Archive for October, 2005

Hariri Report Leads to Security Council Action

by Chris Borgen

Earlier today the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1636 demanding that Syria cooperate with the Hariri investigation “or else.” OK, it didn’t really say “or else” but that was the gist of it. See a summary of main points here; UN press report here.

The UN press report explained that

The resolution called on all States to prevent the entry or transit of suspects designated by the Commission or the Government of Lebanon and to freeze all assets of such person on their territory.

Moreover,

The resolution determined “that any involvement of any State in this terrorist act would constitute a serious violation by that State of its obligations to work to prevent and refrain from supporting terrorism.”

As CNN summarized:

Last-minute diplomatic haggling deleted a direct reference to the threat of sanctions on the Syrian government, but the effect of Monday’s resolution is the same.

The resolution is under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which holds open the ultimate possibility of the Security Council considering the use of force with failure to comply.

Russia and China simply would not have voted for stronger wording. But this nonetheless puts Syria in a fairly tight spot as the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority is the diplomatic equivalent of ending your demand with “or else.” Resolutions under Chapter VII must be followed by UN members States. The specifics of that “or else” may require another resolution but under Chapter VII no options are off the table, as certain Washington politicians are fond of saying.

The Hariri Report was the step that made getting a Chapter VII resolution politically feasible. Heated rhetoric alone from the U.S. could not have done this. Now UN member States are required to assist in the investigation. If Syria persists in stonewalling, then UN member States may soon be required to have sanctions against Syria.

But still, isn’t this less direct than the U.S. going in and trying a little regime change? Well, yes, but the point is that what sometimes seems to be the most direct method (hey guys, let’s topple a government!) can be the least effective. Rather, here we see the role of consensus building and coordination. Moreover, as I mentioned in my previous post on this topic, the UN’s role gives a legitimacy to the process that gung-ho unilateralism simply would not have had. And, with legitimacy, we may get a better and more sustainable outcome.

UPDATE
Christopher Le Mon has commented that the full text is available here. Thanks for the link.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/31/hariri-report-leads-to-security-council-action/

Judge Alito and Forced Abortions

by Roger Alford

A quick review of Judge Alito’s decisions suggests very few that have international law implications. One recent decision that merits significant attention is Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004). At issue is whether the fiancée of a woman who was forced to undergo an abortion in China is entitled to asylum.

Factually the case is extraordinarily sympathetic. A young Chinese couple in China become pregnant, want to marry, and do not want to abort their child. But China has two offensive policies: forced abortions and severe restrictions on the permissible age of marriage. Couples in China are prevented from getting married if they are not of marriageable age (25 for a man and 23 for a woman). Chen and his fiancée were 19 and 18 at the time they sought a marriage license. When they attempted to secure a marriage license they were refused. When his fiancée was finally found by Chinese authorities, she was forced to undergo an abortion in her eighth month of pregnancy.

A few key legal aspects of the case are important. First, our asylum law only affords protection for specific reasons: a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Second, these decisions are initially made by immigration judges, and federal courts grant Chevron deference to their decisions. Past immigration decisions recognize that a forced abortion is persecution on the basis of political opinion and that a woman and her spouse could secure asylum on that basis. But in Chen the agency held that a fiancée of a woman forced to abort did not enjoy such protection. Thus, marital status was the defining distinction that precluded Chen from securing asylum because his fiancée was forced to abort.

The Third Circuit, per Judge Alito, upheld the agency determination. Judge Alito found that there was a rational basis for the distinction. The immigration authorities use “marital status as a rough way of identifying a class of persons whose opportunities for reproduction and child-rearing were seriously impaired … as the result of the performance of a forced abortion or sterilization on another person.” The decision to adopt a bright-line rule and not extend this protection to unmarried partners was found to satisfy the requirements of Chevron deference. To conclude otherwise would force the agency to make difficult distinctions between unmarried persons who had a truly close relationship with the woman forced to abort and those persons who do not.

The most interesting section of the opinion was the question of whether China’s refusal to permit Chen to marry was itself persecution. Judge Alito opined that it was not.

[A]lthough minimum marriage ages of 23 and 25 are contrary to our traditions and international practice, we cannot go so far as to say that enforcement of these laws necessarily amounts to persecution. American constitutional law recognizes marriage as a fundamental right … but all states impose minimum marriage age requirements, and we assume that these laws are constitutional. Laws setting reasonable minimum marriage ages are also recognized as legitimate and desirable under international human rights law. It is certainly true that marriage laws in this country set the minimum age for marriage considerably below 23 or 25. Almost all states set 18 as the minimum age to marry without parental consent…. It is also true that the marriage laws of other countries generally set the minimum marriage age at 18 years or less, and it appears probable that no other country sets the minimum as high as does China. A law or practice, however, does not necessarily rise to the level of “persecution” simply because it does not satisfy American constitutional standards or diverges from the pattern followed by other countries. As we have noted, persecution is an “extreme” concept that “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Here, we cannot say that the BIA was bound to conclude that minimums of 23 and 25 amounted to persecution.

There are several interesting thoughts regarding the Chen decision. Admittedly this is not a constitutional case and therefore it provides little to no information on his views of abortion in that regard. In addition, it is very hard to draw firm conclusions regarding Judge Alito’s stance on key issues in a case that involves Chevron deference. The government rarely loses in a case involving such a deferential standard. If our immigration authorities had said yes it was persecution, he likely would have deferred to that decision as well. But Chen does provide insights on Alito’s decision-making.

First, it appears Judge Alito takes executive deference very seriously. This is a borderline case of an agency refusing to broaden a rule the spirit of which could encompass Chen’s situation. Second, Judge Alito appears to embrace cultural diversity in human rights. He is unwilling to presume that a practice that does not satisfy American standards and near uniform foreign practice necessarily constitutes persecution. Third, the decision is neither pro-life nor pro-choice. It is pro-deference. Forced abortions deny choice and deny life. But the question is not whether the practice is abhorrent, which he no doubt would agree. The question is whether a fiancée of someone who suffered such a terrible procedure is entitled to asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution. Our immigration authorities said no, and Judge Alito was unwilling to find that conclusion to be wholly irrational.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/31/judge-alito-and-forced-abortions/

