Search: unwilling or unable

...segue to the issue for which I tried to lay a foundation in my second post, namely whether or in what circumstances a state can legally take preventive military action unsanctioned by the Security Council against non-state terrorists residing in another country. By “legally” I mean within the UN Charter paradigm. Roger writes that I am “equivocal” about the case where the potential target state is either unwilling or unable to act at the request of the state at risk from the terrorists. Perhaps it would be more precise to...

...Two significant developments occurred during the first days of the Barcelona meeting. First, the African group announced in the Kyoto Protocol track that it was unwilling to continue further negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol rules (for example, addressing credits for land-use activities), until the completion of work on new emissions targets for developed countries for post-2012. Since developed countries are unwilling to do so except as part of a final political deal in Copenhagen, the African group demand brought the Kyoto Protocol negotiations to a standstill. Why the African group...

...international law has historically been thought to permit” with regard to the use of force, she links almost exclusively to UK practice. (The one exception is “unwilling or unable,” where she refers to the flawed Chachko/Deeks post that tries to categorise state positions on the doctrine.) The legal questions are, of course, interesting. But what I find most problematic about Ingber’s post is its most basic assumption: namely, that the international community has failed to do more in Syria because UHI is not legal. That assumption, I think, is categorically...

...a perception that the international community including the CoE was unwilling or unable to address the suffering of the civilian populations. This is not an entirely fair assessment of the CoE’s position, though from the outside it is difficult to know the full extent of diplomatic and other efforts pursued. Confidentiality is fundamental to human rights diplomacy, and it can be a strength, creating the space for dialogue and building trust amongst parties. However, it must be balanced by transparency in the public interest. What is known is that several...

...golden thread. This allows the author to limit (e.g., interventions to counter terrorism (pages 102-3)) or cut (e.g., the unwilling or unable test under the right to collective self-defense) discussion of secondary legal issues, while ensuring that the reader does not lose sight of the overarching message. Interestingly, and admirably, the book also devotes its entire first part to sketching a historical evolution of the concepts at the heart of this topic: sovereignty, (non-)intervention and human rights. She approvingly quotes the great Antonio Cassese to explain why: A still photograph...

...bed. When asked to describe the room, he said that it was not important. There is much that is disturbing in the report, not least how quickly Gaddafi’s attitude toward his captivity and future prospects changed once the Libyan prosecutor left the room. It seems clear that he is not being treated well by his captors and that the Libyan government has been unwilling or unable to provide him with even minimal due process. Either way, his treatment does not bode well for him receiving a fair trial in Libya....

...is irreconcilable with the text, context, and drafting history of the Article. Properly understood, Article 17 permits the Court to find a State “unwilling or unable” only if its legal proceedings are designed to make a perpetrator more difficult to convict; if its legal proceedings make the perpetrator easier to convict by denying him due process, the Article requires the Court to defer to the State no matter how unfair those proceedings may be. Part III illustrates the potentially devastating consequences of Article 17’s unidirectionality by examining Sudan ’s recent...

...hand wringing is the increased role of the CIA in paramilitary (or even traditional military) activities. The criticism often heard is that the CIA has strayed far from its original mission as an intelligence agency and is now deploying force in areas of the world where the U.S. is unwilling or unable to publicly acknowledge its use of force. The current proposal for a Defense Clandestine Service involves the exact opposite. Instead of the CIA getting involved in military activities, this time it is the Defense Department getting involved in...

...in relation to the 9/11 terror attacks, implicitly identified the right of self-defence against the Al-Qaeda, an NSA functioning out of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the right of self-defence against an NSA, by means of cross-border use of force, has received international acceptance (specifically, USA, Israel, Russia, Turkey) in the event that the host State is unwilling or unable to effectively deal with the threat posed by the NSA. India also seems to have relied on this justification by seeking to establish the unwillingness or inability on the part of Pakistan in...

...Here, let us assume the crew has neither chosen to leave the ship nor made an affirmative action of surrender. Although para 1571 of the updated commentary suggests “[n]o active ‘capture’ is necessary,” the enemy certainly seems to have captured the ship, and if the crew is unwilling or unable to abandon the captured ship, are they also captured? The updated commentary makes no further definition, which is understandable. Capture without the physical presence of the enemy is a novel concept with few, if any, analogies. One analogy is the...

...exists if an armed attack against a State is imminent. It is also a matter of fierce debate whether a right of self-defence exists in case of a non-State armed attack and whether it may justify forcible defensive action on the territory of another State. An arguable case can be made that such a right exists where a State is either unwilling or unable to prevent a non-State group from conducting a large-scale cross-border armed attack from the territory of that State – under strict conditions of proportionality. Even on...

...maintained by practice, providing resilient background understandings concerning the parameters for legal interaction and legal argumentation. They are a “real-world sociological phenomenon,” to borrow Monica’s term. As such, they enable not only the identification of legal norms, in this case CIL. They also provide a concrete explanation of why it is not the case that “anything goes.” In the context of the “unwilling or unable” standard for self-defence against non-state actors, for example, norms that fall short of the requirements of legality are likely to struggle to emerge as CIL....