Search: unwilling or unable

...approach for some of the common lawyers). Hope this helps. Best, Ben International Lawyer George: " O’Connell is absolutely incorrect “that there is no right to engage in cross-border military force based on the argument that a state is unable or unwilling to deal with the threat themselves.” It is well established international law under the Geneva Conventions that a neutral state must prevent the use of its territory as a base for a combatant. If it is unable to do so, it loses the benefit of neutrality and its...

...2017 and 2018, two consecutive warrants for Mahmoud Al-Werfalli, commander in Al-Saiqa Brigade, were issued by the court for crimes committed after the 2011 revolution. The 2017 warrant against Al-Werfalli was the first to be largely based on evidence collected from social media. Despite warrants against five individuals, none were transferred to the Court. Muammar Gaddafi, Al-Tuhamy Khaled and Al-Werfalli are dead. The Court declared the case against Al-Senussi inadmissible since Libya was investigating the same case as the one before the Court, and was neither unwilling or unable to...

...CIL competition. This is a narrow appreciation of the problem that ignores power and hegemonic dynamics.   One key aspect of these dynamics is the belief that the world is divided into “major powers” and “small countries” – a belief so pervasive that even Bernie Sanders frequently endorses it. This limits the number of actors that can “afford” to participate in so-called “great power politics”. In Latin America, for example, both Brazil and Mexico have been active in specifically opposing the unwilling or unable test, but never through specific statements...

...unwilling or unable to take the steps needed to ensure that transferred detainees will not pose a threat to the United States or its allies. We are not in a position to transfer detainees to still other states because we have concerns about how those states will treat their nationals once returned. The State Department will continue to push countries to take back their nationals with appropriate security and humane treatment assurances. Similarly, we look to other countries in Europe and elsewhere help resettle those detainees who cannot be repatriated....

...the FSA. Naz Eric, I think that's right. Our assumption is that in the hypo (and probably in reality), given its repeated public statements of support for the rebels, the US could be classified as "unwilling or unable" to arrest, expel or impede the FSA commanders, and that Syria (in the hypo) would be justified, per the US approach to this issue, in determining that the US is "unwilling or unable" to stop the threat. Mihai Martoiu Ticu Luis Posada Carriles is in the US. Cuba could send a drone...

...in some “active” battlezone such as Afghanistan. This claim — the conflict follows the participants — frequently leads to a complaint that this means the US might target him in Paris or London. The US position is that the standard for addressing non-state actor terrorists taking safe haven somewhere depends on whether the sovereign where the terrorist is hiding is “unwilling or unable” to address the threat. No, there won’t be Predators Over Paris; Yemen or Somalia is another matter, as President Obama has repeatedly and without cavil said in...

...regulation but would go far to close the accountability gap. One significant challenge is establishing the doctrine that bridges different national standards with the international standard. International law already uses multiple doctrines to make that bridge, such as the margin of appreciation or the “unwilling or unable” doctrines. Determining the doctrine to use here is beyond the scope of this blog post, but the ultimate system would need to be primarily based on domestic interpretation and enforcement. Domestic courts have been adjudicating based on international human rights law—including economic, social...

...use military force against al-Qa’ida as being restricted solely to “hot” battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the United States takes the legal position that —in accordance with international law—we have the authority to take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time. And as President Obama has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves. That...

...17(3) provides that “[i]n order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings” (emphasis mine). I don’t think Article 17(3) requires Libya to actually have Saif or Al-Senussi in its custody, but it obviously has to have the ability to obtain them. Does it? The motion simply glosses the question...

not to argue the rightness or the wrongness of the invasion, or whether Iraq did or did not have WMD. These are the wrong questions for the argument I'm making here. The point is that Iraq was in violation of international law, and the international community was unwilling and/or unable to do anything to enforce its own rules. When those violations threaten the national security of another member state, and the hegemon in particular, that state will very likely do what it believes must be done if the UN will...

...does not — following the Afghanistan appeals judgment — have to present the PTC with information regarding complementarity. So it makes sense that when a state uses Art. 18 to challenge either a referred investigation or a proprio motu investigation, the OTP must prove to the PTC that, in fact, it does have a reasonable basis for its belief that the state is either unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate. It is possible, of course, that a higher standard of proof applies to Art. 18 authorization requests. The chapter on...

...and the room stood silent for a few more uncomfortable moments. Uribe’s presentation made emphasis on what it called Ecuador’s lack of interest in contributing to Colombia’s security, criticising it for not taking action against FARC activities in its territory. He read a series of emails and classified information that allegedly proved a secret friendship between the Correa administration and the FARC, hinting that such a relationship made it impossible for Colombia to engage in cooperation with Ecuador in criminal matters. In short, Uribe was stating that Ecuador was unwilling...