Canada Charges Rwandan of Genocide

by Roger Alford

This is an interesting story. Under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, Canada has charged a Rwandan living in Canada of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Under Article 8 of the Act, Canada can charge anyone for genocide if the crime or the criminal has a Canadian nexus. This is very broadly defined to include (1) citizens or employees of Canada who committed crimes; (2) citizens or employees of a state engaged in armed conflict against Canada; (3) persons who committed crimes against Canadian victims; (4) persons who committed crimes against a Canadian ally in armed conflict; and (5) persons present in Canada after the crime was committed.
This statute thus embraces an expansive approach to prescriptive jurisdiction that includes the nationality principle, passive personality, and universal jurisdiction. In this case, Desire Munyaneza was a refugee in Canada who allegedly led attacks on Tutsis at the National University of Rwanda. Canada therefore must prosecute based on universal jurisdiction.
The Rwandan Justice Minister welcomed Canada’s move, stating that “Canada has demonstrated that it won’t sit and watch genocide perpetrators roam about its territory,” Mukabagwiza said. “Our only surprise is that other countries are still sheltering genocide suspects. They should learn from this example.”
What is unusual about Canada’s act is the notion of domestic criminal prosecution of war crimes and genocide at a time when we have international criminal tribunals that also are entrusted with this responsibility. It appears to overlap with the authority of the ICTR to investigate and prosecute war crimes in Rwanda.
Which raises the larger question if countries such as Canada exercise jurisdiction to prosecute alleged war crimes, we will have the very real possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in multiple fora–the national court where the offense took place, the national court of the victims, the national court where the alleged criminal is present, and the relevant international criminal tribunal (in this case the ICTR). We have long had the theoretical possibility of concurrent jurisdiction under notions of universal jurisdiction, but it now appears to be becoming a reality.
How these competing jurisdictions will coordinate their prosecutions remains to be seen. Whether the international criminal tribunals will take cognizance of third country prosecutions as part of their determination of whether to prosecute is uncertain.
And whether these third country national courts will adopt the ICC’s approach of complementarity and deference to the primary national court prosecution is even more uncertain. Certainly the Spanish judge that issued an arrest warrant against three American soldiers exonerated by the United States military justice system suggests that in at least some circumstances they will not.
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/30/canada-charges-rwandan-of-genocide/

ICJ Watch: Court’s President Notes "Unprecedented Workload"

by Julian Ku

This past week, the President of the ICJ Shi Jiuyong addressed the U.N. General Assembly as part of of the ICJ’s submission of its annual report (which can be found here, the President’s speech can be found here). It was, of course, very boring. But it also reveals that the ICJ doesn’t realize the seriousness of the problem I have complained about here and here: the ICJ’s unbelievably light workload and its ridiculously low productivity.

The ICJ President’s speech blithely noted that in the past few years, the ICJ has made great strides to improve its organization and its speed in resolving cases. In the past year, the ICJ reduced its docket from 21 to 11, meaning it has resolved 10 cases over the past year. As the President notes, “[t]he level of activity displayed by the Court over the past years is, simply put, unprecedented in its history.”

With all due respect to ICJ President Shi, he is blatantly exaggerating the amount of work the ICJ has done during the past year (although he may be right that even this little amount of work is “unprecedented”).

The ICJ has actually issued one final judgment in a contentious case during the past year: Benin v. Niger, which was an expedited arbitration-like proceeding involving a specially constituted chamber of the court.

It removed eight cases from its docket in one fell swoop by issuing preliminary judgments dismissing Serbia’s (identical) lawsuits against nine NATO countries arising out NATO’s actions in the 1999 Kosovo war. It issued one other preliminary judgment in a dispute between Lichtenstein and Germany dismissing that case from its jurisdiction. It should be noted that the court took five years to remove the Serbia cases and four years to remove the Lichtenstein case, both without reaching the merits of the cases.

In other words, the full ICJ (not counting special chambers) has issued zero final judgments in the past year and essentially two preliminary judgments. It has also held two public hearings.

Obviously, the ICJ President has a duty to present the Court’s work in the best light, especially because his main purpose is to request appropriations from the General Assembly. The ICJ’s budget, in absolute terms, is quite small (about $30 million per biennium). And the ICJ only employs about 98 staff members. So at least the ICJ doesn’t appear to be a bloated wasteful international organization.

On the other hand, it is hard to see exactly why the court needs even this small amount of money and staff to issue three judgments a year (roughly $5 million per judgment). Or why a cash-strapped U.N. should give them any additional funds.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/29/icj-watch-courts-president-notes-unprecedented-workload/

"Outsourcing Authority": Symposium at Albany Law School

by Roger Alford

Albany Law Review sponsored a symposium today on the topic of “Outsourcing Authority: Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic Jurisprudence.” It included a number of speakers, including Ken Kersch, Susan Karamanian, John McGinnis, John Baker, Mark Tushnet and yours truly. Wonderful debate about Roper v. Simmons, Lawrence v. Texas, Charming Betsy and the general trend toward citation of foreign and international authority.

The most revealing comment came from Mark Tushnet on the subject of constitutional comparativism. He said, “If contemporary U.S. liberals have gotten off the rails they should get back on the rails. So what.” When asked whether this meant we might need to revisit cases such as Mapp v. Ohio, Skokie, New York Times v. Sullivan, and Roe v. Wade in light of international norms that provide lesser protections, he unequivocally said, “Yes.”

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/27/outsourcing-authority-symposium-at-albany-law-school/

Testing the Limits of International Law: Symposium at Univ. of Georgia, Oct. 28-29

by Peggy McGuinness

Peter Spiro and Dan Bodansky at the University of Georgia Law School are hosting a symposium this weekend to discuss and critique Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner’s informative and provocative book, The Limits of International Law. I discussed the book’s central thesis — that international law is merely a reflection of states acting rationally to pursue their interests in relation with other states — in an earlier post. In addition to Goldsmith and Posner, papers are being presented by Philippe Sands (London), David Golove (NYU), Kal Raustiala (UCLA), Andrew Guzman (Boalt), Ken Anderson (American) and Allen Buchanan (Duke, philosophy). Oh, and yours truly will be presenting as well. If you’re in the neighborhood of Athens (Georgia, that is) come on by. I’ll post some reflections next week.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/27/testing-the-limits-of-international-law-symposium-at-univ-of-georgia-oct-28-29/

If Everyone is Corrupt, Does it Matter that the U.N. is Also Corrupt?

by Julian Ku

The final Volcker Independent Inquiry Committee Report has been released (see here). News summaries have generally emphasized the final report’s conclusion that over 2000 companies participating for Oil-for-Food were involved in illegal or at least illicit kickback schemes with the Saddam Hussein Iraqi government. But the report also rightly faults the U.N. itself for failing to prevent or stop such widespread and blatant corruption.

Before Chris jumps on me again for complaining about the U.N. without acknowledging its good qualities, let me say that I think the U.N. can be effective in some cases. And I also find the reports of private companies like Daimler Chrysler or Volvo receiving kickbacks from Saddam Hussein just as damning as the reports of malfeasance at the highest levels of the U.N. Secretariat. The fact that diplomats such as France’s former U.N. Ambassador and politicians like Britain’s George Galloway also appeared to benefit from the scheme is equally troubling. Corruption appears to have been endemic in this program.

