Search: unwilling or unable

...recognises that while “[i]t remains the rule that States have primary responsibility to exercise jurisdiction over serious crimes under international law,” where national courts are unwilling or unable to provide justice “international and internationalized criminal tribunals may exercise concurrent jurisdiction.” Arguably the most consequential of the Principles against Impunity are Principles 22 to 30, which set out that “States should adopt and enforce safeguards against any abuse of rules such as those pertaining to prescription, amnesty, right to asylum, refusal to extradite, non bis in idem, due obedience, official immunities,...

...use force in the territory of another state must have that other state’s consent, unless they are responsible for the actual, ongoing, or imminent threat. It is highly unlikely that Afghanistan’s Taliban government consented to the US’s strike on al-Zawahiri as they publicly denounced the strike. The US has recognized a policy of not seeking consent from such a state if they are unwilling or unable to prevent or address the threat, yet this approach is widely debated and employed by a vast minority of states. (see here and here)....

...subsidiarity…. [T]he principle of non-intervention in the affairs of another country must be observed; investigating international crimes committed abroad is permissible only if the country with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to prosecute and only if the investigation is confined to the territory of the investigating state. Simply put, we may not investigate or prosecute international crimes in breach of considerations of complementarity and subsidiarity. The second is that there must be “anticipated presence” of the suspect in South Africa (p. 35): The second limiting principle is practicability. Before our...

...migrants or drugs towards the US but there is no evidence to that effect, and any move to an “unwilling or unable” standard would end up producing an entirely bloated sense of third states’ obligations towards one’s borders. The US border, then, precisely because the US is sovereign, is for the US to police. If the US wants to protect its borders it should, under international law and precisely because it is a sovereign state, do so at its own expense. One way of thinking of this is as the...

...to bear for a relaxation of the jus ad bellum—claims in favor of preventative self-defense and the unwilling or unable doctrine similarly tried to undermine the standards relating to the scale, gravity, attribution, and imminence of armed attacks as the triggering condition for self-defense. All of these efforts have in one way or another sought to alter the nature or timing of the acts that successfully trigger the right of self-defense. The imminent launch of a geoengineering effort that is thought likely to risk catastrophic climate consequences may not fit...

...own nationals when they are faced with imminent destruction in another state. For instance, if the local state is unwilling or unable to counter a terrorist attack against foreigners on its territory or even supports the outrage, their home state may mount a rescue operation if their very lives are in imminent danger. This was the case in the Entebbe mission mounted by Israel against Uganda in 1976. Other cases concern situations where local order has broken down and foreigners are subject to deliberate and systematic attack by rebel movements...

...(ICCPR). Alexandra Lily Kather and Anne Schroeter provided a gendered critique in two parts (here and here) of the German Federal Public Prosecutor’s strategy towards detaining, investigating, and prosecuting returning female ISIL members, which represents the broader challenges facing other EU member states. Srinivas Burra book-ended the week nicely by returning to the discussion of the legal implications of the recent India-Pakistan military standoff, with a particular focus on the “unwilling or unable” test vis-à-vis the exercise of self-defense. Many thanks to our guest contributors and have a great week!...

...Penal Code and Republic Act No. 9851, Duterte could have been prosecuted domestically. However, there have been no substantive efforts to hold him accountable under these statutes, reinforcing the ICC’s assessment under the ‘unwilling or unable’ standard (Article 17, Rome Statute). Rather than seeing a reckoning through its own courts, the Philippine government essentially deferred the problem to the ICC. This is a familiar pattern in global justice, a phenomenon of states ‘outsourcing’ their problems to international institutions. Instead of dealing with the messy realities of prosecuting a powerful figure...

...“unwilling or unable” to do so. Art. 17 Sect. 2 states: In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified...

...(Ongwen and Ntaganda) to the court for prosecution, while at the same time insulating its nationals from investigations and prosecutions by the Court. There is absolutely no harm for any state that ratifies the Rome statute unless the state does not intend to investigate and prosecute its nationals when they commit Rome statute crimes. The ICC as a court of last resort will not investigate nationals of a state party unless the domestic system is either unwilling or unable to do so. If and only if the US fulfils its...

...strip ISIL fighters from their US citizenship, and Kevin responded to a post by Mike Lewis over at Just Security on the application of the “unwilling or unable” test in the context of article 51 UN Charter. Finally, Jessica wrapped up the news and I listed events and announcements. We’re running an insta-symposium on the Scottish independence referendum next week, and are still welcoming submissions. If you saw last week’s announcement by Matrix Chambers, you may want to take note that the deadline has been extended. Have a nice weekend!...

...warranted and that charges against Bemba are appropriate, the DRC would have the opportunity to challenge admissibility on the ground that, inter alia, it intends to investigate his case itself. If it did, Art. 17 would require the ICC to defer to the DRC unless it concluded that “the State [was] unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation” — i.e., was only asserting jurisdiction in order to shield Bemba from criminal responsibility. Given that Bemba is the DRC’s vice-president and is currently running for president, it is quite...