approval.

The G-8 is a means of decreasing transaction costs through information-sharing and coordination. It is also a means of bandwagoning and projecting power. The UN also provides such resources, though its greater size makes it much more cumbersome and the broad ideological range of its memebrs makes it more fractious.

However, while the G-8 is very useful in economic (and to a lesser extent political) coordination, it is not very effective as a legitimating body. It is a coordination engine, after all, not a legitimization engine. But, without some type of legitimacy of action, its attempts at solutions may lead to increased anger over the hegemony of strong states over weak states and thus be ultimately counter-productive.

Since the G-6 was founded in the mid 1970’s, the world system has shifted from bipolarity to multipolarity. Globalization and interdependence have brought new actors and new dilemmas to the international stage. In short, the international system is becoming more complex. Perhaps the G-8 should remain primarily a means fo economic coordination. But, if its member states strive to make it something more—and that is apparently the case—then the G-8 will have to show that it is up to the task of addressing this new world order and that it is not just another photo op.