Having said that, I do think supporters of the U.N. are underestimating the seriousness of the Oil for Food scandal for the institution’s long-term survival. Petty corruption is one thing, but petty corruption that directly undermines the U.N.’s administration of sanctions against Iraq is quite another.

If the U.N. cannot effectively administer sanctions against Iraq without succumbing to rather easy and blatant corruption by an unsavory figure like Saddam Hussein, it is hard to see why the “international community” should “trust” the U.N. to deal effectively with other serious threats to international peace and security. It is also hard to see why, for instance, the U.N.’s claims that it could effectively monitor Iraq’s weapons program should be taken seriously.

The U.S. government has made many mistakes of its own, and it perhaps deserves to have its good intentions questioned around the world. But the Oil-for-Food scandal reminds us that the U.N. has its own serious problems and that its claims of high-minded disinterested protection of world peace deserves just as much skepticism.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/27/if-everyone-is-corrupt-does-it-matter-that-the-un-is-also-corrupt/

The Breyer-Scalia Road Show

by Roger Alford

Justices Breyer and Scalia have now taken their debate about foreign precedent on the road. They were in Melbourne, Australia this weekend to discuss with Australian High Court Justices Kirby and Heydon the topic of judicial activisim. A summary of the discussion is in a John O’Sullivan column here. (No word yet from the University of Melbourne as to whether the event was recorded or transcribed).

On the subject of relying on foreign precedent, Sullivan indicated that the skeptics at the Melbourne discussion (Scalia and presumably Heydon) feared the countermajoritarian thrust of the foreign precedent movement. “Instead of being ruled by elected representatives in Congress and the presidency, we gradually find ourselves living under laws shaped by a new political elite of international lawyers. ” Makes them sound almost as important as Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute! Meanwhile proponents of judicial activism (Breyer and Kirby) argued that “judicial activism was essential to save us from the kind of human rights abuses that occurred in the 1930s in Europe — a necessary restraint on the potential oppression of minorities by majority rule…” Sullivan gives more details on the debate. Read it.

A far more amusing version of the discussion is available from a Melbourne law student over at Underneath Their Robes. Favorite quote, “When I saw him [Justice Breyer], I noticed that he was wearing the lapel pin of the French Legion of Honour, which seemed to be taking this whole ‘foreign law’ thing a bit too far.”

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/26/the-breyer-scalia-road-show/

Foreign Protection from the Tyrranny of the Majority

by Roger Alford

While on the subject of foreign precedent, the ABA has published a letter and issued a news report that sharply criticizes H.Res. 97, the resolution that expresses the sense that “judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of the Constitution … should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution….”

Part of the objection to H.Res. 97 expressed in the letter is that “the founders devised a system whereby the federal judicary was made an independent, coequal branch of government precisely so that it could withstand the ‘tyranny of the majority’ in order to protect the rights of individuals against possible overreaching by the political branches. The federal courts not only have the obligation to faithfully interpret the laws popularly enacted, but also to strike them down if they run afoul of the U.S. Constitution.”

While I’m not particularly impressed with H.Res. 97, does it not strike you as more than a little unusual that the ABA is suggesting that courts might rely on foreign precedents to protect minorities against the tyranny of the majority? Let’s look outside our community to make sure that democratic preferences within our community are not tyrannizing minorities within our community?
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/26/foreign-protection-from-the-tyrranny-of-the-majority/

Top Ten Law Blogs

by Roger Alford

According to TopTenSources, “law news feeds abound … [but] these 10 are the best”:

Legal Theory Blog
Opinio Juris
Jurist
PrawfsBlawg
The Volokh Conspiracy
The Becker-Posner Blog
Law.com
How Appealing
Legal Underground
Overlawyered

Not bad company!

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/26/top-ten-law-blogs/

Feinstein Withdraws ATS Amendment

by Roger Alford

Senator Feinstein has withdrawn her bill that would amend the Alien Tort Statute. Her terse letter to Senator Specter states that while the legislation was designed to address concerns about the clarity of the existing statute in light of Sosa “I believe that the legislation in its present form calls for refinement in light of concerns raised by human rights advocates, and thus a hearing or other action by the Committee on this bill would be premature.”

A copy of her withdrawal letter is available here.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/26/feinstein-withdraws-ats-amendment/

More on Complying with International Tribunal Judgments

by Roger Alford

Julian, regarding your last post, I take a different view of the Canadian softwood lumber cases. My perspective on whether the United States shall give effect to international tribunal decisions depends first and foremost on whether there is a federal mandate relevant to the question. Obviously our obligation to implement a decision of an ICSID arbitral panel is very different from our decision whether to recognize an ECJ decision. In the case of ICSID decisions, there is a federal statute requiring that we give “full faith and credit” to an ICSID award “as if the award were a final [state court] judgment.”

We have something similar in the softwood lumber dispute. There is a federal statute requiring the relevant executive agencies to comply with any binational panel or extraordinary challenge committee decision that has been rendered. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A). Under that provision, if a panel or committee renders a decision, the executive branch agency “shall, within the period specified by the panel or committee, take action not inconsistent with the decision of the panel or committee. Any action taken by the [executive agency] … shall not be subject to judicial review, and no court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review such action on any question of law or fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.”
I read that to impose a congressional obligation on executive agencies to give effect to these binational panel decisions. It is not a matter of discretion, unless of course executive agencies have discretion to violate federal statutes. Nor is it a matter of little moment; several billion dollars potentially rides on the question of whether the United States must comply with these international tribunal decisions.
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/25/more-on-complying-with-international-tribunal-judgments/

The Painfully Slow and Political Process of Complying with International Tribunal Judgments

by Julian Ku

U.S. Secretary of State Rice is visiting Canada this week in a likely futile attempt to defuse a worsening U.S.-Canada trade dispute over softwood lumber. As I’ve blogged in the past (here and here), U.S. relations with Canada have been steadily worsening over the past few years over a variety of issues. But the refusal of the U.S. to comply with a final NAFTA tribunal judgment is now a trade “casus belli” in Canada and the top item on the agenda for Secretary Rice’s visit.

I think as a policy matter, the U.S. position on softwood lumber and other trade issues is hard to defend (although it is worth remembering that Canada is hardly free from blame for this ongoing dispute). But, as I’ve argued rather incessantly in the past, compliance with international tribuanal judgments, even trade tribunals like NAFTA and the WTO, remains a policy decision for the U.S. Congress and President. It is not something that would be appropriately delegated to the federal courts, as many international lawyers often suggest. If trade disputes are a diplomatic bargaining process, the U.S. shouldn’t be burdened with a system of automatic compliance since this would undercut its bargaining power.

