Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response

...the two requirements of CIL. On the other hand, a vague definition runs the risk of being empty rhetoric that does not require the World Bank to do much of anything, let alone out of a sense of legal obligation. Sarfaty concludes her response by asking whether one should distinguish between legal internalization and social or political internalization. My answer, both here and in the article, is an emphatic “yes,” and the current requirements of CIL provide the place for us to look to discern whether a moral norm has...

Eugene has graciously responded to my earlier post; you can find his new post here. It’s well worth a read. I just want to offer a few thoughts on Eugene’s response, because I think it fails to address the core of my critique: that it is incorrect to claim, as Eugene did in his first post, that Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is based on the idea that “minors are not really responsible for their actions.” I argued that, on the contrary, Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death...

...letter was a sufficient response to very serious allegations made against the Australian government by one of its own MPs. As I’ve tried to show in this post, the OTP’s analysis of those allegations is factually deficient and legally questionable. But perhaps that’s why the response is so cursory. A more searching analysis, one that took seriously the damning facts in our communication to the OTP, would almost certainly have concluded that the Australian government is responsible for a wide variety of crimes against humanity on Nauru and Manus Island....

...spread of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV due to widespread demands for unsafe sex practices during pornography production are not discussed by Boyce. Nor are the high rates of substance abuse and suicide among performers. He does not engage with any of the scholarly work on this subject at all, nor even the cultural evidence (he could have consulted one of a number of scholarly works, including Sheila Jeffrey’s new book, The Industrial Vagina ). The late (and much missed) David Foster Wallace devoted a chapter of his book Consider...

Kevin and I have still never met in person, but we’ve already had our first twitter encounter last week on the legality of a U.S. military response to the attacks that killed the U.S. Ambassador in Libya (as well as three other Americans). Although the news reports on the attacks are not exactly clear, some have suggested that there is no Al Qaeda link to the groups behind the Benghazi attacks. This does suggest a new wrinkle to the legal analysis of any U.S. military response. First, under domestic American...

be strictly and narrowly interpreted, the Court warned that the lawfulness of COVID-19 response measures “do[es] not depend on how laudable … they are”. This judgment makes it clear that expansion of executive powers in response to COVID-19 must be regulated to ensure that they are not misused, and that courts should where necessary intervene to ensure executive compliance with the rule of law. Government response to COVID-19 in Namibia When the first cases of COVID-19 were confirmed in Namibia on 14 March 2020, the Government began to take measures...

I am very grateful to Professors Mitu Gulati and Sarah Ludington for the wealth of information they have gathered about the life of Alexander Sack, the Russian legal scholar who penned the doctrine of odious debts, in their article “A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts.” I have taken note of the authors’ view that an inadvertent error was made by Michael Hoeflich, whom I cited in my book, Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World’s Environmental Legacy. I will amend the online...

...therefore may not be interrupted by the coastal State based on such passage being non-innocent; but second, that coastal States could potentially interrupt such vessels as a lawful countermeasure under the law of State responsibility. This response will engage with the first argument on the interpretation of “innocent” passage in Article 19 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Specifically, in contrast to Cavalcanti de Mello Filho’s interpretation of Article 19(2)(a) UNCLOS, I argue that any threats or use of force in violation of...

Normally, we post our conference announcements weekly, but we just got word of one tomorrow that’s worth flagging. The British Institute of International and Comparative law (BIICL) will be holding a Rapid Response Seminar tomorrow, September 11, from 4-6 pm to discuss ‘Humanitarian Intervention, International Law and Syria’. As the title suggests, the conversation will discuss whether humanitarian intervention falls within the corpus of international law and, if so, whether it can be applied to the current Syrian situation. Robert McCorquodale (BIICL) will chair the panel, with scheduled speakers including...

I would like to thank Kathy Stone for commenting on my Article and agreeing to participate in this symposium. She has sharply characterized the main arguments of my paper and made two very helpful criticisms. Both of these are great prods for future work. Let me respond to each of these suggestions in turn. Stone is right that I devoted most of my attention analyzing Doing Business’ main agenda, which I called substantive flexibility: increasing employers’ ability to fire, hire, and set working conditions, thereby decreasing employers overall labor costs....

In the first part of my response to Bobby, I argued (after meandering around a bit) that Title 50’s “fifth function” provision cannot be used to authorise the CIA to kill Americans overseas — a necessary condition of any argument that the CIA is entitled to a public-authority justification with regard to 18 USC 1119, the foreign-murder statute. (Bobby kindly responds here.) I thus ended that post by asking where else that authority might be found. Which brings me to the second argument Bobby makes: namely, that the President’s authority...

...ad bellum appraisal of NATO’s conduct as humanitarian intervention influenced our in bello appraisal of how it conducted the military campaign. 2. In terms of the evidence: I suggest that the DA has been misconstrued or misapplied, sometimes deliberately, but more often subconsciously or tacitly—in part because of natural self-serving biases. I doubt that any belligerent would openly claim that the justice of its cause relieves it of or relaxes the in bello constraints under which it must conduct warfare (although, notably, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and others, in...