Compliance here will occur if and when the President and Congress decide to do so. Which is why the Canadians are going to have to bargain, rather than simply whine about U.S. non-compliance. The U.S, for instance, is already moving to comply with a separate WTO case involving Canada. Compliance can happen, but it is a long, slow, and political process. Which is as it should be.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/25/the-painfully-slow-and-political-process-of-complying-with-international-tribunal-judgments/

The Feinstein Amendment and Presidential Waivers

by Roger Alford

The proposed Feinstein Amendment to the Alien Tort Statute includes an interesting provision regarding presidential waivers of litigation. That provision would stipulate that “No court in the United States shall proceed in considering the merits of a claim under subsection (a) if the President, or a designee of the President, adequately certifies to the court in writing that such exercise of jurisdiction will have a negative impact on the foreign policy interests of the United States.”
It has been asked in another context whether there are similar provisions allowing the President to terminate lawsuits on his independent determination of the negative impact of the foreign policy interests of the United States. The answer is yes.
First, the Helms-Burton Act authorizes litigation against foreign corporations that traffick in property confiscated by Cuba. Section 306 of that statute provides that, “The President may suspend the effective date under subsection (a) for a period of not more than 6 months if the President determines … that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States….” Every six months since 1996, the President has made such a determination, such that Title III of Helms-Burton has yet to become effective. In each case the President has precluded litigation from ever going forward, thereby making the litigation section of Helms-Burton an effective dead letter. This suggests the President has express delegated authority to preclude litigation that is against the national interest.
Another example is the Algiers Accords. As part of the settlement of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Carter Administration signed an executive agreement with Iran stipulating that all legal proceedings against Iran shall be terminated in United States courts. A month later President Reagan signed an Executive Order ratifying the obligation. The Court in Dames & Moore affirmed this executive action, finding that Congress had implicitly authorized such action in the IEEPA and the Hostage Act. Litigation that could have otherwise gone forward in U.S. courts was suspended by virtue of executive action in the national interest. This suggests that the President has implied delegated authority, and perhaps inherent authority, to preclude litigation that is against the national interest.
Third, there have been various examples in which the President waives the right of nationals to pursue claims, such as the San Francisco Peace Treaty that was dispositive in the Japanese POW claims against Japanese corporations. In Article 14 of that treaty the United States waived all reparation claims of U.S. nationals against Japan and their nationals. This suggests the President has inherent executive authority to preclude certain litigation that is against the national interest.

On the other hand, in the Holocaust context the President signed an executive agreement with Germany as part of the German slave labor settlement in which the President promised to submit a formal foreign policy statement of interest that all Holocaust-related claims against Germany and its nationals be dismissed. Thus far, every claim in which such a U.S. statement of interest has been filed has resulted in dismissal of the lawsuit. That said, it has never been suggested that the courts are required to dismiss the claims, and according to his book Imperfect Justice, Ambassador Eizenstat negotiated the statement of interest on the belief that an executive order to courts to dismiss pending litigation could not be constitutionally imposed absent a statute. (p. 220). This suggests that the President believed he did not have inherent authority to preclude litigation that is against the national interest.

The presidential waiver provision in the Feinstein Amendment appears to be a version of delegated ad hoc jurisdiction stripping. It is fairly radical in that it provides express delegated authority to dismiss any pending ATS litigation that is determined to be against the national interest. Applying the provision to the facts of Sosa, the President could have dismissed the litigation against U.S. officials who allegedly engaged in transnational kidnapping. It seems odd that the Executive branch could terminate litigation against one of its own.
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/25/the-feinstein-amendment-and-presidential-waivers/

The Hariri Report, the UN, and Legitimacy

by Chris Borgen

It is difficult to imagine a situation when Julian may ever be satisfied with what the UN has done. Here the UN actually accuses high-level Syrian and Lebanese officials of taking part in a murder and he thinks this is another example of the UN being inconsequential. There’s just no pleasing some people.

Julian mentions “allegations” of possible “high level” interference by UN officials, causing the report to be redacted, specifically removing the names of Assad’s brother and members of his inner circle. Before we get all wound up in some conspiracy theory, one should note that Detlev Mehlis, the author of the report, said he himself made the changes without the urging of any other UN official once he learned that the report would be made public and would not be confidential. This is a perfectly reasonable explanation but, even if you don’t accept it, one should still see the report for what it is: a political disaster for the Syrian regime.

Let’s set aside the rhetoric and actually look at the effects of the report so far. Julian implies that, like reports of other international organizations, this report ends up with “muddy, often useless conclusions in an attempt to avoid rocking the boat.” Well, I guess someone better tell all those demonstrators in Damascus to calm down. That is not the result of a document that avoids rocking the boat.

What is even more interesting are the comments of some of the Syrians in the street when asked about the report. Comments were along the lines of, “well, if these allegations turn out to be true then whoever supported the assassination are traitors,” and “if anyone in Syria was responsible, they must be brought to justice.” Probably not the sound bites that Assad and his cohorts were hoping for when they planned this “spontaneous” demonstration.

No one seems to find that this is a report that was muddy or useless. Look at the news cycles, the report was portrayed not as milquetoast but a bombshell. Even Al Jazeera read the whole report on air. Keep in mind, even without the name of Assad’s brother, the upper echelons of the Syrian and Lebanese security agencies were implicated after an investigation. Maybe this is just like going after Scooter Libby instead of Dick Cheney.

Anyway, what unremitting detractors of the UN miss is when it actually does some good. They don’t realize, perhaps, that in many parts of the world the UN’s voice is believed to be more legitimate than that of the United States, or at least that of the current Administration. Especially after the intelligence fiasco leading up to the Iraq War, the U.S. is not perceived as being especially credible when it starts pointing the finger in the Middle East. But the UN, for all its flaws, is. This is one of the particular strengths of a global organization and one of the things that those who would wish that the UN would just collapse should realize: legitimacy matters. And, even if some in the U.S. see the UN as illegitimate, their view does not map to the rest of the globe. When thinking about foreign policy, we need to remember how others perceive situations as opposed to simply our own ideological views. In this case the UN is the enemy of our enemy. Any realist knows what that means.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/24/the-hariri-report-the-un-and-legitimacy/

For Liberty, For Justice, and for … Yale?

by Roger Alford

“I love Yale…. [but] why bother giving to it? My resources are very far from limitless, so why not give where it makes a difference?” That is the question posed in a wonderful New York Times article on Sunday by Republican multi-millionaire entertainer Ben Stein to, among others, Democratic human rights advocate/scholar and Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh. It is a deeply interesting question.

Yale has an endowment of $12.7 billion. Through its investment team it earned about 17 percent per year, or one billion dollars every few months. Stein notes that with such staggering profits, those gains dwarf whatever pitiful little gifts that he might offer. By comparison his donations of several thousand dollars to other organizations that promote animal rights or assist widows of deceased American vets does far more good. “There are only a few tens of thousands of us alums, so what we give has to be totally insignificant… Why give them money, then?” Donating thousands of dollars is “virtually meaningless to Yale, so why bother giving to it?” Indeed. (Full disclosure: I am not a Yalie, but am married to one).

If we care deeply about human rights or similar public concerns, Stein raises the serious question of why we should divert funds to fantastically rich organizations like Yale Law School instead of human rights organizations that can directly and materially benefit from every single dollar we donate. Yale University earns from its endowment about 6 million dollars a day, or about $4,000 per minute. Rather than give to Yale, why shouldn’t Yale alums give to an organization like International Justice Mission? When I was in India this summer working with IJM, it was clear that a few thousand dollars would pay the annual salary of an Indian human rights lawyer working daily to free those in bonded labor or child prostitution. So with $4,000, an alum could give one minute to Yale, or one year to IJM? Why give money to the anointed “little princes or princesses” at Yale Law School (Stein’s term) instead of the true nobility of our profession who desperately need our support?

Now I do not mean to paint with a broad brush and suggest that all gifts to all law schools are similarly suspect. Certainly gifts to many law schools can make a dramatic difference in the life of that school. For example, Yale’s endowment earns in a few months the total endowment of my current employer. If one of our alums makes a gift to help fund our newly established human rights initiative that is fighting religious discrimination in remote parts of the world, it will materially and dramatically improve the experiences of our most inspired students and their clients. I would suspect most schools are in a similar situation. (The average university endowment is $361 million, and the median is $72 million).

Rather than make a donation to the fat and happy Yale Bulldogs, why shouldn’t Yale Law alums donate a real live bull to the desperate and starving through Heifer International? Better yet, why not have the Yale Law School Dean (whom I greatly respect) spend countless hours campaigning for their alums to make donations to human rights organizations in the school’s name out of a deep sense of institutional gratitude and an abiding commitment to human rights? The capital campaign could announce that Yale would donate one dollar of every two dollars raised from alums to a truly needy non-profit organization of their choice. That may be the best way for Yale to continue to win Ben Stein’s money.

Related links:
For Loyalty, For Irrationality, and For Yale

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/24/for-liberty-for-justice-and-for-yale/

More on the U.N. and Hariri

by Julian Ku

Before we get too excited (see Chris’ post here) about the U.N.’s wonderful effectiveness in the investigation of Harari’s death, it is worth pointing out that allegations of high level U.N. interference have been circulating almost from the moment the report was released. In particular, the electronic version of the U.N. Harari report contained embedded text of last-minute changes. According to the Times of London, these changes removed”[t]he names of the brother of Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, and other members of his inner circle . . .” and instead pointed to “unnamed Syrian officials.” Obviously, the U.N. may have good reasons for redacting the report, but its intervention here to protect the current Syrian president also points to one of the problems with investigations run by international organizations - they tend to try to avoid pointing fingers and end up with muddy, often useless conclusions in an attempt to avoid rocking the boat.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/23/more-on-the-un-and-hariri/

The UN and the Hariri Investigation

by Chris Borgen

Suzanne Nossel at Democracy Arsenal has a good post on the UN report implicating the Syrian government in the Hariri killing.

She explains succinctly how and why the UN can play an important role in investigating such crimes, especially in situations where we, the U.S., cannot. Nor could anyone else (such as the E.U. or the ICC) have done the job.

This is another example of the value of a global organization such as the UN, despite its flaws.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/23/the-un-and-the-hariri-investigation/

The Golden Rule of Enemy Detention

by Roger Alford

I just finished attending the International Law Association Conference in New York and one of the highlights was the insightful commentary on the treatment of detainees in the war on terror. I was particularly impressed by a new professor, Geoffrey Corn of South Texas Law School. Corn was a former Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters, and therefore spoke with far more authority than the typical idealistic academic.

There was much debate on the proper standard for detainees. Professor Corn cut to the chase and articulated what is the best standard that should be applied in the current war on terror. That standard is that you should do nothing to an enemy detainee that you would not wish the other side to do to one of your subordinates. Note that it is not the treatment you would wish for yourself if you were detained and interrogated, for a soldier, if necessary, will willingly die for his country rather than divulge certain information. But rather it is the standard of treatment that you would want one of your men to face if he were detained.

Corn emphasized that the need for legal standards is essential not just for the detainee, but also for the one who detains. It is for their humanity as much as the detainees that we need to adhere to standards.

Corn stated that he regularly taught this standard in JAG school. The substance of such an admonition is also expressed in Army Field Manual 34-52 (”The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government….The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.”)

This standard is a simple one, but one that brilliantly resolves many problems associated with an admittedly incommensurate rule. One might call it the Golden Rule of Detention. It also happens to resonate with one of the primary motivations for state compliance with international law: reciprocity.

UPDATE: There is an informative article in the New York Times Magazine addressing the difficulty of where to draw the line when soldiers are on the ground facing threatening circumstances. It addresses the question of “the line that separates nonlethal force that is justified - and sometimes very painful - from nonlethal force that is criminal.” Not directly relevant to enemy detention, but underscores the need to draw lines between what is criminal mistreatment and what is not. Read it.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/22/the-golden-rule-of-enemy-detention/

What is Feinstein Thinking in Amending the ATS?

by Roger Alford

There has been much speculation in various academic circles as to why Senator Dianne Feinstein–a liberal Democrat representing a state that has been at the vanguard in applying Alien Tort Statute–would propose amendments to the law. Here is her own statement as to why she perceives a change to be necessary:

“Many recent legal cases have demonstrated the need for clarification of the meaning and scope of lawsuits filed in our federal courts by foreigners for alleged violations occurring outside the United States… Judges have grappled in interpreting and applying the relevant law for years with no consensus. The lawsuits should be able to go forward, but judges need better legal tools to understand the cases that come before them….Right now, courts are essentially adrift in terms of being able to pinpoint the underlying meaning, scope and intent of the Alien Tort Statute. I hope this legislation will settle the questions that surround this 200-year-old law by providing a reasonable legal means that both plaintiffs and defendants can rely on to litigate their differences. It is time for Congress to bring clarity to the law and I believe this legislation does so.”

According to her press release, her proposed amendment would:

  • Specify a legal standard convicting defendants of wrongdoing if they directly participate with specific intent to commit the alleged tort;
  • Codify international claims under the Alien Tort law to include genocide, torture, slavery and slave trade, extrajudicial killing, and piracy;
  • Expand on existing statutory law, the Torture Victim Protection Act;
  • State that federal courts shouldn’t proceed with tort claims when the President adequately certifies that such exercise of jurisdiction will have a negative impact on the foreign policy interests of the U.S.;
  • Maintain that every effort should be made to try these cases in the country of origin before granting jurisdiction in U.S. courts;
  • Invoke a 10-year statute of limitations on Alien Tort Statute charges filed against defendants; and
  • Disallow contingency fee arrangements for legal representatives of plaintiffs or defendants.
UPDATE: Senator Feinstein provides a longer explanation of her motivations in her introduction of the bill (available in the Congressional Record here, here, and here). The essence of her motivation was that Sosa did not address which international law claims by foreigners should be heard in U.S. courts and the standard of liability for U.S. companies facing these human rights charges. The Court expressly invited congressional guidance and Senator Feinstein indicated that she believes it is the burden of Congress to “pass legislation that settles on a reasonable legal means that plaintiffs and defendants alike can rely on to litigate their differences.” (Thanks to Ed Swaine).
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/22/what-is-feinstein-thinking-in-amending-the-ats/

Spanish Warrants Issued for U.S. Soldiers

by Roger Alford

This story will no doubt heighten trans-Atlantic tensions. A Spanish judge has issued arrest warrants for three U.S. soldiers whose tank fire on a Baghdad hotel killed Jose Couso, a Spanish journalist. According to the report, the United States has undertaken three separate investigations to determine whether the GIs engaged in any unlawful conduct. In each case they were exonerated. One would have thought that would be the end of the matter. But Spain now plans to prosecute the soldiers for unspecified “delitos contra la comunidad internacional.”

By issuing these arrest warrants, the Spanish judge is clearly second-guessing the conclusions and thoroughness of our military investigations. Of course, any soldier who unlawfully kills an innocent civilian in the course of war should be punished. Central Command spokesman Brig. Gen. Vince Brooks has previously stated that “We don’t target journalists deliberately — not now, not ever.” Spain should take this position more seriously.

As a political and strategic matter this is a bad move for Spain. First, there is no legal obligation for the United States to extradite these soldiers. Article 3 of our extradition treaty with Spain provides that “[n]either of the Contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals.” The warrants likely will not meet with success.

Second, these warrants likely will discourage freedom of the press (especially foreign press) in the theater of war, which will inure to the detriment of all of us. As the Spanish government has noted, reporters such as Couso are “our eyes, our ears, our lives–anonymous people behind a microphone.” In 2003 journalists embedded in Iraq signed waivers that agreed to hold the United States harmless in the event of death. Next time the United States will look with even greater skepticism at the prospect of any journalists on site.

Third, these arrest warrants will embolden the United States to resist joining the ICC for precisely the reasons they have expressed: fear of politically-motivated foreign prosecution of U.S. soldiers for debatable conduct in war. Conservative blogs are already abuzz that these warrants prove that the United States should never join the ICC. See here and here.

Fourth, there are plenty of other journalists who have been killed in Iraq by both sides. Why target this one incident? We do not see, for example, the Spanish judge issuing an arrest warrant for the Iraqi insurgents who killed a Spanish journalist on April 8, 2003, one day after Couso was killed.

Finally, the precedent this may set is remarkable. Any country whose civilians have been killed in foreign battle as a result of any questionable “collateral damage” may be entitled to prosecute foreign soldiers and officers. Are all of these subject to claims of “delitos de asesinato” as well? Under this precedent, countries such as Britain, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Poland, Ukraine, and the United States may also issue arrest warrants for those thought responsible for any suspicious deaths of their journalists who have died in Iraq. We are witnessing a yearning for the domestication of war.

For its part, it appears that United States refused to cooperate in the Spanish investigation. Had it done so and been able to allay the suspicions of the Spanish authorities, it may not have come to this. Apparently the Spanish authorities made two requeststo the Bush Administration, including an offer to fly to the United States to interview the soldiers. The judge wrote, “Given the nonexistent judicial cooperation offered by the American authorities in elucidating the facts” the arrest warrant is “the only effective measure for assuring the involvement of the accused in the process.” It will be important for the United States to disclose its version of events in this regard.

The full text of the arrest warrant (in Spanish) is here.
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/spanish-warrants-issued-for-us-soldiers/

Senate Considers Removing International Law from the Alien Tort Statute

by Julian Ku

Senator Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat from California, has introduced a potentially revolutionary amendment to every international lawyer’s favorite statute, the Alien Tort Statute. While Sen. Feinstein calls her amendment a “clarification,” it looks to me like she is proposing a near-complete evisceration of the Alien Tort Statute as we (international lawyers) know it. And such an evisceration is almost certainly a good thing.

Since 1980, when it was first invoked to allow aliens to bring suits alleging violations of international human rights law, the Alien Tort Statute has become a vehicle for advocates of international law within the U.S. International lawyers loved the statute because it opened the door to federal court vindication of customary international law, a type of law rarely recognized by courts in other contexts. In recent years, advocates have used the ATS to sue large corporations and, more recently, the U.S. government for alleged abuses arising out of the war on terrorism.

If enacted, the Feinstein amendment would continue to permit lawsuits for genocide, torture, slavery and slave trade, extrajudicial killing, and piracy. But, unlike the current open-ended ATS, those are the only claims you can bring under the statute (creative claims for violations of, say, international environmental rights, would not be permitted). Most importantly, the definition of these claims would be statutory as opposed to based on international custom, which is notoriously fuzzy and evolving.

The amendment has some other salutary provisions. It would give the President the power to terminate an lawsuit if he certifies in writing that the suit would have a “negative impact” on U.S. foreign policy. It also appears to shield corporations from theories of “aiding and abetting” liability by limiting damages to defendants who are “direct participants acting with specific intent to commit ” one of the specified torts.”

In sum, Sen. Feinstein is proposing that Congress “de-internationalize” the Alien Tort Statute. Instead of looking to foreign courts or international tribunals (or to international law professor articles), courts considering a claim under the ATS would look to the text of the statute and the legislative history. Victims of serious human rights abuses would still be able to bring their lawsuits, but they would have to meet U.S. statutory standards, and not fuzzy international ones.

I have no idea whether this bill has a good chance of passing, although I think its sponsorship by a moderate Democrat is very promising.

* Here are some key excerpts from the bill

‘‘§ 1350. Alien’s action for tort
‘‘(a) JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.—The district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action brought by an alien asserting a claim of torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or slave trading if a defendant is a direct participant acting with specific intent to commit the alleged tort. The district courts shall not have jurisdiction over such civil suits brought by an alien if a foreign state is responsible for committing the tort in question within its sovereign territory.

‘‘(c) LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.—Any defendant who is a direct participant acting with specific intent to commit a tort referred to in subsection (a) against an alien shall be liable for damages to that alien or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for the wrongful death of that alien.

‘‘(e) FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.—No court in the United States shall proceed in considering the merits of a claim under subsection (a) if the President, or a designee of the President, adequately certifies to the court in writing that such exercise of jurisdiction will have a negative impact on the foreign policy interests of the United States.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/senate-considers-removing-international-law-from-the-alien-tort-statute/

International Law Weekend

by Chris Borgen

From this Thursday through Saturday, the American Branch of the International Law Association (and co-sponsors including the NY City Bar and the American Society of International Law) will hold International Law Weekend 2005 at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 42 West 44th Street, NY, NY. Links to the program and registration materials are available here.

Registration is free for students and members of one of the co-sponsoring organizations. Otherwise, registration is $50.

If you are attending, please swing by to say hello to Roger or me as we will both be there. Roger will moderate a panel entitled “The Charming Betsy and the Role of Presumptions in International Law” (4:00 pm to 5:30 pm on Friday, October 21st ) and I will moderate a panel on UN Reform and the ICJ (2:15 pm to 3:45 pm on Friday, October 21st).

We hope to see you there.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/international-law-weekend/

"The Mother of All Trials"

by Roger Alford

Michael Scharf argues that the trial of Saddam Hussein is the “mother of all trials.” He makes this argument based on (1) the scale of atrocities; (2) the status of the accused; (3) the level of interest of the international community; (4) the legal precedent the trial will set; and (5) the effect of the trial.

Personally, I have a hard time ranking this trial above the Nuremberg trials. Having just returned from a conference in Nuremberg, Germany that focused on the legacy of those trials, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Nuremberg Trials were the genesis for the modern international human rights movement. But to avoid further bias of the poll, I will refrain from further elaboration. What do you think? Scroll down and vote.

Which International Criminal Trial is the Most Important?
Nuremberg Trials of 1945
Adolf Eichmann Trial of 1961
Klaus Barbie Trial of 1987
Nicolae Ceausescu Trial of 1989
Slobodan Milosevic Trial of 2002-05
Saddam Hussein Trial of 2005-06

Free polls from Pollhost.com

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/the-mother-of-all-trials/

Saddam Hussein Trial Blog

by Peggy McGuinness

Michael Scharf at Case Western Law School, together with a group of other law professors and professionals with deep knowledge about international war crimes tribunals, has put together a very useful website and blog on the Saddam Hussein trial, aptly named Grotian Moment. It is well worth a visit.

Update: Of course, Julian posted this blog endorsement a couple of weeks ago. Two endorsement are better than one, no? We’ll add Grotian Moment to the blogroll for easy access.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/saddam-hussein-trial-blog/

"Open Skies" Agreements - It’s a Good Thing Congress is Not Involved

by Julian Ku

The U.S. entered into a new round of negotiations this week with the E.U. for “open skies” air transport agreements. These agreements govern the terms of air traffic rights between U.S.-based and E.U. based-carriers, and the intention is to liberalize these rules so that air carriers can fly to directly to more cities on each side. In other words, more direct flights to more places. This could only be a good thing. Maybe one day, I’ll be able to take Lufthansa from NY to San Francisco.

Air transport seems to be an area that could use more, rather than less, international coordination. Even the WSJ($) editorial page seems to think so. There is the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) but the important agreements appear to be bilateral, such as this recent agreement between the U.S. and Mali. On the other hand, since the majority of the world’s air traffic flows between the U.S. and Europe, perhaps no worldwide negotiations are needed.

Moreover, none of these current agreements appear to require U.S. Senate confirmation or any congressional confirmation. Talk about unchecked executive power! But Congress’ non-involvement may also explain why there are so many (72 and counting) and why they are so uncontroversial.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/open-skies-agreements-its-a-good-thing-congress-is-not-involved/

Australia Seeks ICC Referral Against Mugabe

by Julian Ku

Sometimes, countries really act in ways that don’t appear motivated by narrow material self-interest. Australia’s recent campaign to win a Security Council referral against Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe is a good example of this type of moralist foreign policy. Australia has no obvious national interests at stake in Southern Africa. It stands pretty much alone in its level of outrage. But it is outraged nonetheless and it is taking action.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/19/australia-seeks-icc-referral-against-mugabe/

More on Amnesty and the ICC Arrest Warrants

by Roger Alford

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has praised the issuance of the ICC arrest warrants for top Ugandan LRA rebels. He noted that “the ICC only intends to prosecute those LRA senior leaders who are alleged to bear the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes. He therefore urges all eligible LRA combatants to take advantage of existing disarmament and reintegration programmes.” This is an interesting take on what the ICC may be doing. The ICC prosecutor’s approach may be one of attempting to drive a wedge between the indicted top LRA rebels on the one hand, and the rank and file LRA soldiers on the other, hoping that the latter will lay down their arms in exchange for an assurance of amnesty. The U.N. has more on the Annan statement here.

Meanwhile the ICC prosecutor also has issued a statement in which he emphasized that the matter was referred to the ICC by the Government of Uganda in December 2003 and confirmed again in July 2004. One might well interpret such a State referral as obviating the need for compliance with the complementarity doctrine, as the State is requesting the prosecution before the ICC rather than national courts. Put differently, can there be an Article 17 objection based on complementarity where there is an Article 14 referral by a State?

The problem with this position is that in this case a Ugandan government agency, the Uganda Amnesty Commission, is still maintaining that all LRA rebels–including those indicted by the ICC–are eligible for amnesty. According to the chair of that commission, Ugandan high court judge Peter Onega, “As far as the amnesty law is concerned, all the people who surrender to us are still eligible for a blanket amnesty including the five who were indicted by the ICC.” That conclusion is based on the Ugandan Amnesty Act of 2000 which defines amnesty as “pardon, forgiveness, exemption, or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other form of punishment by the State” and is broadly extended to anyone who “engaged in war or armed rebellion against the government of the republic of Uganda.” Thus under Ugandan amnesty law, the LRA rebels are guaranteed that they will not be “prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the war or rebellion for any crime committed in the cause of the war or armed rebellion.”

So what happens when a high court judge who chairs a government commission pronounces that amnesty is still available under local law to individuals indicted under the ICC, but at the same time the government has referred the entire conflict to the ICC for investigation? Article 17(1)(b) states that a case is inadmissible under the complementarity doctrine if a “State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.” Can amnesty guaranteed under local law render a case inadmissible notwithstanding a subsequent State referral? It is difficult to reach a firm conclusion without an intimate knowledge of the ICC and Ugandan law.

“Ultimately it is Ugandans who have to decide what is best for them. Whatever they choose, it should not hinder reconciliation and healing and yet it should not encourage impunity and hurt the victims yet again,” said Archbishop Desmond Tutu. It appears Ugandans may not know which path is best for them, leaving successful prosecution before the ICC in a state of uncertainty.

Related links
ICC Watch: Uganda Arrest Warrants Unsealed
Peaceful Settlements in Uganda Jeopardized by ICC Arrest Warrants

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/18/more-on-amnesty-and-the-icc-arrest-warrants/

Is McCain Amendment a Step Backwards?

by Roger Alford

Ian Fishback’s open letter to Senator John McCain cried out for clear rules on detainee interrogation. He wrote:
“For 17 months, I tried to determine what specific standards governed the treatment of detainees by consulting my chain of command …. Instead of resolving my concerns, the approach for clarification process leaves me deeply troubled. Despite my efforts, I have been unable to get clear, consistent answers from my leadership about what constitutes lawful and humane treatment of detainees. I am certain that this confusion contributed to a wide range of abuses including death threats, beatings, broken bones, murder, exposure to elements, extreme forced physical exertion, hostage-taking, stripping, sleep deprivation and degrading treatment. I and troops under my command witnessed some of these abuses in both Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Senator McCain responded to this letter with the “McCain Amendment” which he argued was necessary because our soldiers were crying out for clear rules:
“I can understand why some administration lawyers might want ambiguity, so that every hypothetical option is theoretically open, even those the President has said he does not want to exercise. But war does not occur in theory, and our troops are not served by ambiguity. They are crying out for clarity. The Congress cannot shrink from this duty, we cannot hide our heads, pulling bills from the floor and avoiding votes. We owe it to our soldiers, during this time of war, to take a stand.”

Marty Lederman over at Balkinization has an interesting post now arguing that the McCain Amendment as amended by Senator Ted Stevens may actually be a step backwards. Lederman argues that:


“if the Congress enacts the Amendment as so limited, it will be a major step backwards from where the law currently stands. This can’t be overemphasized: If Stevens is successful at adding his seemingly innocuous “augment[ation],” it would make the law worse than it currently is… [I]f Senator Stevens has his way, and successfully exempts the CIA from the McCain Amendment’s otherwise unequivocal ban on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the Congress will for the first time have ratified the Administration’s view that such cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is not uniformly off-limits, and will have given a green light to the CIA to engage in such conduct. Moreover, as explained above, that very unfortunate result would not be offset by any meaningful improvement in the law as it applies to the Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, Jon Holdaway, a former JAG officer over at Intel-Dump, objects to the McCain Amendment for a completely different reason:

“I would support an amendment that directed the military to create rules to protect detainees from such treatment, or which strengthens provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to make such treatment specifically a criminal act (ie., add it to Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment). Putting the mandate in broad terms with the directive for DOD to create implementing policies and instructions, followed up by Congressional oversight gives the military much more flexibility to respond to the unique challenges posed by radical or fundamentalist Islamic detainees. A prohibitive statute such as this one, however, which tries to micromanage interrogations from Capitol Hill, is a mistake that will result in years of litigation, poor intelligence, and wasted opportunities to save lives.”

Both Lederman and Holdaway think the McCain Amendment that may eventually become law is a step backwards, but for very different reasons.

What is fascinating in this debate over detainee interrogation is the larger debate over the role of Congress and the Executive branch on what is essentially an administrative law question: whether Congress shall impose strict rules or general guidance on how an agency of the Executive branch conducts its affairs. The general approach of our administrative state is one of broad grant of authority from the legislative branch and trust in agency expertise to carry out the congressional mandate. The McCain Amendment appears to be one of those instances in which the legislative branch is stepping in because it now lacks confidence in the agency to exercise its expertise.

But of course, as anyone who has studied the Eighth Amendment or the Torture Convention in any detail well knows, precisely what terms like “cruel or unusual punishment,” or “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment is an exceedingly difficult question. If we apply an administrative law gloss to the McCain Amendment, what are we to do if executive agencies interpret those words broadly or narrowly? Courts likely will defer to agency interpretations of what is “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment. Hence the McCain Amendment may not have particularly cabined executive authority in any significant way. Administrative law principles will blunt any major impact it might otherwise have.

I am curious if others have thoughts on whether this administrative law gloss on the McCain Amendment is correct.

Related links:
What Congress Has Done and Not Done to Limit Inhumane Treatment
Congress Speaks–Defining Detainee Interrogation Policies

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/18/is-mccain-amendment-a-step-backwards/

Goldstone and Arbour Hit Pay Dirt

by Julian Ku

Sometimes being virtuous pays off. The Thomas J. Dodd Prize in International Justice and Human Rights has been awarded jointly to Justice Richard Goldstone and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour. The two well-known figures from the human rights community will share the prize of $75,000. Thomas Dodd, the father of current U.S. Senator from Connecticut Chris Dodd, served as an executive trial counsel at Nuremberg.

The prize has only been awarded twice, so it doesn’t quite have the pedigree of the Nobel Prize. Still, if the trend continues, it could be a nice bonus for those folks who make a living promoting or advocating for international human rights. Perhaps like the Nobel Peace Prize, politics is unavoidable. This year’s prize winners are openly critical of the U.S. policies toward the war on terrorism, and I am somehow guessing that taking this line against the U.S. is going to be de rigeur for future winners. Which means, I suppose, I’m never going to win this prize. Not that anyone was planning on nominating me, but it would be nice to have a little extra cash.

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/17/goldstone-and-arbour-hit-pay-dirt/

Three Years Ago Today: "Saddam Wins 100% of the Vote"

by Roger Alford

October 16, 2002: “Iraqi officials say President Saddam Hussein has won 100% backing in a referendum on whether he should rule for another seven years. There were 11,445,638 eligible voters-and every one of them voted for the president, according to Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-Chairman of Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council.” (Link)
October 16, 2005: “I voted then, for Saddam, of course, because I was afraid… But this time, I came here by my own choice. I am not afraid anymore. I am a free man…. It gives me hope in God, and in my fellow men.” (Link)

Lots of wonderful news coming out of Iraq. Best summary of links from MSM is from Google News here. Nice graphic of the unofficial results from the Washington Post is here. An American Marine was live blogging the Iraqi vote here. Iraqi bloggers discuss their personal experience and have photos here, here, and here. Read the comments.

The full text of the Iraqi Constitution is here. The best part of the Preamble reads, “We the people of Iraq, … who are looking with confidence to the future through a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved … to respect the rule of law, to establish justice and equality to cast aside the politics of aggression, … and to spread a culture of diversity and defusing terrorism.”

http://opiniojuris.org/2005/10/17/three-years-ago-today-saddam-wins-100-of-the-vote/

ICC Watch: Uganda Arrest Warrants Unsealed

by Julian Ku

The ICC Prosecutor has unsealed the arrest warrants issued in July 2005 against five leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The warrants can be found here. Not surprisingly, these warrants allege pretty grisly crimes including:

murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements … abducted civilians, including children, …to have been forcibly recruited as fighters, porters and sex slaves and to take part in attacks against the Ugandan army (UPDF) and civilian communities.

I am generally sympathetic to Roger and Peggy’s criticism of the effect an ICC intervention into a delicate peace negotiation, although I do think it is worth noting that the ICC does have some moral (and maybe) legal obligation to act. As one of its arrest warrants has pointed out, “LRA commanders are allegedly inclined to launch retaliatory strikes, thus creating a risk for victims and witnesses who have spo